
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TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS
No. 1331



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METHOD SUGGESTED FOR CONSERVING FLIGHT RESOURCES

Mcscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Nov 77 p 2

[Article by Gds Sr Lt V. Chernobrovkin, military navigator 2d class: "Is the Maneuver Economical?..."]

[Text] One of the important commitments accepted by military collectives in socialist competition is the point concerning conservation of the military equipment and economy of fuel and lubricants. By accomplishing this task the fighting men are also fulfilling a regulation in Article 61 of the Basic Law, which speaks of the USSR citizens' duty to handle the people's property with care.

We military airmen in the transport squadron are contributing what we can to the national cause of making efficient use of resources. With respect to conservation of aircraft fuel, however, I feel that there are still many unutilized reserves.

Various, sometimes acceptable, suggestions have been made concerning this matter. It has been recommended, for example, that fuel be conserved by waiting longer to lower the landing gear. I myself can see another way of economizing — improvement of maneuvering techniques in the airfield zone. There are possibilities for accomplishing this. Take, for example, the "large box" flight pattern for making the landing circle. This flight covers a fairly long route and includes four turns. Is this landing pattern always necessary at all airfields, however? Of course not. In many cases it can be successfully replaced with a more economical maneuver — two 180° turns. This would reduce the aircraft flight time by more than a minute. And if this is done by the entire squadron for an entire shift? Obviously, the total would now involve tens of minutes. The amount of fuel consumed in an hour for the flight of a modern transport aircraft totals tons of high-quality fuel.

And this does not even take into account the time lost on the turns, nor possible deviations from the calculated route parameters. And these almost always occur: after all, there is no such thing as ideal or identical flight

conditions. We could also save in the patterns followed in the dispersal of the flight groups, for the arrival of the crews from the ranges and routes, and straight—in landings. And not just seconds but entire minutes. There is a way of coming in for a landing without approaching the far homing station. It is called "landing from the descent starting line." Employment of this method provides a considerable economy of time and fuel.

In short, if we think about it, we can find possibilities for conserving aircraft equipment service life and time by performing more efficient maneuvering for the landing approach.

HELICOPTER UNIT TASKS AND TRAINING ACTIVITIES CONSIDERED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Nov 77 p 2

[Article by Maj A. Yurkin: "The Routes of Salimgareyev"]

[Excerpts] The helicopter hovered above the canyon. A mountain river shimmered like a silvery thread below, and alongside, the sharp points of green fir trees stretched toward the sky. Another time crew commander Captain Rinad Salimgareyev would have admired the beauty of this mighty ridge. Right now, however, every minute was precious. People who had suffered a disaster were awaiting him in this densely forested mountain region. It was to rescue them that the crew had come.

Helicopter crews have to perform every sort of mission imaginable. During exercises, they attack tanks, land troops, serve as spotters for artillery fire, support communications and transport cargo. Salimgareyev's crew had done all of this. They would no doubt remember this sortee into the mountains longer than anything else, however.

At the emergency airfield, where the crew had arrived in the night, they had checked the helicopter once more and refueled it. At dawn, they had taken off and followed a reconnaissance aircraft to the designated area. Cliffs towered on all sides. The plane made several circles above the canyon. "Search in this area," the pilot directed them, and then headed for its base.

To an observer it might have appeared that the helicopter had become disoriented or lacked the power to rise out of the canyon. It appeared to rummage through the mountain folds, now rising to the peaks, now descending to the foaming waters of the mountain stream. The crew lost count of the long, difficult and complex tasks. Finally, they spotted the people. It would not be a simple matter to take them on board, however. The thin air and the sharp gusts of wind from the passes made the complicated work of piloting even more difficult.

"Heading for a landing!" the commander announced the decision.

The helicopter landed on a tiny spot near a bend in the rushing river. The officers calculated the fuel requirements, discarded everything which was not essential, and, having lightened the machine, rose once again to the mountain peak. Evacuation of the people began. Each of them had to strap himself into a sling and be lifted on board by means of a winch.

Following the performance of this responsible mission Communist Captain Salimgareyev, military pilot 1st class and commander of a helicopter flight, was warmly congratulated by his friends and promoted to major.

As a youth, Rinad had dreamed of flying high, to the stars. He wanted to become a military pilot — — and he became one. The altitudes at which he has to fly are relatively small, to be sure, but he has reached high pinnacles of combat skill.

Salimgareyev endeavors to increase his knowledge and improve his skills in order to handle the equipment like a professional, like a master. He frequently trains the men with practical demonstrations. Nothing is as effective in the aviation as the personal example.

At the firing range, during the free-flight rocket firing practice, the flight commander was able to destroy the target with the first salvo, under extremely difficult conditions. Later that day, all of the flight crews received excellent scores. Good results were also achieved in subsequent night firing practice.

Having fired past midnight, Rinad Galeyevich was observing his men. A helicopter set out toward the black wall of a forest. This was Senior Lieutenant M. Kadyrov leaving for the firing range. The navigation lights on the aircraft were soon lost among the constellations.

A light blue flash flared up in the distance. The rockets rushed toward the target. Kadyrov landed soon after that. Young and full of life, he could not hold back his impressions from the attack. The pilots listened to him, and the commander observed him with admiration. Years of flying bonded them together. Nor had there been a lack of difficult tests. Once, during a flight, Kadyrov hit an electric power pole with his landing gear and made a forced landing.

The law of flying is strict: a pilot committing such an error is forbidden to fly! And so, one of the best graduates of a higher military air school for pilots became a ground specialist... Kadyrov settled into his new position rapidly, but he lived in the hope that he would soon take over the control of a rotary-wing machine once again. The days passed, however, and the miracle was not forthcoming...

The flight commander was sick at heart for his subordinate and reproached himself for not having noticed that the impetuous Muslim was not always circumspect. Bitter as it was, however, Rinad Galeyevich said firmly: "Let him ramain on the ground for awhile: mistakes in the air are too costly...".

Considerable time passed before the officer was again permitted to fly... Senior Lieutenant M. Kadyrov rapidly "regained his form" and won the respect of his comrades. That summer, he and Captain A. Miroshkin were already performing difficult missions in the mountains. These communists performed the missions brilliantly.

Major R. Salimgareyev's flight is now known as a party collective. All of the members are communists. Captain V. Morozov is a member of the squadron party bureau. Officer M. Kadyrov is a party group organizer. Based on the results of the anniversary year, the collective of communists holds first place in the squadron in all areas. Commitments accepted in honor of the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution have been fulfilled ahead of schedule.

And this summer was an extremely intense one for the helicopter crew members. They flew in all sorts of weather, in the daytime and at night, over difficult routes, and above those sites where Salimgareyev had once helped the builders of the Tyumen'—Surgut railway. What was there that the aviators had not done!? They had hauled food and construction materials. And everything had been accomplished rapidly and without hitches. They flew with the maximum load, as a rule, and had to take off and land on small areas the size of postage stamps, built, most frequently, on swamps. They flew above a clearing axed out by the construction workers. It served as their only landmark in the shoreless sea of taiga and monotonous swamps. When the clearing was locked in with fog or concealed by a snowstorm, the crews had a hard time. It was especially difficult for the pilot—navigators.

"We have passed the Big Dipper. Ahead lies the Little Dipper," the crew would joke as they flew in the North.

They joked despite their extreme fatigue and the hazy gloom hanging above the swamps, the tundra and taiga. They say that in the aviation, without humor, the engines stop. This is where Rinad learned the art of flying and navigation, memorizing the map of the heavens and learning to orient himself by the stars. He listened carefully to the accounts of the seasoned Northerners about the peculiarities of local conditions. The skill acquired in the harsh North later helped him to orient himself rapidly, while flying above the mountains or over desert terrain.

Now, whenever a crew is about to take off on an especially important mission, it goes to Major R. Salimgareyev for advice: he has flown here, and he knows it all. Such missions are most frequently assigned to the crew headed by this extremely experienced pilot, however. The commander is then fully confident that there will be no failure, no matter how difficult the conditions.

TRAINING ACTIVITIES IN OUTSTANDING TANK REGIMENT DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Nov 77 p 1

[Article by Lt Col A.Zakharenko, Red Banner Belorussian Military District: "The Degree of Dependability"]

[Text] The tank regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel V. Dubynin was the first in the district at the beginning of the past training year to support the initiative of the Carpathian fighting men and launch a campaign for a fitting reception for the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The tankmen fulfilled their socialist commitments entirely and made the regiment one of the outstanding. Based on the results of the anniversary training year, every third fighting man in the unit [chast] became an expert, and everyone slated to become a class specialist, did so. A total of 78 percent of the specialists achieved a higher rating. In the final test, regiment personnel demonstrated a high level of technical training, thorough knowledge and skillful mastery of the equipment and weapons.

A delegation of veterans visited the regiment on the eve of the final test. Observing the actions of the combat vehicle crews in the tank firing, driving, and tactical exercises, front-line driver-mechanic Hero of the Soviet Union Viktor Antonovich Grigor'yev had this to say about the modern tanks:

"Dependable equipment ... ".

One could probably say nothing more to the point about the machines which the fighting men of the regiment have to master today. A great deal has changed since that time at the front. The equipment has been perfected, which means that it is more dependable in combat.

I had the opportunity to be present at a tactical exercise involving field firing, in which the battalion commanded by Captain A. Ponomarev was performing. At the signal to attack, an avalanche of steel rushed toward the "enemy," which,

it appeared, had foreseen everything. According to its calculations, the terrain should slow down the rate of attack and simplify the battle with the oncoming tanks. This did not occur, however. We did not see a single tank reduce speed or come to a halt, even where this appeared simply inevitable. The maneuverability and firing efficiency of the subunits [podrazdeleniya] were also good.

Relatively recently, however, one would have observed an entirely different scene in such situations, although the vehicles were the same and the personnel, especially the officers, were, with few exceptions, the same. Just what had changed?

"Our approach to the study of the equipment and weapons," Lieutenant Colonel V. Dubynin, officer in charge of the exercise, told us in brief.

Elaborating on his statement, he told us further that the combat dependability of the equipment lay not in its structural features alone, but also in the ability of the officers and all the personnel to employ the machines capabilities properly. The hours of theoretical classes and training specified by the plan proved inadequate for achieving perfection. It was necessary to seek additional reserves. And they were found. First of all, it was recommended that the subunit commanders conduct all combat training classes, without exception, in inseparable unity with the study and practical employment of the equipment and weapons.

Take the tank gumnery exercises, for example. Their main purpose is naturally that of training the personnel accurately to destroy targets. This is not an easy task in itself. Would there be any point in complicating it further? A different approach was taken in the regiment, however. The effectiveness of the tank guns depends not only on the ability to detect targets and make correct computations. It is also determined by the driver-mechanic's ability to move over any sort of terrain, to overcome obstacles, to utilize the machine's power and speed. Practical work on the equipment became a mandatory part of each training session.

This is how it was done in the battalion led by Captain A. Ponomarev, for example. Before setting about the firing tasks, the crews arriving for an exercise were familiarized with the tactical situation and were assigned concrete tasks, including preparation of the equipment for combat. The general inspection of the tanks by the specialists and the performance of other operations increased the knowledge and practical skills of the fighting men.

The situation was the same in the firing practice engaged in by the subunits. Reminding them of the fact that the successful accomplishment of missions on the battlefield is inconceivable without an excellent knowledge of all tank instruments and equipment on the part of the crews, Captain A. Zavertanyy, commander of an excellent company, for example, worked out a large number of operations involving the equipment for each field firing exercise. Before moving the combat vehicles to the firing line in the last practice firing of

standard shells, for example, the subunit soldiers had to make practical preparations for the operation of the engine and practiced using the evacuation facilities. Competing for complete interchangeability, the crew members performed difficult operations on the clutch and epicyclic steering unit, tightened the tracks and replaced track pins, worked on the norms for readying the observation and sighting devices for combat, and refueled the tanks using individual equipment.

In the driving practice, along with negotiating difficult routes, the tankmen competed in setting up the mine-clearing tank attachments, prepared the machines for negotiating water barriers, and using the self-recovery equipment.

In short, there were no exercises in the regiment in which the tankmen did not perform the entire groups of tasks involved in the technical servicing of the combat vehicles. An evaluation system developed there, simple in form, but proven effective in the methodological sense, contributed to the high level of effectiveness of those exercises. Under the direction of Major N. Kokhov, deputy regimental commander for technical affairs, Majors M. Starovoytov and V. Shakin, Captain I. Berdnik and other officers worked up nearly 40 operational charts, which include all of the main types of work involving a tank and the normative time for their performance.

This permits the commanders unerringly to determine the extent of the knowledge and skills which each soldier must possess and to adhere to an overall, progressive set of methods for teaching the equipment and its use.

The combining of all classes with technical training required changes in the system of preparing the officers for them. Problems of planning and organizing comprehensive exercises were worked out and unified methods were mastered in the process of commander's training, at a special technical conference and during preparation of the officers for their examinations. These call for the inclusion in the plan outlines of theoretical and practical classes with the men, as well as physical and technical supporting data for the operation of the tank armament and instruments. The better trained officers performed the essential calculations for this in individual assignments.

The subunit technical groups played a large role in the mastery of the equipment and weapons. Their classes were coordinated by the deputy battalion commanders for technical affairs and were set up so as to fill in gaps in the specialists training. The groups directed by Senior Lieutenant V. Romanov, Lieutenant Ye. Boroda and Warrant Officer [praporshchik] V. Filippov worked especially productively.

The tankmen passed the final check, the main test of the anniversary training year, with honor. The soldiers were inspired by the success. Personnel in the regiment are filled with resolve to take new heights of combat skill in the forthcoming training year by applying the experience of the best subunits.

PARTY WORK CREDITED FOR AVIATION SQUADRON'S OUTSTANDING RATING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Nov 77 p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Vorob'yev: "In a Self-Critical and Serious Manner"]

[Text] A half hour remained before the beginning of the report—and—election meeting of the party organization in the squadron commanded by Captain I. Goncharov, but the Lenin room was already filled with people. The attention of those gathered was drawn to the poster: "It is the duty of the Armed Forces of the USSR to the people to reliably defend the socialist homeland, to be in a constant state of combat readiness insuring the immediate repelling of any aggressor." This statement taken from the Constitution of the USSR is familiar and understandable to every communist, to every fighting man in the subunit [podrazdeleniye]. The airmen worked well this past training year. All of the airmen became 1st— or 2d—class specialists. A full 70 percent of the specialists in the aviation engineering service also have a high rating, and a fourth of the officer—technicians have become masters. A total of 80 percent of the aircraft have been judged excellent. The number of experts in combat and political training and rated athletes has grown considerably. The squadron has reclaimed its excellent title.

The squadron lost its high rating last year. The reasons for this were thoroughly analyzed, and a great deal of criticism was addressed to the party organization. What has changed in its work during the report period?

"A great deal has changed," said Captain Goncharov. "First of all, we began tying party work in more closely with the combat training tasks. And I derived a lesson for myself. I relied on the initiative and assistance of the communists for organizing the training process and socialist competition and in the indoctrinational work. In short, the party bureau helped me throughout."

Following are a few examples. At the beginning of the training year, many airmen committed themselves to raise their rating by the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The party bureau found its own ways of promoting the successful accomplishment of this task. It constantly inquired

about the fulfillment of commitments and came to the timely assistance of those comrades who, for some reason, began to fall behind in this or that stage of training. The communists took every opportunity to maintain a spirit of comradeliness and mutual assistance in the collective. Captain I. Klimov, for example, was not successful in the precision dive bombing, and it was decided that V. Sirota, master of tactical employment, would assist him. Sirota talked with the pilot and studied the objective control data, and the error was found. They performed several training sessions together, after which Klimov began destroying the targets accurately.

It was noticed once, at the height of combat training, that certain pilots were approaching the target at a great altitude and were not maneuvering properly, failing to take "enemy" counteraction into account. This was a paradox: none of the aviators was a proponent of laxity, but this is what was occurring. After consulting with the commander, they judged it expedient to discuss this matter at the next party meeting. It was concluded that one of the causes lay in the inadequate objectiveness with which the performance of exercises in combat employment were evaluated. If the pilot was able to destroy the target, then consideration was sometimes not given to the speed of the attack and the maneuvering. Serious conclusions were drawn from the discussion at the party meeting by the commander, the officers placed in charge of flights to the firing range, and all of the communists. Intolerance of the slightest manifestations of laxity became more perceptible in the collective, which could not help being reflected in the level of pilot training. The squadron received an excellent rating for the next tactical flight exercises.

The party bureau worked constantly to increase the effectiveness of socialist competition. It skillfully channeled the patriotic enthusiasm evoked in the men by preparations for the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and by the discussion and adoption of the new Constitution of the USSR toward the achievement of good training results. Competition for the title of best specialist of the anniversary year was thoroughly supported and developed. These matters were regularly analyzed at party bureau meetings, and the activists provided extensive publicity for the competition in visual agitation, photographic reports and special news releases. Meetings were arranged with those out front in the training.

It was noted at the report—and—election meeting that most of the steps taken to improve the organization of competition, the training process and indoc—trinational work were suggested by the communists. And it is very important that a situation of party concern for the job and a friendly, creative quest for reserves was created. Also very important is the fact that initiative culminated in practical work, that it was carried to the point of a concrete result.

The squadron party bureau remembered this and attempted to support every valuable initiative. Captain of Technical Service V. Pavlenko, for example, suggested organizing competition among the subunit's rationalizers. His suggestion was supported, and practical steps were outlined. Pavlenko himself

made three rationalization proposals, and his example was followed by many aircraft technicians and mechanics. The result — many new stands and devices came into being, which made it possible to conduct the classes more effect—ively, to improve the quality and reduce the time required for servicing the equipment.

In short, the party organization has accomplished a great deal. As they analyzed what they had accomplished at their report—and—election meeting, however, the communists spoke of their successes with modesty and demonstrated greatest concern for the work ahead. The accountability report was filled with criticism of deficiencies in the work, a feeling of dissatisfaction with the achievements and a desire to reveal and efficiently utilize existing reserves.

Captain N. Kolbanov, party bureau secretary, stated in the report that the party organization had utilized far from all of the possibilities for increasing its influence on the combat training and indoctrination of the personnel. There were no serious preconditions for flight accidents in the squadron, but the secretary stressed the fact that this should in no case result in complacency. The speaker and the communists addressing the meeting criticized members of their organization N. Krasnokutskiy, S. Mordasov and V. Grigor'yev, who had violated the requirements set forth in documents regulating flight work. It was pointed out that the party bureau itself was not always prompt in applying a high level of demandingness to those comrades with deficiencies in their work.

The matter of demandingness was sharply discussed more than once in the meeting. Cases were recalled in which certain comrades had ignored so-called "petty" violations of discipline on the part of colleagues, and it was pointed out that the party bureau had not always evaluated cases of nonregulation relations among servicemen from a position of principle, and had not been persistent enough in helping the commander to introduce progressive experience in indoctrinational work and to structure it in a comprehensive manner.

It is perhaps natural that the apathy of certain comrades and the inadequacy of steps taken to motivate them would be discussed so sharply in a collective in which the communists demonstrate good initiative. Those speaking in the discussion pointed out to the party bureau that it made unsatisfactory use of the proven forms of work — the hearing of reports and accounts from communists at bureau sessions and party meetings, and individual talks. They saw this as one of the reasons why there are party members alongside the active comrades, who fulfill party assignments without proper initiative and do not demonstrate creativity in their work. In this respect, serious criticism was leveled at communist A. Titenko.

Appraising the work of the party bureau and their own work in a demanding manner, the communists attempted to look ahead, to see the future, to outline ways of making the party influence on the training and service of the personnel more effective.

Deep and clear are the impressions left by these festive days, by such an exciting event as the joint, formal meeting dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, at which Comrade Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev delivered a report. The squadron communists are now performing a great deal of work to clarify materials of that triumphant meeting in Moscow. They are filled with desire to lead their collective to higher levels of combat readiness.

METHODS OF IMPROVING INDOCTRINATIONAL WORK DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Nov 77 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen V. Rodin, member of the military council and chief of the Red Banner Turkestan Military District Political Directorate: "Raising Organizers"]

[Text] Serious omissions in the organization of the training process have begun to appear for some time in the N-skiy unit. The effectiveness of the indoctrinational work conducted in the collective has also been lowered.

It was decided that the political directorate would listen to a report from Lt Col Ye. Nagornov, the unit political worker.

He said: "We do not have enough organizers. I must do almost everything myself...."

The lieutenant colonel requested that he be supported by having the cadre organs reinforce the troop unit with "real organizers". At first glance the request may seem simple and sound. However, in this case we knew that a steady negative tendency had been observed and that a certain "cadre position" had been detected with which it was impossible to agree in any way. Where should cadre be raised and experience accumulated if not in the thick of life and in the practical work of subunits and units?

Unfortunately, in this unit they had buried this important truth in oblivion and had relaxed concern for having leaders at all levels master the job entrusted to them better and more thoroughly so that their ability would be continually improved, including experience in organizing ideological activity and the indoctrinational process. Speaking figuratively, it was necessary to call for help. A characteristic trait was that Lieutenant Colonel Nagornov was not able to say to whom he would entrust the carrying out of his duties in case of necessity.

We could not fail to be interested in how the combined approach to organizing personal indoctrination was taking root. Lieutenant Colonel Nagornov and the analysis conducted by political directorate officers testified that this was

being resolved slowly -- primarily because many in the unit had a very superficial idea of the essence of a combined approach and the method for translating it into reality.

These and similar facts again and again recall the necessity to instill organizer skills in all who participate in the ideological indoctrination of the troops.

Today, propagandists are required to diversify the ways they participate in agitation and propaganda work; not to limit themselves to lectures and reports; to participate in Leninist readings and classes, public youth debates, evening get-togethers on various subjects, oral magazines, etc.; and not only to appear at a particular event but to help prepare for it. Any collective leader must be concerned about increasing the indoctrinational role of socialist competition. It is impossible to specifically list all those times in indoctrination when your organizational art is required. The regimental commander and the platoon commander, the subunit political worker and the party group organizer, the leader of the political class group and the company's master sergeant— each one of them not only appears before the people but also thinks about the system for indoctrinational measures, trains aktivists, constantly encounters the need to give them advice and help in implementing their creative plans, and mobilizes the collective for the best performance of assigned tasks.

In other words, there is no profession or position in the army which is free of ideological work. It is impossible not to emphasize that the indoctrinational work of each officer and warrant officer [prapeshchik] is being filled even more with organizational work elements. Teaching organizational ability is a task of paramount importance.

This requirement of the 25th CPSU Congress was emphasized with new vigor in the decree of the party's Central Committee: "On the CPSU Orskiy Gorkom's Implementation of a Combined Resolution of Ideological and Indoctrinational Work Questions." We find fundamental instructions in it: to see that a leader at any level also takes indoctrinational aspects into consideration in his practices, to organize the systematic training of cadres and the aktiv in methods for a composite approach to ideological work, and to arm them with the best experience and a knowledge of the scientific foundations of political indoctrination. For us, all this is straightforward guidance for actions.

One cannot fail to consider that a policy for advancement to basic command, political and engineer-technical positions for young prospective officers is being actively carried out during recent years. They have high theoretical training but do not always possess sufficient organizational experience. Therefore, as was emphasized during the scientific and practical conference of leading army and navy political workers, party concern for their formation and indoctrination is one of the most important tasks of military councils, commanders, staffs, and political organs. We are talking about the formation of indoctrinational skills in the young leaders.

Experience has more than once proven that, if a young officer arrives in a unit where problems in training all categories of leaders and the entire agitation propaganda aktiv are thoroughly solved—all the more if he is apprenticed to a skillful and experienced senior comrade—he starts service with confidence and becomes a thoroughly capable indoctrinator. That this is so is corroborated by the way our best commanders, political workers and non— T/O propagandists are formed. Let us take Maj Gen I. Tokarev, Lt Col V. Mironov and A. Khanin, and Maj O. Shakhmardanov. They are good propagandists and know how to captivate people with a passionate word. Along with this, they are excellent organizers. The roots of their skill go back to their years as a lieutenant when intelligent mentors transmitted to them the "secrets" of influencing people and their own ability to organize the job.

Teaching indoctrinators is also a composite problem and if it is resolved thoroughly it is possible to count on success. It is gratifying that we have ever more leaders who thoroughly understand this. Here is one of them--Col D. Budanov, chief of the political section of the Samarkandskiy Higher Military Automobile Command School. He knows the school's officers well, looks closely at their work style, does not skimp his work and time in helping them to master the art of influencing people more effectively. He has an individual plan for working with subordinates. A special place here is devoted to instilling organizational skills. Subunit commanders, their deputies for political affairs, and party and Komsomol secretaries have such plans also. With the support of the school's chief, Colonel Budanov created an orderly system for training newly assigned commanders and political workers in practices for organizing the indoctrinational process in collectives. It included theoretical and instructional methods classes, a demonstration of concrete experience, and help directly in the subunit. Maj Yu. Zaytsev, the training battalion commander, and his deputy for political affairs as well as the young secretary of this battalion's Komsomol organization who were recently appointed to these positions express great thanks to such training. The help of the political section increased their organizational ability a lot. This, on the whole, had a beneficial effect on training and the state of discipline in the subunit. As we see, the political section can do a lot to raise the organizational ability of indoctrinators higher and higher.

Is such a task really secondary for party committees and bureaus? At the same time, some of our party aktivists try to keep aloof from its solution. They seldom submit to the party collective questions about the indoctrinational skill of communist leaders and ways to increase it. This important area sometimes is without the party's influence. Undoubtedly, much is lost in this case and the effectiveness of indoctrination grows more slowly than is wanted. On the other hand, if problems in teaching organizational skill and the demand for activity in communists as organizers is at the center of commanders' and party collectives' attention then ideological and indoctrinational work naturally acquires more thoroughness, accuracy and scientific character. In a word, it becomes more effective. One would like to characterize in this way the efforts exerted in this direction by the party

committee which Capt O. Rymar heads. Here, stress is placed not only on having each officer active as an agitator and propagandist but also having him come forward as an organizer in the area of ideologically influencing the troops. The party committee displays great persistence in informing each communist about the essence of a composite approach and the way to implement it in practice, helping each leader to skillfully rely on the aktiv and the party and Komsomol organization, and using every work method and means of influence.

Questions about raising the effectiveness of indoctrination are examined here in a topical manner. In this regard communists N. Ban'ko, A. Makausov and V. Shishlin and a number of other comrades were heard at a party committee conference and at party meetings. Regular training, specific help and strict demand contributes to the fact that people accumulate experience from day to day and work better today than yesterday.

The communists in our district have taken as their primary and main task the publicizing of the decisions of the October (1977) CC CPSU Plenum; the new USSR Constitution; the materials of the great meetings of the CC CPSU, USSR Supreme Soviet and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet devoted to the 60th anniversary of Great October; the achievements of the motherland; and the prospects for the construction of communism. We see the success of this work in the fact that a broad ideological aktiv will come forward as its organizers, introducing a spirit of creativity into it and displaying a high level of exactingness for the quality of each measure and of each presentation to the troops.

Life urgently demands that teaching everyone who participates in the ideological and political indoctrination of the troops means to teach them high proficiency in organizing the indoctrinational process and at the same time raise the individual propaganda skill of each one. The most important condition for raising the effectiveness of all indoctrinational work is contained in this unity.

ADVERSE EFFECTS OF WITHHOLDING INFORMATION FROM SUPERIORS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Nov 77 p 2

[Article by Col A. Kulakov and Lt Col A. Pimenov: "Facets of an Officer's Maturity"]

[Text] The colonel paced anxiously up and down his office measuring it from corner to corner with large steps. His face conveyed an extreme degree of annoyance. Having turned half around while pacing to his deputy, a lieutenant colonel, he let drop in a fit of temper:

"And how did we overlook this?"

It became clear from the dialogue between the chief and his deputy that they had made a serious error in planning an instructional methods training course.

The lieutenant colonel suggested: "Perhaps go to the general again, Nikolay Vasil'yevich? We will quickly work it up"

The colonel glanced angrily at the deputy: "Report? No. Be dismissed. Never: It is necessary to look for another opportunity to correct the mistake"

This event which a witness passed on to one of the authors causes one to think. Why didn't the colonel report the error made to his chief and thus use the most convenient and shortest way to correct it? What kept him from such a natural and necessary step--the desire not to spoil his work reputation. the danger of evoking dissatisfaction in the senior chief?

To be sure, in such a complex and difficult affair such as military service no one is immune to mistakes. The question, perhaps is how to treat them. And here light is thrown on the facets of an officer's ideological and moral maturity, his high principles, and the depth of his awareness of his responsibility for the part entrusted to him.

At one time Engr Col V. Fen'-- an excellent specialist in the area of missile technology and an expert in engineer analysis -- was entrusted with familiarizing himself with a new method for training young soldiers in the N-skiy

unit. There was much that was unusual, even surprising, in it. Up to then training had been conducted according to a tested scheme: first--theory, then--practice. This seemed inviolable and natural as the changeover from day to night. And here that which was usual and settled was broken. The new men were brought from the very first days to the launch mounts and were taught in a practical way how to perform their duties--to be sure, safely precautions were observed. But what about theory? It was presented during training.

The engineer colonel saw more negative aspects than positive ones in the new method. He reported this to the senior chief. However, Fen' visited one other unit and again watched the new method in operation and that which had seemed stable to him began to fall to the ground like an enormous block of snow hanging over a ravine thaws in the blazing spring sun--one more warm day and it will crash down the slope.

Not everything in the new method now appeared self-evident to the engineer colonel. If he took a grain of logic and developed it, sense would come out of it. And not a little bit! That means going to the chief and fighting for the innovation. But how will the general regard this? Perhaps simply remind him of the former position And perhaps....

Without going into detail, let us point out that the general rated this step by the officer at its true worth and supported him. Fen' later became a real publicizer of instructional methods innovations and did much to put them into practice (Officer Fen' is now in the reserves).

Every day very many officers go in the course of their service to report to their chiefs. One has a briefcase full of business papers; another had only brief information on how a particular assignment was carried out. The questions which are discussed during this are of different magnitudes and importance but all of them, both direct and indirect, have an effect on the progress of the training process and socialist competition and on the state of combat readiness.

To be sure, the senior chief has enormous experience and a high level of ideological, theoretical and professional training which permits him to evaluate vital phenomena and facts correctly and to find the optimum decision in any situation. An extremely valuable source of information for him is the reports of his subordinates. They enrich the leader's knowledge of the actual state of affairs in the collective and permit him to picture more graphically all facets of the problem awaiting his decisions.

In the absolute majority of cases this information is verified and correctit comes from servicemen with highly developed ethical, political, and moral qualities. However, individual officers try to conceal negative information and phenomena from the chief in order not to "spoil his good mood" and protect themselves from possible criticism. Others try to guess what kind of a report or what conclusions the chief expects from them. Under modern conditions and in connection with the fundamental changes in all areas of military affairs, the role of the commander's decision in organizing the indoctrinational and training process, classes and tactical exercises is growing even more. It is understandable that this immeasurably increases demands on the completeness, timeliness and reliability of information which the commander gets from subordinates and, naturally is considered by him when making his decision. The slightest inaccuracy in a subordinate's report, being reflected in the decision, can complicate or even wreck the performance of combat training missions. In this connection, a situation which took shape during one tactical exercise is instructive.

Maj N. Beligorov, a tank battalion commander was intensely scrutinizing a map dotted with conventional signs. From everything it appeared that the "enemy" was preparing to counterattack the battalion's left-flank company. How could he, the commander, oppose him? First of all, it is necessary to select a favorable line to repulse the counter attack. The battalion's reserve which would strike the "enemy" in the flank at the necessary moment must be moved here also.

However, events developed differently. The company on the left flank was repulsing the counterattack from the halt as it had been ordered to do. The "enemy" using his superiority in forces pressed against it and stubbornly moved forward. The situation could still be corrected. Send the reserve—a company under Lt V. Chernikov's command—to the site of the battle now. Major Beligorov impatiently glanced now at his watch and now at the edge of the forest but the reserve did not move to the attack line at the designated time....

What had happened? Before making his decision on repulsing the counterattack, the battalion commander had asked the battalion chief of staff, Sr Lt V. Pozdnyakov, where the reserve was located.

Pozdnyakov's report rang out: "It is moving according to plan."

A chain of wrong decisions and unrealized hopes stretched from this report by the chief of staff. The fact of the matter was that the company running into a destroyed bridge across a river bypassed it by another route. Only Pozdnyakov, the chief of staff, knew about this but he considered it unnecessary to tell the commander about the destroyed bridge and Chernikov's new decision. He says that Major Beligorov's time is worth its weight in gold as it is. Pozdnyakov relied on the fact that Chernikov would be able to reach the route without a delay.

It is true that later, having heard on the radio the task assigned by the battery commander to the reserve, the chief of staff had serious doubts about the correctness of his actions. He experienced unpleasant moments. His first impulse was to confess his guilt. This thought chilled his heart. What would the battalion commander think of him? And so Pozdnyakov did not find the strength in himself to correct the mistake in time.

Commanders, political organs and party organizations, guided by the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress are doing a lot to instill in military cadres a spirit of very strict discipline, a high level of principles, honesty, and veracity. The personal example of a leader, his implacable attitude toward shortcomings, and the ability to create in the collective a situation which impels a subordinate to complete frankness and sincerity when it is desired to share with the senior man not only joy but also grief and failures in the hope of receiving good advice and support, has inestimable importance.

Famous Soviet military leaders and commanders, particularly Maj Gen I. Panfilov, fully possessed such skill. An interesting example which throws light on this trait in his work style is given in the book, "Narodnyi G eneral" [The People's General].

An artillery regiment suffered heavy losses in men and equipment during the first 3 to 4 days of battle on the division's left flank. The regimental commander, Kurganov, was deprived of sleep. As soon as he closed his eyelids and dozed off, he saw as if he were awake his strong, healthy and cheerful warriors who had died as heroes in the unequal struggle against the enemy. And the cannons: Their burnished gleaming steel, their technical data and even the number of each weapon were engraved in his memory seemingly for his whole life.

Kurganov and the regimental commissar, Skorobagat-Lyakhovskiy, drove to the division headquarters with sad faces dark as a cloud in order to report the condition of the regiment to the general. Panfilov invited them to have breakfast but they didn't even touch the food. Then the general got up from his chair and said warmly and in a fatherly way:

"You have fought well. You have destroyed very many tanks and enemy infantry. You cannot be in battle without losses. We will find weapons for you. Beat the enemy even more energetically."

Unbidden tears sparkled on the faces of Kurganov and Skorobogat-Lya khovskiy -- brave men-- because of these words. Panfilov ordered them to recommend for an award those who had distinguished themselves. The commander and the commissar left the general as quite different people. They had experienced a flood of strength and the sorrow for their fallen heroic brothers in arms evoked vengeance toward the fascists in their hearts.

Today's army and navy officers who do not have any combat experience are learning from famous frontline commanders the art of working with people and the ability to establish strictly regulation and at the same time candid and confidential relations with subordinates. This is important in all spheres of military life and service. Sincerity and faith between chiefs and subordinates and between seniors and juniors play a special role during the course of checking combat and political training and the results of socialist competition.

An officer from the senior headquarters, Lt Col Yu Orlov, arrived in the air defense missile subunit which officer I. Fedorov commands. As usual, before the beginning of the inspection there was a conversation with the commander who had all the reference data at hand. Fedorov reported in a deliberate and business-like manner how training and competition were going and what results had been achieved. And in conclusion he candidly expressed what was troubling him:

"Some classes are conducted with low quality. Especially when young officers act in the role of leaders..."

Orlov rated such frankness highly. Of course, he, an experienced staff officer who had served quite a bit with the troops, was in a position to discover the bottlenecks and weak places in training. The only pity would be wasted time--it is possible to use it more productively in providing help on the spot.

Now, having evaluated the subunit commander's information, he made changes in his work plan, Orlov talked with the young officers, visited them in classes and discovered their instructional methods flaws more distinctly. The next day he conducted a demonstration with the lieutenants. Then based on a study of the problem in this and in other subunits Orlov prepared a detailed report addressed to the senior chief and on his instructions measures to improve the instructional methods training of the young officers were devised and carried out.

Here it is—a logical chain. With his objective report the commander helped the staff officer with this seemingly private fact to see the typical shortcomings and the senior chief to take effective measures to eliminate them. This is a graphic manifestation of concern for the common cause, for improving combat training, and in the final analysis for strengthening the combat might of our glorious armed forces which have been called upon, as is emphasized in the USSR Constitution, to reliably protect the homeland and to be constantly combat ready guaranteeing a quick rebuff to any aggressor.

MOTORIZED INFANTRY RAIL-LOADING TRAINING DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Nov 77 p 1

[Article by Col V. Nagornyy, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent with the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "Examination on the Rails"]

[Text] Field Training.... The concept is complex and many-sided. It includes the ability of personnel to load equipment and weapons on flatcars in a very short time and complete a rail move in an organized manner observing a high level of discipline. During the training year just completed the troops had to take examinations not only on tactical fields, firing ranges and tank ranges but also on the rails.

The railroad track slipped out of the near-by thicket in a smooth curve, stretched in two tightened strings and rested against a siding. Here, a practical class took place on loading wheeled and tracked equipment on the rolling-stock. The motorized riflemen were not testing their ability for the first time; however, this class would sum up everything that had been achieved during the training year. This predetermined the high frame of mind of the men and their desire to exceed existing norms.

Before going to the field, the subunit officers replenished their store of theoretical knowledge. Military rail transport service workers gave highly qualified lectures to them on the fundamental demands made on transportation. Having joined in the socialist competition, military rail transport service officers wrote down as one of the points in their obligations—to ensure the complete and qualitative carrying out of the troop transportation training plan and to provide practical help to subunits and units in creating the necessary physical training base. Col V. Nikitchenko gives the impressive figure of classes conducted and it becomes clear that by the end of the training year there seemingly remains not a single unit which representatives from military traffic control stations had not visited providing commanders with very active help in organizing training sessions. Capt B. Leto, Majs A. Kochev and G. Krikup, and other officers proved themselves to be skillfulinstructional methodologists. With the participation of the

military rail transport service the necessary physical training base was created everywhere directly on training grounds and near tank ranges and other installations—in those places where the combat maturity of soldiers is forged.

On the eve of the transportation class Maj V. Shepit'ko in talking with the motorized riflemen especially emphasized that the importance of troop maneuverability has grown immeasurably in modern combat; therefore, the capability of skillfully performing a rail move has become a very important element in combat readiness.

As experience has shown, the established norms for loading items of equipment can be shortened by 30 - 40 percent in progressive subunits. The motorized riflemen also achieved this result. You observe the actions of the soldiers and you understand how much they have worked to demonstrate firm skills during the training year's final stage.

... Among the first to take the test was Pfc M. Shakirov, a mechanic-driver. The tank driven by his skillful hands seemingly directed its powerful hull from the side-loading platform to the ribbon of the rolling-stock. In low gear and without any sharp turns and jerks Shakirov brought the vehicle almost to a 30 degree angle to the track. The platform of the car receiving the heavy load rocked gently. As if on a cord the vehicle moved forward and stopped on the flatcar having been inserted with delicate accuracy into the overall dimensions. The crew immediately began to lash down the tank.

Meanwhile, another one was "climbing" onto a flatcar and after it an infantry combat vehicle, an armored personnel carrier.... The loading director, Capt V. Gerasimov confidently controlled the actions of the drivers. Not a single vehicle had to come down from the flatcar because of some mistake. A no less critical element in the loading had already begun—the lashing down of the equipment, its locking, sealing, and camouflaging.

And here military rail transport service officers also had their say. As is known, the problem of lashing a tank to a flatcar was solved long ago. Experience brought military rail transport workers face to face with the necessity to develop a more reliable method for lashing down infantry combat vehicles and other equipment with narrow tracks. The competition between the officers in this service during the jubilee year pointed out correct paths for research. They committed themselves to the introduction of several streamlining proposals. And they kept their word. Motorized riflemen are already using the results of their creative research. For example, the device suggested by Capt N. Starovoyt and Sr Lt B. Deyev proved very successful in lashing down BMP. It is simple in construction and capable of being made under troop conditions. It has already been "registered" in units. The capability of using it many times makes it economical regarding the materials which go into the preparation of the fastening system and permits the norm for carrying it out with a high level of quality to be significantly shortened.

Finally, all work is finished. The motorized riflemen managed the assigned task in an excellent manner. The military rail transport service representative, Lt Col A. Fedchenko, who was present during the class gave a high rating to their training. The examination on the rails was passed successfully. The acquired skills will undoubtedly prove useful to the motorized riflemen during the new training year for which active preparation is now underway.

IMPORTANCE OF CONSTANT VIGILANCE STRESSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Nov 77 p 2

[Article by Maj Ye. Tsitsulin, a regimental chief of staff in the Northern Group of Forces: "Regulations Require It"]

[Test] Once in the unit duty officer's room I was an accidental witness to the following scene. The phone rings. The officer lifts the receiver and answers:

"Regimental duty officer.... This is" He gives his military rank and last name. "No, this is not the polyclinic, you made a mistake."

I inquired: "And do you answer everyone that way?"

"What should I do? You do not know who is calling."

Yes, who is calling—the duty officer doesn't know. However, he introduces himself to each caller with his "full title." To my comment that he is divulging information which it is not necessary for an outsider to know, the officer answered resentfully that he is divulging nothing. He says that he did not name the regiment. The fact that he introduced himself as the duty officer—there is nothing so secret in that.

A panel hung on the wall directly opposite the duty officer. On it were documents regulating the regimental duty officer's performance of duty. How a duty officer should answer the telephone is defined in one of them. The officer disregarded this requirement.

The fact that there is a duty officer in each unit is really no secret. However, is it necessary to make known to complete strangers that this telephone number is the regimental duty officer's?

The need for our high vigilance pertains first of all to the performance of tours of duty or guard duty. This is correct. The performance of a combat mission requires from the troops special teamwork, discretion, and readiness for immediate and resolute actions. However, vigilance is

necessary not only on guard duty. It must be our daily standard of conduct-always and in any situation-especially when performing duty. Only one thing is required from a serviceman in this connection: to strictly carry out the duties specified in regulations.

Let us take, for instance, duty on the regimental detail. The duties of each individual on the twenty-four hour detail are clearly and specifically stated in the regulations. Their punctual execution by itself guarantees a vigilant performance of duty. The overwhelming majority of fighting men carry out prescribed duties irreproachably. However, cases are still encountered where the conduct of individual servicemen creates, for example, preconditions for the leakage of information which is not to be divulged. When you begin to analyze why such an event occurred, it invariably turns out that the serviceman deviated from requirements in regulations.

The same regimental duty officer in answering the phone incorrectly undoubtedly didn't have a thought that he was divulging information which was a military secret. However, he did divulge it by his actions. This was only because he deviated from the requirements in regulations where it is clearly defined who, to whom and in what situations a regimental duty officer must introduce himself.

The vigilance of a fighting man—this is a broad and many—sided concept. It is not only high combat readiness and the preservation of military and state secrets. Vigilant performance of service in a detail also presupposes the continual and complete inner mobilization of a fighting man and his readiness to act in any situation as regulations, manuals and instructions require. It is understandable that such performance of duty is unthinkable without a knowledge of the requirements in regulations—not an approximate knowledge but a thorough one without which it is difficult to count on a high level of vigilance when performing any duty detail—be it a regimental, motor pool, checkpoint or messhall duty officer.

The following even recently occurred in our unit. The KPP [checkpoint] duty officer's assistant, Pfc S. Musakayev, allowed WO [Praporshchik] Ye. Vasil'yev into the regimental area without checking his documents. The warrant officer had just arrived for duty in the unit and naturally no one knew him there. It was sufficient for him to say that he served in the unit and the duty officer's assistant let him pass without difficulty.

When this event was investigated, it turned out that Pfc S. Musakayev did not know the duties of a KPP duty officer's assistant very well. He had learned that officers, warrant officers and extended active duty sergeants from his unit could be let by without showing an identity card. However, such a "detail" as letting someone pass only if you knew them personally, the private first class did not memorize.

Of course, the soldier was guilty in that, having been assigned to the detail, he studied his responsibilities poorly. However, one cannot remove guilt

from his chiefs who were responsible for training the detail, in particular the company commander, Sr Lt I. Chigrintsev. Having assigned the soldier as the KPP duty officer's assistant for the first time, he did not check his knowledge and his ability to put it into practice.

In other words, the possibility for what happened at the KPP was "formed" even before Pfc S. Musakayev took over the duty. The gap in the knowledge of regulations turned into, as should have been expected, a violation of the detail's procedures.

This and other examples once again prove that the inculcation of high vigilance in fighting men must be conducted inseparably linked with the study of regulations and with the instilling of a high level of discipline. In general, much is being done in this regard. However, at times it is possible to notice a division like this: regulations and discipline—one direction in work and another in the instilling of vigilance. It is not always possible to hear in a lecture or discussion an example which would corroborate the thought that deviating from requirements in regulations leads to violations of discipline and hurts vigilance. On the other hand, if he is talking about vigilance, the propagandist tries to shock his listeners with an example which, though old, is clear and unusual. But he will often appear abstract and rambling to his listeners. It is said this happens somewhere else under other conditions but we don't have any.

One day during a discussion with personnel in one of the subunits I mentioned Pvt V. Bumenyuk as an example of vigilant performance of duty and cited the following fact. A soldier wanted to take a stool out of the barracks but the man on duty didn't allow him to do this without the company duty officer's permission. Smiles appeared on the soldiers faces. They say he showed vigilance—he did not permit a stool to be taken out.

Then we began to discuss this item together. Of course, it wasn't the stool itself--its absence would not bring any outright loss. However--this is company property just as, let us say, an engineer shovel, a gasmask and many other items directly linked to combat readiness. There is another aspect to this example--the psychological one. If man on duty is located at his post and does not notice who is dropping in on the subunit and what is being removed this gradually will turn into a habit of looking and--not seeing. A deep-rooted habit to which attention is not paid can lead to extremely serious consequences. Therefore, it is very important that Private Gumenyuk act just as the regulations say and not consider this requirement a "trivial detail." Life shows that great harm normally begins with what at first glance is insignificant.

Many years of experience in troop service is concentrated in our combined arms regulations. There is not a single extraneous line in them. We, the officers, are required to inculcate this thought daily into the consciousness of subordinates instilling in them high vigilance and discipline. But do we always act in this way?

Once I had occasion: to observe the following scene. An officer was coming through the KPP-- the man on duty, as was prescribed, asked:

"Please show your pass."

"Yes, I have a pass, I have." The officer put his hand in his pocket but moved on further without stopping.

The determined man on duty stood his ground and demanded the pass but the other, seemingly, was ashamed to do this. The officer did not think that he was inculcating carelessness and complacency in personnel on the 24-hour duty detail by acting this way and that he was unwittingly instilling in their consciousness the idea that checking documents is an unnecessary formality....

The regiment's twenty-four hour duty detail.... Important and vital tasks in maintaining combat readiness and internal order and in guarding weapons, ammunition, premises, and equipment are being laid upon it. At any moment-no matter when the assembly or combat alert signal is received—the first to receive it are the men on the 24-hour detail.

At night when the troops are resting in the barracks, their rest is protected by the duty officer and the men on duty who are ready to sound the alarm at any moment.

The checkpoint detail will not allow a stranger in the unit's area, the messhall detail will prepare food of high quality for the troops....

The 24-hour detail--figuratively speaking, it is the watchful eye of the unit. So that it will always be attentive and vigilant, each man must strictly carry out his duties contained in the regulations. The guarantee of high vigilance in those who are entrusted with performing internal service is contined in this.

TRAINING OBJECTIVES IN AIR DEFENSE MISSILE REGIMENT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Nov 77 p 1

[Article by Lt Col V. Sinyutin, Order of Lenin Moscow Air Defense District: "Masters Are Becoming More Numerous"]

[Text] The guards surface to air missile regiment commanded by Gds Lt Col O. Fitkulin is the initiator of competition among troops of our district in honor of the 60th Anniversary of the Armed Forces. It was first to respond to the patriotic call by missilemen of the Red Banner Baku Air Defense District and to outline new milestones in combat improvement for itself. Among the socialist pledges made by the guardsmen is also the following: to increase the number of masters by ten percent by the end of the training year.

Is this a large or a small number? If we consider that the reserves and opportunities for raising the qualifications of officers and warrant officers in the unit were used to the maximum in the past training year, then this figure appears very weighty. At the same time, it is fully realistic. One arrives at this conclusion on becoming familiar with the experience gained here in developing masters, with what the staff and the methods council has done during the period of preparation for the new training year, and with what is planned to be done during the upcoming combat training.

We know how high an honor it is to bear the title of master. This title includes recognition of the specialist's broad technical outlook, his ability to operate successfully in any situation, and his ability to control the combat work of subordinates competently. Meanwhile, one sometimes has occasion to encounter the opinion that the struggle to raise combat qualification to the highest level is strictly a personal matter. First of all, allegedly not everyone (especially from among the commanders) can always find the time for this, and secondly, it is also not so bad to have a first or even a second class rating: we still get by in the accounting in the column for increased rating. Moreover, the qualification of first class sometimes has a soothing effect on the strictest checker.

All these points were always considered in the guards unit. They were given particular attention during preparations for the new training year. One of

the most important results of the work done in this period was to gain the appropriate psychological mood: if an officer or warrant officer did not set the attainment of a higher qualification as his goal and did not struggle for the title of master, that meant he was lagging and did not meet the demands being placed on competition participants.

The role of "motivator" was played by the personal example of senior comrades. All staff officers authorized to do so raised their ratings. The regimental chief of staff, Gds Lt Col L. Krudov, brilliantly confirmed his title of master of combat qualification.

A party meeting was held in the regiment at which party members analyzed in detail the reasons why some specialists did not fulfill socialist pledges to raise their ratings. Those at the meeting also were not silent about those commanders and technicians for whom everything appeared favorable at first glance concerning the growth in professional and technical levels, when in fact there was a trend toward self-complacency and stagnation.

Take guards captains A. Babich and G. Gavrilov, for example. Both of them are specialists first class. Both are successfully performing their functional duties. Nevertheless, they did not plan to outline the next goals in combat improvement to the level of master in the upcoming training year. The motives to which they referred reduced to a "lack of time."

As a result of an exacting and fundamental talk at the party meeting, both comrades pledged to become masters.

The staff concerned itself in detail about the training process itself. After the candidates for master were finally determined, a special commission checked their knowledge and noted the strong and weak points of each person. On the basis of the commission's conclusions, the officers elaborated detailed personal training plans for themselves and submitted them to their commanders for approval.

The system of monitoring the course of training also was not ignored. While previously the officer's performance of his personal plan was checked once every three months by staff workers, now they decided to do this somewhat differently: as before, the staff would conduct control tests at the end of every three months of training, but the subunit commander was given the responsibility of performing such checks monthly. This also extends to second and third class specialists.

An analysis of the results of the past training year also suggested a number of other steps aimed at raising the effectiveness of the training process. More improved and strict control will make it possible to place great reliance on the officers' independent work. Specific corrections have been made in the planning and organization of training practices on the equipment and classroom activities. For example, wider use will be made of technical training means. And the fact that the minuses and plusses in the knowledge of commanders and technicians have been identified ahead of time makes the

group practice of individual topics and exercises advisable (two to three persons in a group). In practice, this will be done in such a way that the officers' knowledge is mutually supplemented and mutual assistance and mutual monitoring is more effective.

The fact that the regiment has not lost sight of popularization of the masters' experience will undoubtedly also play a part. They spoke at a rally of outstanding personnel and to the young replacements. A display is dedicated to them in every subunit telling about their experience. Materials are regularly published in the wall newspaper about how they service and operate equipment. Demonstration classes are planned for all masters. Their portraits hang in the unit room of combat glory next to the portraits of six countrymen who are Heroes of the Soviet Union and who were given this title for exploits in the war.

The pledges of personnel of the guards regiment emphasize that they will struggle to attain new milestones by raising the exactingness toward the assessment of competition results. This also relates to the development of masters. Each officer and warrant officer in the regiment knows full well that a specialist with a higher qualification is not only a technical expert and master of his work, but also an outstanding organizer, methodologist and educator who is the commander's first assistant in raising the subunit's combat readiness. That is how the staff poses the matter. And this naturally imposes an additional responsibility on all commanders and technicians. But the more strenuous and full-fledged is the competition, the higher that the authority of the honorable title of "master" will be raised.

6904

REPLY TO QUERIES ON MONETARY ALLOWANCES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Nov 77 p 4

[Article: "Reference Service of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA"]

[Text] Sgt P. Alekseyev, Pvt N. Tkachenko and military construction worker Pfc F. Pavlov request an explanation of what benefits are paid by the state for children of service personnel and military construction workers.

By Decree No 1108 of the USSR Council of Ministers dated 25 October 1963 and by Order No 1370 of the USSR Council of Ministers dated 4 July 1969, the payment of benefits is established for children of privates, seamen, sergeants and petty officers on first-term service, as well as of cadets and students at military educational institutions who do not have officer rank and who are in a barracks status.

The benefits for one child are paid to those who are living permanently in cities, city type settlements, and workers' and resort settlements in the amount of 15 rubles, and for two or more children in the amount of 22 rubles per month. Residents in a rural area who are not connected with agriculture receive benefits in the same amounts. In case the mothers of the children of service personnel or guardians are involved with agriculture, the benefits for one child are set in the amount of 7 rubles 50 kopecks, and for two or more children in the amount of 12 rubles per month.

Benefits also are paid in the indicated amounts for children of privates, seamen, sergeants, petty officers, warrant officers and officers of the reserve who are sent for training courses but who at the moment of being called to these courses were not working for one reason or another.

Payment of benefits to the families of military construction workers is not provided. Military construction workers have an opportunity of giving material assistance to the family from the funds they are earning.

However, in conformity with the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase dated 1 Nov 1974, benefits are paid for each child monthly in an amount of 12 rubles until

he reaches eight years of age for children of military construction workers serving in military construction detachments, if the average aggregate income per member of the family does not exceed 50 rubles per month.

In designating benefits, aggregate income is determined by the family income for the calendar year preceding the year of submission for designation of benefits.

These benefits may also be designated for the children of military personnel on first-term service as a supplement to the benefits designated on the basis of USSR Council of Ministers Decree No 1108 dated 25 Oct 1963, if the family's aggregate income does not exceed 50 rubles per month for each member.

6904

CSO: 1801

TRAINING OBJECTIVES IN OUTSTANDING MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Nov 77 p 1

[Editorial introduction and three comments: "On the Main Axis: New Training Year Begins Tomorrow in Units and Aboard Ships"]

[Text] Soviet soldiers are beginning the accomplishment of training plans and programs and of socialist pledges with enormous political and job enthusiasm. Inspired by adoption of the new USSR Constitution and by the vivid, moving speech by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the ceremony in the Kremlin dedicated to the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, they are full of resolve to achieve a further increase in combat readiness and in field, air and naval training. The appeal by personnel of foremost units and of the nuclear-powered submarine to raise even higher the banner of socialist competition and continue it under the motto "Reliably defend the socialist homeland, be in constant combat readiness, persistently master weapons and equipment, improve combat expertise," and to make the year of the 60th Anniversary of the USSR Armed Forces a year of shock military labor has found fervent support in every military collective.

Personnel of the motorized rifle regiment commanded by Lt Col V. Boriskin responded actively to this patriotic initiative. The regiment won the title of outstanding in the past training year. In the new phase of competition, the motorized riflemen intend to reinforce what they achieved and attain new milestones in military improvement.

Regimental officers tell about the search for reserves and about complete use of the capabilities of competition on one of the most important axes of struggle for combat readiness—mastery of equipment and weapons.

Raise Class Effectiveness - Lt Col V. Boriskin, Regimental Commander

Sometimes we take the realization of reserves to be an elimination of particular omissions which occurred in the past. It stands to reason that

advancement is impossible without elimination of mistakes. Nevertheless, I see much deeper meaning in the concept of "reserve." Reserves do not lie on the surface. Most often a lengthy, collective search and a great deal of analytical work is required to identify them.

I recall a tactical exercise which took place long ago. In it, one of the regimental subunits was assaulting a water obstacle. How much disappointment we then had to experience! The ICV's [infantry combat vehicles] entered the water slowly and cautiously. The engines of some of the vehicles immediately stalled near the shore. The company continued the practice battle for the river at reduced strength. Later there was a thorough discussion of what had occurred with the officers and driver-mechanics. Everyone recognized the gaps in their personal training, but one also sensed a mistrust of the vehicle: it was capricious and allegedly obstinate. How important it was to prove that this was an error! It understandably could not be done by words, but by action and an inspiring demonstration.

I cannot count the practices we held on the river since then. Gradually the entire picture of the assault crossing changed and acquired increasingly new colors. The ICV's began to move to the river resolutely, at top speed. They would literally leap from the bank and become fully immersed in the water. The regiment received outstanding marks in exercises of the jubilee year, which also provided for crossing water obstacles.

After that crossing of long ago which was disappointing for all, each person naturally realized that we could accomplish this tactical mission more successfully and that there were reserves. But their essence was revealed to us as we mastered new equipment and understood its true capabilities in the process of purposeful training and combat competition of the subunits.

Reading deeply the new pledges of initiators of the jubilee competition, one senses that they were made by people aimed at strenuous labor, a deep search for unused reserves, and military creativity. We tuned ourselves to this same frequency.

Exactingness - Maj A. Rybin, Secretary of Regimental Party Committee

In analyzing the results we achieved in combat and political training, it can be said that the high indicators of the past year did not come easily for us. We did not always succeed in maintaining the rigid rhythm of the training process, ensuring high quality in class preparation, and maintaining the spirit of competitiveness in them. The spring control check showed that we had planned the proper course in competition. We had to build up our efforts, but the situation in the subunits somehow had begun to change imperceptibly. The rightful pride in results of work began to be intermixed with flattery over what had been achieved. A self-complacency and some kind of winner's mood even appeared in some of the party members. There began to be fewer mentions of pledges in the field, in the training classrooms and in the combat vehicle motor pool.

This caused great concern in the party committee. On the commander's advice, we listened to an account of the party organization secretary of one of the battalions, Sr Lt V. Boyko, and of other party members of this subunit about the progress in fulfillment of pledges by personnel at an expanded session. We discussed separately the matter of the style of direction of socialist competition in the unit's artillery subunits, where the exactingness of officer-party members had become particularly relaxed. Serious complaints were lodged against party members Capt N. Grigorenko and Lt A. Rebrov.

The efforts of the command element and party organization managed to put an end to the complacency, but it was not easy to return the previous rhythm to training and competition and to make up for what had been lost.

We strive to ensure that the lesson was learned by everyone. It stands to reason that the party organization has its methods. Above all, it is to increase ideological conditioning of the party members and instill in them a feeling of high responsibility and the ability to assess what has been achieved by the yardstick of tomorrow. We are teaching everyone, using the leaders as an example. Together with the regimental staff, the party committee generalized the working experience of Sr Lt A. Deshko, commander of an outstanding company, party member, skilled organizer of socialist competition, and an industrious, persistent and exacting officer. The experience of the best secretaries of party organizations has been generalized.

By All Forms - Maj I. Akolo, Battalion Technical Officer

Today an integrated approach is required to improve technical training. Scheduled classes, the solution to various "technical" situations in exercises, the work of technical circles, a regular exchange of experience among specialists, competitions of specialists, technical conferences, and active military-technical propaganda must comprise a single system. In practice it often occurs otherwise. In our regiment this system operated effectively only at certain stages of the past training year. An imprecision in planning made itself felt.

In contrast to, let us say, tactical and weapons training, there is more frequent violation in technical training of the principle that the supervisor trains subordinates. Some platoon commanders do not rely on their personal training, but prefer to give way to the company senior technicians for heading classes. In our battalion, for example, only Warrant Officer N. Shelegovich is capable of conducting a class at the proper level. The remaining technicians themselves require assistance.

Officers of technical services of the regiment and subunits took a most active part in elaborating socialist pledges for the new training year. Much attention was given in them to mastery and exemplary safekeeping of weapons and equipment, to increasing the class ratings of specialists, to a struggle to surpass the established norms, and to a rational expenditure of engine resources. To achieve what has been planned and take a step up in mastering weapons and equipment, we must set the main reserve in motion—integrated use of all forms of technical training.

6904 CSO: 1801

SHORTCOMINGS IN MILITARY TOURISM PROGRAM NOTED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Nov 77 p 4

[Article by Lt Col N. Kartakov, Chief of Tourism Department of Red Banner Central Asian Military District: "Reader Asks a Question: Obstacles on the Path of Tourists"]

[Text] The recently ended 2nd All-Army Tourist Rally showed that this type of active rest has acquired much popularity in the Armed Forces, and especially in our Central Asian Military District. Hundreds of entertaining trips have been made to places of revolutionary, combat and labor glory of the Soviet people, along with dozens of interesting ascents. Much is being done to develop tourism in the Alma-Ata Higher Combined-Arms Command School imeni Mar SU I. S. Konev and in units where the tourist clubs are headed by Engr-Lt Col G. Serdyukov and Sr Lt V. Korshun.

The growing interest in tourism has been generated by many causes. Above all, it is the good feeling after strenuous combat training and the excellent means for increasing physical and psychological conditioning of the soldiers.

In my view, however, the effect from tourism could be considerably greater if some Army collectives in the district did not look at it as something secondary. As a result of this attitude in some collectives, the organization of active rest of service personnel and their family members actually has been curtailed. Tourist clubs in some garrisons exist only on paper. The activities they organize are conducted in a formal manner from time to time, for the sake of a "card-punch," and in no way facilitate a strengthening of the health.

The lack of qualified cadres of specialists, and particularly instructors, substantially retards the development of tourism among troops. The introduction in military schools of an optional course of lectures on the organization of tourism in units and subunits would probably help out to a certain extent. And it would appear that such a course should definitely be given in the Military Institute of Physical Culture, for sports and tourism are inseparably connected and serve the same goal.

Unfortunately, we specialists in tourism receive practically no help from the Military Publishing House. We expect methods aids and professional elaborations from it. Such aids would greatly help our work and assist us in getting things going, especially in amateur tourist clubs and sections.

We are also disturbed by the matter of the inventory. It often is lacking, and quality does not always satisfy the customer. Army tourists are tired of waiting for tourist gear that is of high quality and good looking.

Tourism serves the interests of combat training, and the attitude toward it is one of the important avenues of improving physical conditioning and the field, air and naval training of personnel.

6904

CSO: 1801

BASIC MILITARY TRAINING RESULTS DISCUSSED

Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 77 signed to press 9 Nov 77 p 32

[Article by Maj Gen N. Levadnyy, assistant commander of troops of the Red Banner Siberian Military District: "Service Is the Test"]

[Text] We are rightfully proud of the USSR Armed Forces, their might, and the successes achieved by our fighting men, who are mastering modern weapons and the most complex combat equipment. But the strength of the Soviet Army does not lie in powerful weapons alone. The people who handle the weapons — the reliable defense of the peaceful constructive labor of the Soviet people and of the gains of October depends on them.

Each year higher requirements are made of the fighting men of the army and navy. They must master the weapons entrusted to them perfectly in a short time and learn to operate confidently in modern battle.

Preparation of young people for military service in the Red Banner Siberian Military District is carried out on the basis of the Law on the Universal Military Obligation , just as in the rest of the country. Basic military training [BMT] has a positive effect on the internal and external bearing of the students, their success in learning, and labor discipline among working young people. Young men's interest in the profession of officer has increased significantly, as has the number of persons who want to enter military schools.

The soldiers themselves speak of the unquestioned usefulness of BMT. For example, Sr Sgt V. Tselinn and Pvt I. Saulov recall how useful they found knowledge of the physical parts of the weapons and of regulations and drill training skills acquired before being called up. Cadet A. Shabaldin, a graduate of the Omsk Higher Combined Arms Command School, will always be grateful to his teacher, military instructor Ye. Grishin (Drachenskaya Secondary School in Kemerovskaya Oblast) for help and advice in choosing his path in life, his occupation.

The experience of past years provides eloquent testimony that where BMT is given proper attention there will be no formalism, indifference, and conventionalism in the work of the pedagogical collective and the pre-draftees will receive the necessary military and military-technical knowledge as well as solid practical skills. Analysis of the results of comprehensive inspections allows us to conclude that most young men are assimilating the program well and receiving solid military training that helps them become true masters of military affairs quickly.

I would like to take note of the good work done on BMT in most of the schools of Novosibirskaya, Omskaya, and Kemerovskaya oblasts and Krasnoyarsk Kray. For example, in Omskaya Oblast more than 80 percent of the students tested received good and outstanding marks. This is a result of close practical contacts between the commissariats, military units, military educational institutions, and agencies of public and vocational-technical education. The Komsomol, DOSAAF, and other public organizations promote BMT actively.

One of the key challenges in securing a high level of BMT teaching is undoubtedly selection of the military instructors. We have made some advances in this in recent years. For example, in Omskaya and Tyumenskaya oblasts more than 80 percent of the military instructors are reserve officers. There as in other places, almost half of the military instructors have higher or secondary military education and an absolute majority are members of the CPSU and Komsomol.

It should be considered that not all military instructors who have recently left military units can master the techniques of working in a regular or vocational-technical school immediately and fully. The pedagogical collectives, oblast methodological councils, and institutes of advanced study by teachers must help them at first.

This problem is solved by systematic, purposeful work to raise the qualifications of the military instructors. We have a 112-hour program for study by military leaders. It includes sections on Marxism-Leninism, pedagogy and psychology, teaching methods, and special training.

Those schools which have put the work on a practical basis are enjoying positive results. Secondary School No 27 in the city of Barnaul is rightly considered one of the best for BMT. Director Ye. Cherepanova brought Capt (Res) A. Shabanov into the pedagogical collective with tact and skill and helped him at first. The military instructor, taking advantage of his rich practical experience, quickly mastered the specific requirements of his new job, set up the teaching of BMT outstandingly, organized special study circles, and became a reliable helper in maintaining discipline at the school. And his case is not unique.

The annual competitive inspection for best organization of BMT and military-patriotic indoctrination of young people has had a beneficial effect on the young men's level of knowledge. During the inspection

socialist competition was begun in the district for outstanding and good scores in all areas of BMT.

The best results in the competitive inspection were achieved by secondary schools No 27 in Barnaul, No 12 in Krasnoyarsk, and No 109 in Omsk, the transportation construction tekhnikum in Omsk, the Krasnoyarsk Polytechnic Tekhnikum, vocational-technical schools No 12 and No 50 in Novosibirsk, No 52 in Novokuznetsk (Kemerovskaya Oblast), and the training points at the Omsk Engine Building Plant imeni Baranov and the Novosibirsk Sibtekstil'mash Plant. The military instructors and assistants at these schools have good physical facilities to use in their work: well-equipped military Offices, military-technical training classrooms, indoor ranges, drill training areas, and the like.

Unfortunately, this is far from the case everywhere, but work is going forward in this direction all the time. For example, in Omskaya Oblast the number of indoor rifle ranges at schools doubled last year and the number of drill training areas in Krasnoyarsk Kray and Tomskaya Oblast increased 25 and 30 percent respectively.

Comments received from units of the Red Banner Siberian Military District generally contain high praise for the knowledge of military affairs with which young fighting men begin their service. According to Senior Lieutenants V. Kopakov and N. Mikhaylovskiy the draftees' knowledge and skills enable them to move quickly from assimilating the elementary aspects of the soldier's work to mastering complex military specializations. Officers A. Peschanko, N. Bazylin, and many other commanders and political workers say the same thing.

But alongside the positive comments many complaints are made with respect to the organization of BMT. Many schools in regions of West Siberia still do not devote enough attention to the physical training of young men. It sometimes happens in the military units and schools of the district that new fighting men and cadets are unable to pass the standards of the GTO [Ready for Labor and Defense] test or to repass it after having done so earlier. But this test has a glorious history.

Mar SU K. K. Rokossovskiy, the outstanding Soviet military leader who was twice Hero of the Soviet Union, said: "I recall the great and beautiful 1930's when, after work, millions of people would go to the stadiums and athletic fields to take tests for the GTO badge. This little badge was a symbol of courage and valor. The badge aroused enormous respect on the best marksmen or most courageous parachutists. And I am firmly convinced that the excellent organization of military sports work was very helpful to Soviet people in passing the great examination that the war presented to us."

Nonetheless, one often hears the view that because the Armed Forces today have so much combat equipment good physical training is not at all compulsory for the soldier. This is a dangerous misunderstanding! The missions performed by motorized riflemen, artillerymen, tank troops, and fighting men of the other arms of troops are so broad and multi-faceted today and modern battle is so complex and dynamic that physical endurance and athletic conditioning are simply essential to a young man taking his place in the ranks. That is why sports must be given considerable propaganda among pre-draftees and draftees and interesting, attractive competitions should be held. Public and vocational-technical educational agencies, working with physical training and sports committees and DOSAAF organizations and receiving help from the military commissariats, should significantly improve physical education and mass sports work among students.

We should take note of the organization of physical education for students at Secondary School No 10 in the city of Novosibirsk. Each summer the young people travel to a sports-labor camp where they receive solid physical conditioning. It is no accident that graduates of this school often win in top competition.

Psychological preparation is closely tied to the physical preparation of a future fighting man. Here too everything is not yet in order. Military instructors sometimes tell stories about the romantic aspects of army service but forget to inform their students of its difficulties and hardships, of the labor hidden behind the externally simple, precise, and rapid actions of soldiers at exercises, during alerts, and combat duty, that is, the work behind what young men see in movies and on television.

Another serious gap that must be filled is tactical training for draftees. The very first weeks of service show that some of the recent graduates of regular and vocational-technical schools and tekhnikums have not mastered the rules and procedures of advancing by short dashes and crawling or digging in. The main reason for this is poor organization of the five-day field training periods and the shortcomings in support for them. The military commissariats, DOSAAF committees, and directors of city and rayon educational institutions should work together to develop and carry out steps to raise the effectiveness of this important stage in BMT. They should make broader use of sponsorship relationships with military units and schools.

There are some already today who are giving substantial practical assistance to their young comrades; among them are the cadets of the Novosibirsk Higher Military Political Combined Arms School, the Omsk Higher Combined Arms Twice Red Banner Command School imeni M. V. Frunze, the Kemerovo Higher Military Command School of Communications, and the Tomsk Higher Military Command Order of the Red Star School of Communications. Unfortunately, such cases are still not numerous.

In Omskaya Oblast the five-day field training periods were held at tank and combined arms schools. An organizing meeting was attended by employees in public and vocational-technical education and the commissariat, as well as officers. They established a plan for each training period and reviewed the questions of material-technical support.

Careful preliminary preparation made it possible to conduct the fiveday assembly on a high methodological level.

It is true as the people say that soldiers are not born, people become soldiers. They become soldiers through intensive, painstaking, and purposeful work. The entire meaning of our work and our party and constitutional duty is to eliminate existing problems, make use of accumulated experience, and prepare young men to perform the sacred duty of a USSR citizen: defend our socialist land.

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11,176 CSO: 1801 COOPERATION OF MILITARY INSTRUCTORS AND SCHOOL DIRECTORS DISCUSSED

Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 77 signed to press 9 Nov 77 p 33

[Article by M. Potapov, city of Poltava, inspector in Poltavskaya Oblast Department of Public Education: "Not Alone"]

[Text] I think that every military instructor can draw a great deal from V. Zubarev's article published in No 6 of VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA. But I want to talk about something that Comrade Zubarev only touched on in passing: interrelationships among subjects in basic military training [BMT] and the ability of school directors to manage the activities of the military instructor precisely.

The Kolkhoz imeni T. Shevchenko in Mirgorodskiy Rayon of Poltavskaya Oblast is a highly mechanized farm. And almost everyone working there studied at the Khomutetskaya secondary school at some time in the past. Many of them are famous for their labor achievements. The names of Hero of Socialist Labor agronomist Ye. I. Guliy, tractor operator D. G. Kepko who has won the Order of the Labor Red Banner and the Order of Labor Glory 3rd degree, and team leader Ye. K. Puziy who has received two Badge of Honor orders are known far beyond the boundaries of the rayon.

Young men from the school who are drafted into the Soviet Army generally become good fighting men. This is a result of the skillfully organized military-patriotic indoctrination of students and the training periods in basic military training.

With help from the kolkhoz the school has built a 50-meter firing range, set up an obstacle course and grenade-throwing area at the stadium, and prepared an asphalt area for drill training.

The school has a good military office. The dimensions of the black-board, which is built onto the wall, can be enlarged or decreased.

A little above it are attachments for fastening graphic aids. If the blackboard is moved aside a small movie screen appears in its place. The military instructor's desk is at the same time the control console for technical teaching aids in the classroom and a place for demonstrating instruments. In addition, the military instructor and physics teacher designed a testing device: the top of the desk is moved aside and beneath it is a model of terrain.

Careful thought went into preparing the room. There are displays which tell about the history of the Soviet Armed Forces, the regulations and oath, and the branches of the Armed Forces and arms of troops. A display dedicated to local people who distinguished themselves in the battle for our country has a prominent place in the combat glory corner. Material collected by the Red Pathfinders during excursions to places of revolutionary, military, and labor glory in their native region are also displayed there.

The military instructor, Lt (Res) Valeriy Panteleymonovich Kholodnyy, put his heart into his work. It was tough for him at first. He had neither adequate training nor experience. But he had a love for military affairs and a desire to become a teacher and prove that he was worthy of the trust shown in him.

School director V. A. Smolyak, his deputy for educational affairs P. Petlyukh, and other teachers often attended lessons conducted by the young military instructor. They gave him valuable advice and invited him to their classes. A pedagogical meeting was held to discuss the question "The interrelationships of the general educational subjects and basic military training." The positive situation in the teaching collective, a demanding attitude toward the young teacher, and painstaking, persistent, and systematic study did their work. In five years he had become one of the best military instructors in the oblast.

Comrade Kholodnyy studies regularly and prepares carefully for every lesson. He uses the most effective teaching methods. Thus, before going to the ninth grade for training periods on the topic "Description of the chemical and bacterial weapons of the armies of the imperialist states," the military instructor talked with the chemistry and biology teachers, acquainted himself with the syllabi in these subjects, and ascertained that the students ought to know many things already. Therefore, he devoted primary attention to explaining procedures for detecting means of intoxication and contamination and defending against them. Ties with the teachers of regular subjects make it possible for him to use class time efficiently and achieve good results in BMT. Before practical training periods Valeriy Panteleymonovich drills himself in order to be able to perform the particular procedure in an exemplary manner. He also calculates necessary time and prepares physical facilities.

When working on drill training and grenade throwing the military instructor relies on the knowledge and skills acquired by the students

at physical training classes. Together with reserve officer V. I. Tolubets, the physical training teacher, and the school DOSAAF committee, he prepares students to meet the standards of the GTO [Ready for Labor and Defense] test and holds competition in military-applied sports.

The second training period on the topic "Individual Protective Gear" was interesting and instructive. In working out this topic the military instructor took into account the fact that the students had already studied the construction of the gas mask in the second and fifth grades. Therefore he began the first lesson with rules for picking out a helmet facepiece. When they had chosen gas masks, disinfected them, and wiped them the instructor suggested that the students put them on by themselves. Then he watched to see who carried out the assignment and how well, and checked to see if the fit of the strap was correct and the hole in the respirator canister was opened. After correcting mistakes observed during the drill he went on to the next question.

Comrade Kholodnyy usually conducts practical lessons in the following order: model demonstration by the elements with explanation; study with the students by the elements and as a whole; check; drill; review of the lesson and home assignment.

He leaves 4-5 minutes for the concluding part of the training period. In this time he tests how well the class has assimilated the topic, announces grades, and gives the assignment for the next lesson.

The school director and military instructor devote a great deal of attention to extracurricular work. With the DOSAAF committee they organize competition in BMT and hold military sports days. The school has two rifle shooting circles directed by the military instructor. He also heads the school shooting team which participates successfully in rayon competition.

It is noteworthy that students who have graduated from the school continue to maintain contact and correspond with the military instructor. They are grateful to him. For example, here is what Guards Pvt Aleksandr Grishko, a former student, wrote: "Dear Valeriy Panteleymonovich! Four months have passed since I was called up to the army. In this time I have gotten used to life in the subunit and become a regular member of it. You deserve most of the credit for the fact that I like military service and it is going well. At BMT lessons you taught me and the other fellows love for military affairs and for the Soviet Armed Forces and gave us knowledge which has proven very useful.

"Thank you very much for all the work which you put into training future fighting men. I wish you happiness, good health, and success in your work of indoctrinating young people! A. Grishko."

Comrade Kholodnyy has had great success. But no matter how much the military instructor worked, alone he could not achieve the desired results. For his achievements he is obligated first of all to the leaders of the school, party organization, and entire collective of teachers. And it is not just that they helped him become a teacher and created good physical facilities for BMT. The "secret" of success is that work on military-patriotic indoctrination and BMT is considered at the school to be one of the key components of the entire educational process. The entire large and harmonious collective of teachers takes an active part in it.

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CONTROL OF ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY FIRE DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 77 signed to press 9 Nov 77 pp 36-37

[Article by V. Dedov, engineer: "Control of Antiaircraft Artillery Fire"]

[Text] Antiaircraft missile complexes are one of the basic means of air defense today. They include powerful rockets and highly sophisticated radioelectronic equipment. The launched missile is guided to the target and hits it accurately.

But antiaircraft artillery, an old and proven means of air defense which received its greatest development in the late 1920's and early 1930's, has not lost its importance either. In those old days airplanes flew at speeds of just 300-400 kilometers an hour and antiaircraft artillery was a menace to them. It could destroy targets in a broad range of altitudes and on the distant approaches to the site being defended and it had enormous density of fire.

Antiaircraft artillery fire has definite characteristics. The shell is aimed at a point assumed to lie in the path of the target's movement. Before firing, therefore, the coordinates must be determined: the azimuth, elevation angle, and slant range. Let us recall that the azimuth is the angle formed between the direction to the target and a northerly direction with the apex at the point where the antiaircraft gun is, the elevation angle is obtained by intersecting the line of the horizon with the line that connects the point where the gun is with the target, and the slant range is the distance from the gun to the target.

After calculating the target's direction of travel and speed and knowing the position of the target at the moment of the shot, the lead point is determined. This is the point which the aircraft and shell will reach in the same time from the moment of the shot.

The calculation figure can be obtained without calculation instruments, but this of course requires a good deal of time and the target will

escape from the probable hit zone during it. Therefore, an approximate lead point was chosen at first. And when it was difficult to determine even the approximate position of the target, guns would open up with defensive fire. It is not surprising that hundreds of shells were sometimes used to wipe out one plane.

In 1932 antiaircraft artillery units adopted the PUAZO (antiaircraft fire control instrument). It was a calculating unit which determined the data needed to fire at the lead point. At first these data were given to the gun crews by voice, which also had problems. In 1935 the troops received the significantly improved PUAZO-2 device equipped with synchro-servo transmission. Now the parameters of the target position computed by the instrument were transmitted to the antiaircraft guns by wire, shown on the corresponding scales, and all the gun layer had to do was turn the control column until the aiming arrow matched the readings on the scales.

The appearance of the PUAZO made it possible to increase the rate of fire and accuracy in hitting maneuvering targets and to reduce the number of shells fired.

The chief parts of modern PUAZO's are: the computer, the stereo range-finder, the antiaircraft instrument carriage, and the cables connecting the PUAZO with the guns and gun-laying radar. The radar can determine the coordinates of targets at any time of the day or night in any weather.

Firing data may be obtained using the stereo rangefinder mounted on the PUAZO or by the radar. In the latter case the distance between the PUAZO and the radar should not be more than 50 meters and the center of the battery should not be more than 300 meters away from them.

The crew prepares the PUAZO carefully for combat work. At first they do the leveling, then the instrument orientation, and finally the electrical check. The synchronization of transmissions between the PUAZO and the radar and the PUAZO and the gun is checked. Corrections are made for wind velocity and azimuth, change in air density and the muzzle velocity of the shell, and loading time. After this the crew is ready to perform its combat mission.

The command is received to begin work: according to data from the stereo rangefinder for example, an enemy plane is approaching. The layer for elevation and the layer for line search for the target, at first using the rough-laying sights of the stereo rangefinder and then the optical sites.

When the plane is in the center circle of the sights, the layers set the instrument on semiautomatic target tracking. Next the stereoscope operator matches the measuring markers with the target image for depth and continues manual tracking using a control column or switches on the semiautomatic tracking. Meanwhile the elevation setter matches the zero reader with the zero mark. The angle of elevation received is fed to the computer for further processing.

Upon receiving the flight elevation of the target as calculated by the PUAZO, the platoon leader determines the azimuth and velocity of the wind and change in air density. The commander of the instrument division makes the corrections ordered.

If the flight elevation of the target does not change for a certain period of time the height setter switches the instrument working regimes to the "horizontal flight" position. When the instrument has performed all the calculations necessary for firing, the green "Data ready" lights go on. Similar lights go on on the commander's remote console where the battery commander works.

The PUAZO data are transmitted to what are called "gun receivers." They are selsyn receivers connected synchronously with the selsyn transmitters of the PUAZO. The values of the lead azimuth, angle of elevation, and fuse setting calculated in the instrument are transmitted from the PUAZO to the antiaircraft guns by the synchro-servo transmission circuits.

When the battery commander presses the siren button, the signal to open fire, all the commands worked out by the PUAZO will already have been performed: the hydraulic drive turns the gun to the given azimuth, the barrel will assume a definite angle of elevation, and the fuse will be automatically set in the necessary position.

The battery commander presses the siren button and the antiaircraft guns fire a volley. After the first comes a second, then a third, until the plane is hit. New data on the next targets flow in a continuous stream from the PUAZO to the guns.

The large volume of computations performed by the PUAZO requires timely data input. Only a crew which has practiced its actions to the point of automatism and works very well together can meet this challenge. A sense of responsibility, precision, and great skill are required of every fighting man. While combat work is underway it is a monolithic, unified collective that one sees at the instrument controls. And this is what makes a battery of antiaircraft guns a significant force.

Antiaircraft artillery, especially small-caliber artillery which is highly mobile, simple to service, and reliable in battle, is still in use as a means of fighting an air enemy. Antiaircraft artillery and antiaircraft missile complexes are a reliable shield guarding our peaceful skies against possible infringement by any aggressor.

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COMMENTS ON NATO PROPAGANDA EFFORTS

Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 77 signed to press 9 Nov 77 pp 40-41

[Article by Col V. Katerinich: "The Washing Machine"]

[Text] The propaganda machine of the NATO countries has been working its hardest in recent months. It faces the challenge of "selling society the neutron bomb," the new weapon of mass destruction being developed in the United States. "The neutron bomb is a great Western achievement"; "The neutron bomb will save us from Russian aggression"; "To oppose the neutron bomb means to help the Russians"; "The neutron bomb in NATO hands is good"; — this is what these merchants of death wail on every street corner. They are directed by a contemporary "brainwashing machine." It is constantly growing stronger and being improved, searching for new, more refined forms and methods of influencing human minds. This "machine" has become an important factor in shaping public opinion in the NATO countries, a tool of the bloc's aggressive policy.

The NATO Council, the supreme military-political body of the bloc, determines the strategic line of the machine's work. For 28 years now the council has gathered for sessions twice a year. And at each session anticommunism and anti-Sovietism have been at the center of attention; at each one calls have rung out to intensify military preparations aimed at the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community. The session held in May 1977 was no exception. It set the goal of qualitative improvement in the bloc's military machine: production and delivery of new weapons systems to the armies, improving the training of the reserves in all branches of the armed forces, and working out questions of mobilizing them. But what about the "brainwashing machine"? Its mission is to impress people with the reality of the "Soviet military threat" and convince them of the necessity of new sacrifices to build up the might of the bloc.

In the periods between sessions of the NATO council adjustments in NATO propaganda are made by the international secretariat which has a

group of special consultants on issues of policy, information, the press, and culture, as well as three committees (on problems of modern society, policy, and information and cultural ties) which determine the direction of operational propaganda in their various areas of specialization and give concrete recommendations for the conduct of propaganda.

The information service is the working agency for NATO propaganda. The the name "information service" does not, however, indicate the essence of its work. The name was selected to create the appearance of objectivity and impartiality, which are expected to act as a kind of lure to public opinion. But in fact, the service long ago adopted the lie, false information, and slander as its tools.

The service is headed by an information directorate. On its orders propaganda materials for newspapers and magazines, books, brochures, photograph exhibits, and the like are prepared and supplied abundantly to all bodies and institutions participating in shaping public opinion in the NATO countries. Specifically, each year they publish the "NATO Reference Book," "NATO in Facts and Figures," "Aspects of NATO Activities," and other books which set forth the basic arguments in favor of the bloc's policy and the arms race and the main tenets of anticommunism and anti-Sovietism. The journal NATO REVIEW is the press organ of the information directorate.

To correct the propaganda apparatuses of particular countries and to influence public opinion the information directorate makes extensive use of press conferences and talks by military and political figures, above those who stand at the helm of the bloc's military machine. American General A. Haig , supreme commander of NATO Unified Armed Forces in Europe, is particularly active. For example, during a regular press conference in Brussels in July 1977, speaking with great heat, he told his listeners that the NATO countries faced a "growing threat of Russian attack" and therefore it was urgently necessary to bolster the NATO military machine.

At the insistence of the NATO information directorate all the leading newspapers of the bloc countries carried reports of this press conference and added their own anti-Soviet commentary.

The information directorate organized a talk between West German General Schultz, commander of NATO Unified Armed Forces and Central Europe, and A. Weinstein, military observer for the newspaper FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE. The general set forth the "strategic conceptions of NATO" and tried to show that the "forward defense is a political and military necessity for NATO" because "the field of military actions must be advanced far forward." In these statements, as in all others, the aggressive essence of the North Atlantic bloc shows through convincingly.

The NATO information service is organizing the exhibition of traveling truck and railroad shows with great pomp. These shows scurry from city

to city, from town to town, trying to prove that the existing bloc is "very necessary" to the people because otherwise they would "be subject to attack by the Soviet Union" and "lose their freedom." To prevent this, the shows say, "everything must be sacrificed" in order to "save the world" from the "Soviet threat." The utter absurdity of these arguments is plainly evident to the Soviet reader. However, Western readers who do not receive objective information frequently "take the bait."

The information service carries on training and retraining of propaganda cadres and other people in various ways involved with shaping public opinion, above all teachers and leaders of youth organizations, on an all-NATO scale. Assemblies, seminars, colloquia, and excursions are organized for them. The leader of the American communists Gus Hall described the chief principles of NATO's journalism very accurately when he said: "When it comes to reports about the socialist countries, the journalists become amazingly unobjective, implausible, and heedless of means. The main rule of their journalistic activity is to use the big lie. Their anti-Sovietism bounds on foolhardiness."

The information service conducts many of its propaganda operations through the so-called NATO Assembly as well as a good hundred other organizations like it. According to a statement by the English journal INTERNATIONAL NAVY, its mission is to "force the public in the NATO countries to become aware of the seriousness of the Soviet threat." The assembly has five committees: military, political, economic, science and technology, and education, culture, and information. Twice a year its members gathered for sessions which are purely propagandistic and are conducted under the banners of anti-Sovietism and anticommunism.

Thus, to be specific, the session held in November 1976 spoke out "against participation by communists in the governments of the countries of Western Europe," recommended that Spain's preparations for entry into NATO be intensified, and demanded that the "supply of more up-to-date types of weapons to the armies of the NATO countries" be stepped up. Speaking of this session, the newspaper of the French communists L' HUMANITE wrote: "It has been proven once again that in the name of primitive anticommunism the politicians are ready to sacrifice the interests of the people in all fields, politics and military affairs included."

One of the elements of the NATO "machine for washing brains" is the Association of the North Atlantic Bloc. It is a gigantic propaganda octopus with branches in all the NATO countries. Its director is the not-unknown W. Rostow, who was once a security advisor to the American presidents Kennedy and Johnson. He has now declared himself a fighter "to root out the ulcer of communism" and he directs all the activities of his association to this end. In February 1977 the association held a special colloquium devoted to studying "the results of fulfillment of the Helsinki agreements in the USSR." Representatives of the most active anti-Soviet and anticommunist centers in the West were assembled at the colloquium: the Swedish Institute of International Relations,

the Hague East-West Institute, the subversive radio station Radio Free Europe, the German Institute of International Eastern Studies, and others. The speakers tried to accuse the Soviet Union of all the mortal sins, even of supposedly "attempting to thwart the alleviation of international tension."

The so-called International Confederation of Reserve Officers also carries on aggressive propaganda activities. Its goals are to keep reserve officers in constant readiness for mobilization and to work among young people. In June 1977 the confederation gathered for its regular congress, the 30th, in London. More than 1,000 delegates attended. The congress was conducted in an anti-Soviet spirit.

The permanent conference of Atlantic organizations also engages in ideological "bombardment" of the population and military personnel of the NATO countries. The conference joins more than 50 organizations scattered through all the countries of the bloc who apply their influence to all aspects of public life.

The information directorate is not even ashamed to make use of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, the White Emigre Popular Labor Union, and Zionist organizations such as the Jewish Defense League, the World Zionist Organization, and others.

The large number of organizations who work for the NATO information directorate and propagandize its militarist ideology is the result of a special kind of reasoning. The thing is that few people believe official propaganda in the West any longer. Therefore, today it is carried on in what is called a "dispersed" manner by creating an appropriate situation of mass anticommunist, anti-Soviet psychosis. With the help of the many supposedly public organizations one anti-Soviet sensation follows another, establishing an atmosphere hostile to the USSR. The whole situation influences a person continuously and steadily. He is not directly called to war, but, as the West German journal BUNTE writes, "the image of the enemy is before him at all times" and he himself must conclude that war is inevitable. And the enemy depicted is invariably the Soviet Union and its armed forces.

What are the results of the latest methods of military propaganda? We can judge this from a statement by the West German newspaper DEUTSCHES ALLGEMEINES SONNTAGSBLATT. It wrote that the population of the NATO countries does not have "even primitive knowledge of the Soviet Union," but that "for many people the USSR is a foreign world which arouses hostile associations." Using a steady stream of sensational messages such as "In 48 hours the Russians can reach the Rhine," a virtually hysterical fear of so-called "Moscow militarism" is kindled in the people. That is why, the newspaper says, "people have become accustomed to receiving news of military building in the East with concern but feeling satisfaction upon hearing of the development of new weapons systems in the West," for example the cruise missiles and neutron bombs, especially when the latter are often called "clean weapons."

The methods of "dispersed" propaganda and social demagoguery, which were very useful to fascism in its day, are being used more and more broadly in NATO, supplanting the methods of "straightforward" deception. Having neither sociopolitical reserves nor the spiritual values with which to work out ideas that could be accepted by the masses, the imperialists of the NATO countries more and more often present them with various kinds of propaganda "novelties" taken from the old arsenals of bourgeois propaganda.

The extraordinary activity of NATO propaganda can be explained not only by attempts to impose such barbaric weapons as the neutron bomb on the population and not only by a desire to plunge the world into a new round in the armed race. The steady growth of the influence of the ideas of peace and socialism is also a factor. The NATO propagandists are taking special pains today because it has become more apparent, in the year of the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and adoption of the new USSR constitution, which has revealed even further the majestic achievements of socialism in the economic, social, political, and cultural fields, that capitalism has no future, that it cannot offer its people anything like that which socialism provides. This is the source of the desire to distract the masses with fabrications concerning the "aggressiveness of the Soviet Union," its "violation of human rights," and so on in order to prevent them from seeing the superiority of socialist democracy.

Of course, one must not underrate the malicious activity of NATO propaganda. Behind it are the militaristic circles of imperialism who control modern weapons and are nurturing aggressive plans against other peoples, above all the peoples of the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community. Therefore, high political vigilance and constant readiness to defend our native land are demanded of us all.

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REVIEW OF NEW BREZHNEV BOOK

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[Unattributed review on occasion of publication of book by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev "Voprosy razvitiya politicheskoy sistemy sovetskogo obshchestva" (Issues of Development of the Political System of Soviet Society): "The Political System of Developed Socialism"]

[Text] Speaking at a VTsIK [All-Russian Central Committee] session on the eve of the 5th Anniversary of the Great October, V. I. Lenin expressed the firm conviction that, having begun economic and cultural development, the Soviet land would overtake the foremost capitalist states with a swiftness such as history had never before known. He said that "no one will believe the fantastic speed of our transformations, no matter what kind there are, but on the other hand, we believe in the actual speed, in a speed compared with any period of historical development, taken as it was, in such a speed where the movement is led by a really revolutionary party, and we will attain such speed no matter what."*

Life fully confirmed Lenin's wise foresight. An enormous, backward country was transformed in historically minimum periods of time into a country of highly developed industry, collectivized agriculture and foremost science and culture. The developed socialist society built in the USSR was a natural stage along the path toward communism. In this stage, when socialism is developing on its own basis, the creative forces of the new system and advantages of the socialist way of life are being revealed ever more fully and workers are enjoying the fruits of the great revolutionary achievements more and more widely.

The past six decades of socialist development are the clearest demonstration of what the people of labor are capable of, having taken over political leadership of society and assumed for themselves the responsibility for

^{*} Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], XLV, 247.

the country's fate. These decades have shown that there were and are no ways to socialism without the power of the workers and without socialist statehood except for this one.

The political system which took shape in the USSR now represents an integral complex of state organs and public organizations by means of which the Soviet people, headed by the working class, control the affairs of society. The Communist Party is the managing nucleus of this system. The party in its many-sided political, ideological and organizational activities, carefully considers the needs of social development. One of these needs is the further improvement of all levels of state and public control over the processes of the building of communism.

The nature of problems of development of the political system of mature socialism which have been advanced by life itself, their creative interpretation on the basis of Marxist-Leninist science, their practical resolution, and the new theoretical conclusions and directions for the work of the party and people all are concentrated in the works of CPSU CC General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, included in the book "Voprosy razvitiya politicheskoy sistemy sovetskogo obshchestva," put out by Politizdat [Political Publishing House].

The book includes fully or partially Comrade Brezhnev's speeches, appearances, articles and welcoming remarks during the period from November 1964 through October 1977. It also examines such fundamental issues of the development of the political system of socialism as the increase in the Communist Party's managing and directing role, a strengthening of the Soviet state, improvement of socialist democracy, and expansion of the rights and obligations of public organizations and labor collectives. A great deal of space is devoted to the new USSR Constitution, to the development of which Comrade Brezhnev made a decisive contribution.

The book written by Comrade Brezhnev is a major event in the country's ideological and political life. It arms party and state cadres and the aktiv of mass public organizations with a precise program of action. It teaches the party, scientific approach to resolving problems of creating a material-technical base of communism, improving social relationships and shaping a new person.

Lenin always viewed Marxist teaching as the science and art of revolutionary creativity. He emphasized that Marxism consists of being able to determine which policy must be conducted under particular conditions. In pointing to the complexity of managing society, Vladimir II'ich taught the party always to see the dialectical interconnection of events and to find in the chain of tasks the most urgent, key task which predetermined successful accomplishment of the entire aggregate of problems.

Allegiance to creative Marxism-Leninism, reliance on its fundamental scientific principles, and an innovatively bold approach to posing and solving current problems being put forth by everyday practice and the historical creativity of the masses permeate all the activity by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, its Central Committee and the CC Politburo headed by Comrade Brezhnev. This also was fully manifested in the party's solution to questions of the development of a political system of Soviet society, which is shown convincingly by the book's contents.

In order to solve the truly historic problems of social development facing us in the stage of mature socialism, which are unprecedented in scale and significance, there is a need for a concentration of the will and energy of all the Soviet people and high activeness and organization by the masses. Comrade Brezhnev points out that "creation of a material-technical base of communism, development of communist social relationships, and the comprehensive growth of the human personality are impossible without every possible increase in the creative initiative of the masses, without development of socialist democracy" (p 6). The task for the leaders of a society heading toward communism is "to identify to the maximum the capabilities within it for harmonious and even development. Just where is the key to solution of this problem? This key is the correct functioning of this political system of society; above all, the many-sided work of the Communist Party, which rests on the data of science and rich practical experience" (p 161).

The topic of the party as the nucleus of a political system and the managing and directing force of Soviet society, and an increase in its role as the scale and complexity of tasks of building a new society grow can be traced through all the statements by Comrade Brezhnev. It is the Leninist party which, on the basis of a profound analysis of political, socioeconomic and ideological processes, reveals to the country the prospects of forward progress, generates a gigantic amount of energy in the masses and organizes them to accomplish the urgent problems of communist creation. It is noted in the book that "we do not have and there cannot be another political force which would be capable of considering, combining and coordinating the interests and needs of all classes and social groups, all nations and nationalities, and all generations of our society with such completeness and consistency as is done by the Communist Party" (p 140).

The CPSU was advanced to the role of managing and directing force of society by the victory of the October Revolution and by the entire history of the Land of Soviets. This role of the party is clearly reflected in the Basic Law of the Soviet State.

The CPSU exists for the people and serves the people. Soviet communists, as with all Soviet citizens, realize full well that no privileges for the party at all come from the constitutional reinforcement of the CPSU's managing role in our state and society. To the contrary, this imposes a heightened responsibility on it, since the CPSU exercises its directing role not by force, but thanks to high political authority and ideological influence among

the masses. The book points out that "the meaning of party leadership lies in ensuring the indestructible ideological and political unity of all society and of ensuring the purposeful, coordinated development of all component parts of the social organism" (p 84).

The people's revolutionary creativity brought forth a broad and cohesive system through which the party is connected with the masses on a daily basis and exercises leadership over them. This consists of the soviets, trade unions, Komsomol and voluntary societies of workers. Throughout six decades now, this system has convincingly demonstrated its indisputable advantages.

A most important element of our political system is a new type of state born of the Great October—the Soviet state, the basic tool of defense of revolutionary achievements and of the building of socialism and communism. It has proven its strength and vitality over the past 60 years by going through severe trials. Arising as a dictatorship of the proletariat, the Soviet state has become a state of all the people as the result of the profound socioeconomic transformations which have taken place in our society and the transition of all layers of the population to the ideological and political positions of the working class. In expressing the will and interests of workers, peasants, intelligentsia and toilers of all nations and nationalities of the country, it turns the growth in physical production and the progress of science and culture to their welfare.

The book reveals the dialectics of the progressive development of socialist statehood and shows the continuity and expansion of basic internal and external functions of the Soviet state. There is fundamental significance in Comrade Brezhnev's profound substantiation of the thesis that the leading role of the working class is preserved in a mature socialist society and in the state of all the people—the role of the largest, most organized and politically most experienced class, which occupies key positions in economic life and which makes a decisive contribution to the creation of the physical foundations of communism and to strengthening of the country's defenses.

In conformity with objective domestic and external conditions, and having become a state of all the people, the Soviet state does not lose its class essence: being the natural development of a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat, it now serves as a powerful tool for complete accomplishment of the world-historical mission of the working class—the building of a classless communist society. This goal is secured in the new USSR Constitution as the highest goal in the state's activities. A clearly defined class nature is inherent to the USSR's foreign policy, which is aimed at ensuring favorable international conditions for communist development, a strengthening of the positions of world socialism, support of the peoples' struggle for national liberation and social progress, and prevention of aggressive wars.

While firmly defending the cause of peace and international security, our country is forced to take into account the actions of forces hostile to socialism and to strengthen its own defenses. Comrade Brezhnev emphasizes that "everything created by the people must be reliably defended. To strengthen the Soviet state means to strengthen its Armed Forces as well and to increase the defense capability of our Motherland in every way possible. So long as we live in an uneasy world, this task remains one of the most important ones!" (p 183). The new USSR Constitution places the defense of the socialist homeland among the most important functions of the state and proclaims it a cause of all the people.

In revealing the Army's place in the political system of our society, Comrade Brezhnev characterizes its historical purpose and shows the concern of the party, state and people for the Armed Forces. A fundamental distinction between the Soviet Army and bourgeois armies is that it has been brought up in a spirit of deep dedication to the socialist Motherland, to ideals of peace and internationalism, and to ideals of the friendship of peoples. This makes it an excellent school for communist indoctrination, as well as one of professional training and volitional conditioning of the youth. Our people highly esteem and love their Army, realizing that so long as forces of aggression exist on earth they cannot get by without a well equipped army. Carrying out the people's will, the Communist Party at its 25th Congress confirmed the resolve "to do everything to ensure that the grand Armed Forces of the Soviet Union continue to possess all necessary means for performing their important mission of being the guardian over the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the bulwark of universal peace" (p 379).

The might of the Soviet state and of all its organs, which provide for successful functioning and development of society, effective resolution of the grandiose socioeconomic and cultural-indoctrinational tasks, defense of revolutionary achievements, creation of peaceful conditions for communist creation, and firm law and order in the country is determined primarily by the awareness and organization of the citizens and by the social activeness of workers and their associations. Lenin's statement that the socialist state is strong in the awareness of the masses fully preserves its currency in our days as well.

The main lines of progress of Soviet statehood and of a strengthening of its democratic foundations are these: all possible strengthening of the socialist state of all the people; an improvement in the work of all elements of its apparatus; an increase in the role and responsibility of its representative organs; assurance of absolute observance of socialist legality in all spheres of social life; and bringing in an ever increasing number of citizens to take part in solving these problems and in managing the affairs of society and the state. Comrade Brezhnev says that "democracy for us is not simply a blessing, but a vitally necessary condition for all our activities and an important moving force of communist society" (p 61). And inasmuch as the course for consistent expansion and deepening of democracy defines the party's activities in developing the Soviet political

system, the book has much space devoted to the problems of implementing sovereignty of the people.

Socialism and democracy are indivisible concepts. This conclusion stems not only from theory, but from the very rich practice of socialist and communist development as well. Millions of Soviet citizens now take part in the work of the soviets, people's control organs and public organizations, in production management and so on. Thus, even at the present stage of development of the political system of a mature socialist society, prerequisites are being created for resolution of the great task formulated by Lenin: "Transition through the Soviet state toward gradual destruction of the state by means of systematic enlistment of an increasing number of citizens, and then of all citizens to a man, to carry their share of burdens in managing the state directly and on a daily basis."*

The consistency and purposefulness of the party's work in this direction and universal support of its efforts, focussed on further improvement of socialist democracy and practical realization of provisions of the new USSR Constitution, will unquestionably allow activation of additional reserves of the historic creativity of the masses and thus an accelerated movement of our society toward communism. As Comrade Brezhnev accurately stated in his briefing at the Extraordinary 7th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, "the future does not lie beyond the present. The future lies within the present and, by accomplishing the tasks of today, of the socialist day, we gradually enter the day of tomorrow, the communist day" (p 469).

The large-scale, complex character of development of a mature socialist society and the tasks facing it also have an effect in one way or another on the sphere of its political organization and relates to problems of its improvement. For example, the task of creating a material-technical base of communism cannot be viewed as a purely economic task, in isolation from all party policy or from the accomplishment of social, cultural and ideological-indoctrinational tasks. It stands to reason that we also cannot fail to consider the fact that the Soviet state's accomplishment of its economic function is closely tied in with the work of such nonstate institutes as kolkhozes, cooperatives, trade unions and the Komsomol.

In this sense there is a great theoretical and practical value to the provisions stated in the book concerning concrete functions of various elements of the Soviet political system, the need for a party and political approach to any matter, and the need for firm implementation of the principle of democratic centralism. Thus, in examining problems of development of the USSR's economy at the present stage, Comrade Brezhnev advances the improvement in the economic mechanism and an upsurge in labor activity of the masses as the most important tasks. And although these tasks primarily bear a political character, the increase in effectiveness of production and quality

^{*} Lenin, XXXVI, 74

of output, the strengthening of the economy and thrift, introduction of new technology and equipment, and so on, depend primarily on their successful accomplishment.

The book poses fundamental and politically acute problems of combining economic activity with organization and ideological-indoctrinational work, problems of developing socialist competition, disseminating foremost experience, strengthening conscious discipline, and creating in all labor collectives a moral climate which would facilitate every possible upsurge in creative activity, initiative and enthusiasm of the people. "Here lies a great advantage of socialism. Here is one of its main 'secrets' which throughout our history has permitted the achievement of what appeared to be impossible and to stun the entire world with the tempos of development of the new society and with its vital force and dynamism" (p 401).

The book attests to the very close ties of its author with the working class and with the broad masses of toilers. Comrade Brezhnev strives to identify the "human" aspect of the problem everywhere. Very typical in this regard is his statement at the 16th Soviet Trade Union Congress: "The working person in a socialist society is not a mechanical performer of particular operations or particular directions. Of importance to him not only is the immediate result of his own efforts, but also their place and significance in the overall labor process. . . Where the working person knows that his voice is heeded, that he is reckoned with, and that his position is really being considered in the elaboration of social and economic plans, there and only there does he feel himself to be a true master of production, and the master of his own fate. Thus do the political and the production tasks come together" (p 408).

The true humanism and democratism of Soviet society is embodied in the activity of all elements of its political system. The directions and contents of this activity now are fixed in the new USSR Constitution, which crowned the party's enormous theoretical and practical work in the field of improving the mechanism of socialist sovereignty of the people.

According to the Constitution, all power in the USSR belongs to the people, who exercise it through the soviets of people's deputies. The role of the soviets as the political foundation of our state is invariably emphasized by Comrade Brezhnev. In statements from various years, their activity has been analyzed thoroughly and specifically, in close connection with tasks facing the country. A uniform line has been consistently conducted here, the essence of which was expressed as far back as the 23rd Party Congress in the propositions that "an improvement in the work of the soviets must be made on the basis of their further democratization," and that "success in the work of the soviets largely is determined by enlisting broad masses of the people in their work" (pp 35, 36). Comrade Brezhnev was the initiator of a number of legislative acts passed in recent years on the soviets and their deputies, which determined the spirit and letter of the corresponding articles of the new Constitution. The conclusion formulated

at the 17 June 1977 session of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet that "any one of our Soviets is a particle of supreme power, that it not only is invested with the authority to resolve all questions relating to its competence, but also to act as the conductor of statewide decisions" (p 437) has a fundamentally important theoretical and practical importance.

The book examines in detail matters of an improvement in the work of the state apparatus and raising the culture of management. Comrade Brezhnev emphasizes that "without a smooth-running state apparatus which operates precisely at all echelons, it is impossible to manage the complex and fine organism of the modern economy or other aspects of social life, not to mention the country's defense" (p 117).

Considerable space is taken up in the book by an analysis of such means of improving the work of all elements of the political system as proper selection, placement and indoctrination of management cadres, affirmation of Lenin's principles and style of management, control and check of execution of the decisions made, development of businesslike criticism and self-criticism, and increasing the effectiveness of party influence on all aspects of the work of state organs and public organizations.

The party displays constant concern for improving the work of trade unions, which, in Lenin's definition, are a school of management, a school of administration, a school of communism. Trade unions, which bring together over 113 million workers, facilitate with all their many-sided activities the implementation of democracy in the basic sphere of application of man's creative forces—the sphere of production. The 35-million-member Lenin Komsomol is an active force in the country's sociopolitical life and the party's reliable assistant in indoctrinating the young generation of builders of communism.

Bourgeois ideologists and revisionists of a right and "left" doctrine distort the meaning and content of party direction of the soviets, trade unions and Komsomol and attempt to depict matters as if the CPSU were striving to "dominate" society and expand its rights at the expense of other labor organizations. The speculative and slanderous nature of these assertions is obvious. The dialectics of development of the political system of socialism is such that the rights of state and social organizations expand along with the expansion in the party's role. The book's contents convincingly show that it is the Leninist party of communists which always has been the initiator and is the reliable guarantor for further improvement of socialist democracy and an expansion in the authority of mass labor organizations.

Elaborated on the basis of precise party directives, the new USSR Constitution secures broad democratic rights for trade unions, the Komsomol, other social organizations as well as labor collectives, including the right to take part in resolving political, economic and sociocultural matters and to display legislative initiative. In his report at the May (1977) plenary session of

the CPSU CC, Comrade Brezhnev remarked that realization of the Constitution's provisions should elevate to a qualitatively new level all our state and economic activities and all the work of organs of power and management, and will allow millions upon millions of Soviet citizens to join even more actively in managing the economy and in supervising the operation of the state apparatus (see pp 427, 428).

The tasks being accomplished by the Communist Party of shaping social awareness, raising the political and legal culture of the masses, and engaging in irreconcilable struggle against the influence of alien ideology and morality are closely connected with a complex of problems of developing the political system of mature socialism.

The exercise of political power and management is impossible without social norms, and above all legal norms, regulating the diverse manifestations of social life and thus orienting the activities and interrelationships of people, collectives and organizations.

It should be emphasized in this regard that, in being concerned for all possible development of democracy, the party at the same time attaches great significance to further strengthening of social discipline and observance by all citizens of their obligations to society, since democracy is impracticable without this. As Lenin pointed out, communist organization of social labor, in which the first step is made by socialism, is maintained, and the farther it goes the more it will be maintained, on the free and conscious discipline of the workers themselves. This is why more and more significance is acquired in the progressive movement of mature socialism by tasks of uplifting all social awareness to a new level and shaping that human personality for whom the observance of Soviet laws and requirements of socialist democracy and rules of community living become a habit.

The character of popular discussion of the draft of the new Constitution convincingly attests to the rightfulness and timeliness of such problems and tasks. Unanimous recognition and support went to the scientifically based conclusions formulated in Comrade Brezhnev's statements—conclusions which met the pressing interests of the workers—concerning the indivisible unity of rights and obligations of citizens, the need for further increasing the effectiveness of socialist legislation and the authority of Soviet laws, and on discipline, as being invariable conditions for implementing democracy and for all citizens to realize their rights and freedoms.

The need for systematic propaganda and for bringing to the awareness of every Soviet citizen the ideas and provisions of the new Basic Law of the country places great and responsible tasks before all organizations of our party and before ideological cadres in particular. The book states that "we want USSR citizens to know their rights and freedoms and the ways and methods for exercising them well, to be able to apply these rights and freedoms in the interests of building communism, and to have a clear understanding of their indivisible link with conscientious fulfillment of their

obligations as citizens. It is an important task of party, state and social organizations which are responsible for communist indoctrination of workers to facilitate this and help develop high political culture in every citizen" (pp 476-477). The entire meaning and every letter of our Constitution is aimed at ensuring that the historic creativity of the people's masses is maintained and developed in every possible way.

Speaking of prospects for the movement toward communism, Comrade Brezhnev pointed out in the report "The Great October and Progress of Mankind," that the level of awareness, culture and civil responsibility of Soviet citizens will play an ever increasing role in all spheres of life and development of our society. One of the primary tasks is to instill in the citizen the striving for high social goals, an ideological conviction and a truly creative attitude toward work. This is where a very important front in the struggle for communism passes, and both the progress of economic development and the country's sociopolitical development will depend more and more on our victories on this front.

Of enormous political and ideological significance in this regard are the tasks of struggle against revisionist and bourgeois ideology in problems of democracy, discipline, personal rights and freedoms, the relationships of man and society, and the political system of developed socialism as a whole—tasks which are sharply posed and broadly covered in the book. Using specific examples from life, Comrade Brezhnev shows the historic advantages of our Soviet democracy over the false and eroded "democracy" of the capitalist world, and he provides a rebuff to slanderous fabrications to the anti-Soviets and anticommunists of every stripe. And the new USSR Constitution is our most convincing argument in ideological struggle against the class enemy. It places "the truly epochal achievements of workers, gained thanks to the power of the working class under the direction of the Communist Party," (p 430) on the scales of history.

The book "Voprosy razvitiya politicheskoy sistemy sovetskogo obsichestva" shows convincingly the fruit of the CPSU's theoretical, organizational and indoctrinational activities aimed at all possible strengthening of the Soviet state and further improvement of socialist democracy as the most important conditions for successful accomplishment of historic problems of building communism. It is a major contribution to the ideological arsenal of the party and people. It contains a great creative charge and serves as a guide for action for state and social organizations and for all Soviet citizens.

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PAVLOVSKIY ON ARMED FORCES ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND COMBAT READINESS

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[Article by Arm Gen I. Pavlovskiy, CIC of Ground Forces, Deputy Minister of Defense of USSR, Hero Soviet Union: "Toward the 60th Anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces: In the Formation of Defenders of the Homeland"]

[Text] The Soviet people and their Armed Forces live and work in a remarkable time filled with historic events. The recent Extraordinary 7th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet unanimously adopted the new Constitution—the Basic Law of the first socialist state of the entire people in the world. A new influx of energy and enthusiasm was generated in Soviet citizens by the ideas and propositions of the report by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "The Great October and Progress of Mankind," and by other materials of the ceremonial session dedicated to the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

In these days our country and its soldiers are heading toward the glorious jubilee of the valorous USSR Armed Forces, who stand vigilantly on guard over the achievements of the Soviet people. In preparing for the 60th Anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy, we again and again pay homage to the wisdom and farsightedness of the Communist Party, which created and nurtured our valorous Armed Forces—the pride and glory of the Soviet people. The entire history of their origin and development is indivisibly connected with the enormous theoretical and practical activity of the Communist Party, and of its creator and leader, the great Lenin.

Daily leadership by the Communist Party is the basis for the might of our Army and Navy. The CPSU elaborates fundamental issues of military organizational development and of military theory and practice, and outlines the main directions and ways for technical outfitting of all branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms. The party and its Leninist central committee devote constant attention to party-political work and to improving its forms and methods. They steadfastly bring up Soviet soldiers in a spirit of utter devotion to the Motherland and in the spirit of allegiance to the behests of Lenin about defense of the socialist homeland.

In preparing to celebrate the 60th Anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy, we turn once more to their heroic annals and their glorious combat path. As foreseen by Lenin, the events of the very first post-October days convincingly confirmed that we could not exist without armed defense of the socialist republic, and that "any revolution is worthwhile only if it is able to defend itself."* From the very first days of existence of Soviet power, the associated forces of international imperialism and internal counterrevolution attempted by fire and sword to destroy the first state of workers and peasants in the world. Under these conditions the Communist Party managed to create the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and Workers' and Peasants' Red Navy in the very shortest periods of time. Our party had to accomplish such an exceptionally difficult and responsible mission under conditions of complete economic chaos in the country, under enemy necessary experience fire, and in the absence of trained cadres and in military organizational development.

The young Red Army possessed high morale, revolutionary awareness and utter devotion to the Leninist Party, which permitted it to win victory over the associated forces of foreign military intervention and internal counter-revolution. Thousands upon thousands of fighting men, commanders and political workers displayed unparalleled courage, valor and bravery on battlefields of the Civil War. Many of them were decorated with combat awards, including the first Soviet order, the Order of the Red Banner. To this day, the feats of Red Army units in the Urals and Siberia, on the Volga and the Don, in crossing the Sivash, and in the assault on Perekop and Volochayevka generate admiration in our friends and astonishment in our enemies.

The great victory over enemies of Soviet power was achieved thanks to the wise leadership of the Communist Party, led by the great strategist of the revolution, V. I. Lenin. It was the force which ensured a unity of political and military leadership in the course of the war and which managed to mobilize all resources to repel the enemy. Lenin pointed out that "only thanks to the fact that the party was on guard, that the party was most severely disciplined, and because the party's authority united all departments and establishments, and that tens, hundreds, thousands and in the final account, millions of persons went as one under the slogan which was given by the CC, . . . only for that reason, in spite of a second, third and fourth campaign by imperialists of the Entente and imperialists of the entire world were we in a position to win."**

After concluding the Civil War victoriously, our Motherland began peaceful socialist construction. The world was extremely unstable, however--imperialism had not abandoned its plans of destroying the Soviet system. Therefore the party did not forget for a minute Lenin's behest on the need to always be

^{*} Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], XXXVII, 122.

^{**} Lenin, XL, 240.

on guard, to preserve the Armed Forces as the apple of our eye, and to strengthen the country's defenses. With consideration of the accumulated experience, the combat practice received in the years of the Civil War, and the country's economic capabilities, there was a further organizational development of the Armed Forces of the Land of Soviets, including of the Ground Forces. Thus, as a result of the military reform (1924-1928), they received a stable organization in conformity with their class-revolutionary nature, the available material resources of the state, and demands of military science and military art of the time. This made it possible to improve the system and quality of combat and political training, to strengthen military discipline, to elevate the combat effectiveness of all combat arms and to develop the training of command and political cadres.

Rifle and cavalry corps were created on the basis of uniform manning tables. These were the highest combined-arms units, consisting of rifle and cavalry divisions respectively as the basic tactical units. At that time, the Ground Forces included the following combat arms: rifle troops, cavalry, artillery, armored forces, engineer, railroad, chemical and signal troops and rear services organs. In the thirties the porportion of artillery and armored troops rose as a result of refitting. Thus, in the rifle division of 1935 numbering 13,000 men, there were 57 tanks, 96 guns, 180 heavy machineguns, 354 light machineguns, and 18 antiaircraft machineguns. There was a corresponding change in the number of fighting men servicing the equipment.

Party and governmental decisions on military issues played an important part in the accelerated build-up in the country's defensive might, in strengthening its Armed Forces and in the composition of the Armed Forces and the Ground Forces. There was not a single party congress after the victory of October which did not examine these issues. The party foresaw the danger of a military confrontation with forces of imperialism and consistently readied the country, the people and the Army for armed defense of the Motherland. Results of this work were fully manifested during the mortal engagement with Hitlerite fascism.

The war imposed on the Soviet Union by fascist Germany was the largest military confrontation of the shock forces of world imperialism against socialism. It was the most difficult of all the trials which our Motherland ever had to endure. In the face of menacing danger, the Communist Party lifted all the Soviet people up for the sacred battle against the hated foe. In the shortest possible time, the country was transformed into a single military camp. The Great Patriotic War showed with all convincingness that the Communist Party was the organizing and directing force of the Soviet people and their Army in the severe years of trials.

Having assumed the main burden of fierce defensive battles, the Ground Forces in coordination with the Air Force and Navy then shifted to a decisive offensive, which was crowned by the brilliant victory of Soviet arms. In this strenuous battle, which lasted around four years, our Ground Forces, as well as the other branches of the USSR Armed Forces, proved their full superiority over the enemy both on the offense and on the defense, and played a decisive part in the final destruction of the main forces of armies of the coalition of fascist states.

Centuries will pass, but the people will retain in their memory the bright names of their true sons, who performed truly legendary exploits in defending the hero-fortress of Brest, the hero-cities of Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad, Sevastopol', Odessa, Kiev, Minsk, Novorossiysk, Kerch' and Tula, in battles in the Kursk Bulge, on the Dnepr, the Vistula and Oder, in the assault on Berlin and in liberating the nations of Austria, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia from the fascist yoke. The exploit of those soldiers who took part in the war against imperialist Japan and who crushed the million-man Kwantung Army also will not be forgotten. Having liberated the northeast provinces of China and Northern Korea, they drove the occupiers from age-old Russian soil—South Sakhalin and the Kuriles.

Comrade Brezhnev, who covered the entire front path together with Soviet soldiers, said that "the simple and modest people displayed unparalleled courage, scorn for death, valor, intelligence, resourcefulness and a steadfast will to win."*

Hundreds of thousands of soldiers of the Ground Forces were awarded orders and medals of the USSR for combat feats and mass heroism displayed at the fronts. Over 8,600 persons were presented with the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Over 2,000 became full bearers of the Order of Glory.

And the party members were there where it was most difficult. By their personal example of fearlessness, courage and heroism, they inspired comrades in arms to perform exploits. The main content of party-political work among the troops was a strengthening in fighting men and commanders of the faith in our complete and ultimate victory, instilling a hatred for the enemy in them, and developing in privates, sergeants and officers steadfastness, valor, combat activeness, a feeling of mutual help and collectivism, and allegiance to their patriotic and international duty. Our commanders and political workers had good knowledge of the road to the hearts of soldiers. They were able to win their trust and they mastered the art of maintaining high troop morale and an offensive spirit. The enormous, purposeful work of commanders, political organs and party organizations in maintaining a high moral potential in troops in the field was one of the decisive factors of our world-historical victory.

And now, when over three decades have passed since the last war, we indoctrinate personnel in the very same way in the revolutionary, combat and labor traditions of our people and in a spirit of boundless love and devotion for the Soviet Motherland and the Communist Party. We remind all who join the ranks of the Armed Forces of the great Lenin's behest that we must learn military affairs in a genuine manner and persistently master the science of winning, which is forged in battle.

Defenders of the socialist homeland are true sons of the people. They fervently approve and unanimously support the domestic and foreign policies

^{*} L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom" [With A Leninist Course], I, 130

of the Communist Party and the Soviet state. As with all Soviet citizens, our soldiers deeply realize that the CPSU's efforts are aimed at providing favorable international conditions for building communism in the USSR, for defending the state interests of the Soviet Union, for strengthening the positions of world socialism, for supporting the nations' struggle for national liberation, social progress and prevention of aggressive wars, and for attaining general and complete disarmament and consistent implementation of the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. So long as the aggressive forces of imperialism oppose the policy of detente and the peaceful aspirations of the peoples, however, and so long as the arms race, which creates the threat of nuclear warfare, continues, we will steadfastly show concern for strengthening the defenses of our Motherland; we will expose the intrigues of forces of aggression, revenge-seeking and reaction; we will increase vigilance in every way possible; and, as the USSR Constitution obligates us, we will be in constant combat readiness which guarantees immediate rebuff to any aggressor.

Thanks to the unflagging concern of the Communist Party and its Leninist central committee, and as a result of the selfless labor of all our people, the Soviet Armed Forces and their Ground Forces have been provided with everything necessary to perform their honorable missions. Nuclear missile weaponry, tanks and infantry combat vehicles, sophisticated long-range tube and rocket artillery systems, surface to air missile and self-propelled artillery mounts, and more improved means of control have sharply increased the combat capabilities of our forces and raised their shock and fire power, mobility and maneuverability. Military art and the theory and practice of training personnel have received further development.

As it is known, there is no longer an infantry in the previous sense, but there are motorized rifle units and large units, which comprise the basis of the Ground Forces. They are outfitted with automatic small arms, powerful means of antitank warfare, artillery and mortars, tanks and air defense systems. In comparison with the rifle division of 1939, the modern motorized rifle division surpasses it by 16 times in tanks, 37 times in APC's and armored vehicles, and five times in means of radio communications. The weight of one artillery and mortar salvo of the modern division is 31 times greater than that of the 1939 division. The presence of missile subunits in the combat formation capable of delivering nuclear strikes greatly increases the might of motorized units of the Ground Forces.

By associating almost all types of weapons and equipment within themselves, the motorized rifle forces are capable of shifting rapidly from one form of operation to another under combat conditions, and of performing broad maneuver on the battlefield. Subunits and units can be moved as a landing force on helicopters and aircraft, and can conduct prolonged fighting independently in isolation from the main body.

It is noteworthy that in the course of field problems troops show good cohesiveness and the capability of making long-distance marches at high speeds on and off the road, of conducting a swift attack, delivering powerful, accurate attacks by fire to a great depth, successfully crossing broad zones of obstacles and demolitions, assaulting major water obstacles from the move and performing rapid maneuver.

Tank troops serve as the basis for the shock force of the Ground Forces and as a powerful means of armed warfare, intended to accomplish important missions in different types of combat actions. Out of all the branches of the Ground Forces, they are most well adapted to swift and maneuverable combat actions under conditions of the employment of nuclear weapons. Tanks give the Ground Forces high combat activeness, maneuverability and an offensive impetus. They increase the depth of attack, rates of advance and stability of combat formations.

Missile troops and artillery comprise the basis for the firepower of the Ground Forces. Thus, operational-tactical and tactical missiles are capable of delivering powerful, accurate nuclear strikes against any targets situated within range of these missiles. The great range of the missiles and high speed of movement of the launchers permit broad maneuver both of the missile strikes and of the missile subunits. Their combat employment is not contingent on meteorological conditions, season of the year or time of day.

The artillery has merged organically with the missile troops. It is capable of broad operational and tactical maneuver and reliable fire support to combined-arms units and subunits in all types of warfare. At the present time, its inventory includes fully motorized gun, howitzer, rocket and antitank artillery and mortars distinguished by high maneuverability, high rate of fire and powerful, destructive projectiles.

There has been a significant increase in combat capabilities of air defense troops. They are now armed with highly mobile surface to air missile launchers of various types, which strike targets with high accuracy. Surface to air missile subunits, which now comprise the basis of air defense forces, are capable of combating the air enemy at low, medium and high altitudes. In addition, multibarrelled self-propelled air defense artillery possessing a high rate of fire and with fully automated fire control can be employed to combat air targets at low and medium altitudes.

The engineer troops also have modern equipment. They are outfitted with various assault crossing and ponton bridge means for the assault crossing of wide water obstacles at high rates of speed, and they possess the necessary personnel and means for laying various antitank, antipersonnel and antitransport minefields.

The Ground Forces also include chemical troops, consisting of subunits for chemical defense, special monitoring, gas and radioactive decontamination and disinfestation of the terrain, radiation and chemical survey, and others.

The role of the signal troops has increased. With their help, a harmonious system of stable troop control has been set up. To this end they have multichannel radio-relay stations, modern VHF [very high frequency] radio communications systems and other electronic gear permitting the transmission of information under conditions of enemy electronic countermeasures.

Motor transport, road repair, pipeline and rear services subunits occupy an important place in the Ground Forces. They are assigned missions of transport, supply and comprehensive support to the life, training and combat activity of all combat arms.

As we can see, the Ground Forces now represent the largest branch of the Soviet Armed Forces in size and the most diversified in technical outfitting and combat make-up. They are in a position to perform major strategic missions, both in conjunction with other branches of the Armed Forces and on their own.

There are vivid pages in the annals of many of our units and large units which tell of successful actions not only on the battlefields of the Great Patriotic War, but also in maneuvers and exercises such as "Dnepr" and "Dvina," in the Brotherhood in Arms' exercises held jointly with armies of the Warsaw Pact countries, and others. They were conducted under difficult conditions and on very broken terrain. They required great physical exertion, outstanding mastery of modern equipment and weapons and high moral-political and psychological conditioning of our troops. And it must be said that each time they honorably withstood the difficult test for combat maturity by demonstrating heightened combat training and military expertise.

Inspired by decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and of the subsequent plenary sessions of the party central committee, personnel of the Ground Forces, as well as of other branches of the Armed Forces, are selflessly performing their patriotic duty and are doing everything to ensure that the fruits of creative labor of the Soviet people are under reliable protection. True sons of the homeland, they deeply realize that their contribution to the general struggle for implementing plans of the Tenth Five-Year Plan lies in further increasing the combat readiness of units and large units. Its most important elements are practiced and polished with greatest effectiveness in the course of field training. As a rule, problems in tactical, tactical-special and weapons training are conducted in a difficult and instructive near-combat situation. Particular attention is given to concealed marches at top speed and to great distances, to swift attacks, to the assault crossing of water obstacles, and to the effective employment of weapons and combat equipment. This helps achieve cohesiveness and precise coordination in crews, teams, squads, platoons, companies and batteries.

This was confirmed by Exercise "Karpaty," which was held this year. The Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment from the Samara-Ul'yanovsk, Berdichev Iron Division of the Red Banner Carpathian Military District--the

initiator of socialist competition in the Ground Forces in honor of the 60th Anniversary of the Great October and of the 60th Anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces--distinguished itself in particular in the exercise by its competent tactical actions. The regiment successfully fulfilled its jubilee pledges and became outstanding. It was awarded the Pennant of the USSR Minister of Defense for courage and military valor. An atmosphere of industriousness, creative approach toward accomplishment of missions assigned to the soldiers, and of each one's indomitable striving to master combat equipment and weapons in outstanding fashion has been created in the best regiment in the legendary division. By methods of persuasion inherent in party work, by an active adoption of everything that is new and foremost, by eradication of shortcomings in the training process and, most importantly, by persistent struggle for personal example of party members in military labor, service and discipline, the commander and party organization have ensured a highly effective performance of operational training missions by the regiment. They have done much to ensure that battalion, company and platoon commanders themselves first of all have good mastery of the equipment, raise their class ratings and pass on their knowledge and experience to subordinates. And the result is evident, as they say. Many soldiers have become outstanding and specialists of a high rating. And again we would like to say a good word about those on the right flank of socialist competition -- the party members. Eighty percent of them became outstanding in combat and political training, and 97 percent became rated specialists.

Many examples could be cited of selfless military labor. Many units and subunits of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, of the Red Banner Belorussian, Far East, Carpathian, Turkestan and other military districts and groups of forces took new milestones in combat improvement in the jubilee year and are now struggling for a worthy celebration of the 60th Anniversary of the USSR Armed Forces.

I would like to mention the names of battalion commanders captains V. Kundyukov and G. Sidnev, of company commanders senior lieutenants B. Polyakov, V. Samborskiy, A. Deshko, M. Bogatyrev and A. Kostryukov, of Lt V. Domodyko, of political workers senior lieutenants S. Feopentov and V. Boyko, of Lt Yu. Gorin, and of many, many more. They give all the fervor in their hearts and all their energy to the cause of raising the combat readiness of their subunits. They skillfully train and indoctrinate subordinates to be courageous, ideologically persuaded defenders of the Soviet Motherland.

It must be said that our people are remarkable. The Ground Forces possess a politically mature officer corps which is utterly devoted to the cause of the party and to the Soviet people, and which is well trained in the military and technical sense. At the present time over 90 percent of the officers are party or Komsomol members and over 50 percent have a higher military or military-specialized education. The overwhelming majority of privates and sergeants have a secondary education.

All party-political work among the troops is organized in such a way as to facilitate to the maximum a steady growth in political awareness of the soldiers and their tactical, weapons, technical and special training. As in other branches of the Armed Forces, primary attention in political training and ideological-indoctrinational work in the Ground Forces is focussed on a deeper study of Lenin's theoretical heritage of materials of the 25th CPSU Congress and of subsequent decisions of the party's central committee. Soldiers study the USSR Constitution—the Basic Law of their native state—and materials of the ceremonial session of the CPSU CC, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet dedicated to the 60th Anniversary of the Great October with unremitting interest.

An integrated approach in ideological work is being actively implemented in practice. A useful exchange of experience was held recently at courses for chiefs of political organs of the Ground Forces. Commanders, political organs and party organizations persistently shape in soldiers an active life position and an aware attitude toward fulfillment of their sacred duty to the Motherland. Activities of a political indoctrination nature are held in the process of all training, service and life according to the principle "In training, indoctrinate; while indoctrinating, train."

The entire tenor of military life, training and service in units is calculated, arranged and organized in such a way that the soldier comes to manhood, becomes strong in heart and body, is enriched with experience, and receives good political conditioning and the deep military-technical knowledge which is needed not only for defense of the Motherland, but also in peaceful, creative labor.

The work of a majority of political organs and party organizations is distinguished by creativity and purposefulness, and it is designed with consideration of the specific missions and specific nature of combat training of different combat arms. It is conducted actively primarily where success of the matter is decided, where combat expertise is forged—in the field, on the ranges, at the tank practice areas and on the firing ranges. Take, for example, the political department of the Rogachev Guards Motorized Rifle Division headed by Lt Col V. Oleshchenko. This political organ is distinguished in that it delves deeply into the status of affairs in units and subunits. It carefully analyzes the work of political personnel and party organizations. It aims its main efforts at practical accomplishment of fundamental tasks of further increasing vigilance and combat readiness. Party-political work here is aimed at providing precise organization and high quality of all classes, primarily those of field training, and at a struggle to eradicate indulgence and oversimplification.

The division political department gives much attention to ideological conditioning of personnel and to indoctrinating them in the spirit of high responsibility for the assigned job. It does not lose sight of questions involving the study and mastery of modern equipment and weapons. Technical and weapons circles and lecture groups operate and technical conferences are arranged in units and subunits of the division. The struggle for

mastering related specialties, for interchangeability in teams and crews, for high march speeds and for extending the operating periods of vehicles between repairs has received wide dissemination. As a result of all of this many-sided work, a majority of the soldiers achieved outstanding indicators in technical and weapons training and in driving combat vehicles in the jubilee year and are striving to reinforce them in the training year which has begun so as to worthily celebrate the 60th Anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Such a fighting mood is also typical of personnel of the Taman' Guards Motorized Rifle Division, which was first in the Armed Forces to begin a struggle for the title of foremost large unit, which showed stable, high results in combat and political training throughout the entire training year and successfully fulfilled its socialist pledges.

It must be noted that in a jubilee year filled with events of enormous political importance, the Ground Forces not only have taken new milestones of combat improvement, but also have created favorable conditions for achieving high effectiveness and quality of combat and political training for strengthening military discipline and organization in the training year which has begun.

Socialist competition dedicated to the 60th Anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces now has received wide scope in the military units. As we know, it is going on under the motto "Reliably defend the socialist homeland, be in constant combat readiness, persistently master weapons and equipment, improve combat expertise." A search for ways of further reducing the time for bringing subunits into combat readiness is continuing in the course of the competition. A special role belongs to the party members in this important matter. They are the cementing force of military collectives and set the example in fulfilling socialist pledges. The report-election party meetings facilitated an upsurge in job activeness of party members and the fighting spirit of party organizations. In striving to come on line with the party members, the soldiers are conscientiously and assiduously laboring in the training year which has begun to accomplish the task set for the Armed Forces by the Communist Party Central Committee and USSR Minister of Defense.

Personnel of the Ground Forces are not flattering themselves with results of their military labor and are not becoming complacent with what has been achieved. They see as their duty to raise vigilance and combat readiness steadfastly and celebrate worthily the glorious 60th Anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy.

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TROOP CONTROL EMPHASIZED IN TRANSCAUCASUS MD

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 24, Dec 77 signed to press 6 Dec 77 pp 40-46

[Article by Maj Gen V. Mironyuk, chief of political department of staff and directorates of Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District: "Work of Political Organs and Party Organizations: Party Concern for Improving Troop Control"]

[Text] Materials and decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress thoroughly and comprehensively substantiate the ways for further improvement of the management system under conditions of developed socialism and issues of raising effectiveness and quality from positions of Leninist methodology. The congress required that our cadres deeply study and persistently master the science and practice of management.

This demand also relates fully to military cadres and to Army party organizations which implement in practice the fulfillment of party and government decisions in the field of military organizational development and in the matter of further strengthening the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces.

In speaking about troop control, special emphasis should be placed on the ever increasing role of staffs. Now as never before, their functions have become important and many-sided. The staff is the brain of the troops, a unique driving oscillator for a large complex of management activities. There is in essence no issue of combat training which does not concern staff activities in one way or another.

This is why our staff and directorate primary party organizations devote unremitting attention to increasing party members' responsibility for improving the level and quality of troop management and control.

One of the important conditions for effectiveness of control and management is, as we know, ideological conditioning of the cadres. The political department and party organization of the staff and directorates of the district show constant concern for precise organization of Marxist-Leninist

education of generals and officers. The basis of this work is a profound study of Lenin's ideological-theoretical and military heritage, materials and decisions of the 25th Party Congress, the CPSU CC plenary sessions and the Extraordinary 7th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the report and statements by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, the USSR Constitution, and materials of the ceremonial session in the Kremlin dedicated to the 60th Anniversary of the Great October.

Study of topical material of Marxist-Leninist training as suggested by the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy permits understanding not only of the theoretical issues, but also the practical issues of troop management and control, principles of scientific organization of training and indoctrination of personnel, and requirements placed on work style of military cadres. An important place is devoted to study of Lenin's ideological and theoretical heritage on management problems as well as of issues of military theory and practice involving management and control of troops. Lectures are given to commanders and staff officers devoted to such matters as intuition, creativity, the dialectics of objective and subjective matters in military affairs, and the role of scientific prevision in troop management.

Issues of the theory and practice of management and control of troops are widely examined in the course of theoretical interviews, seminars and conferences which take place in all staff and directorate party organizations. A practical science conference on the topic "The 25th CPSU Congress on increasing the level of management and control under present conditions. Quality and effectiveness in troop management and tasks of staff officers," was of use to all officers and generals of the staff and directorate.

The briefing at the conference was given by district chief of staff Lt Gen Tank Trps S. Varichenko. The comrades who spoke made many suggestions aimed at every possible improvement in the work style and in troop management. Maj Gen V. Kalistyy spoke of further elaboration and practical application of the so-called systems approach to troop management, which signifies the accounting and regulation of all aspects without exception in the life and activity of troops--armed warfare, training, indoctrination, maintenance of high combat readiness, strengthening of military discipline, organization of everyday routine, and so on. Maj Gen A. Pil'nikov raised issues of exactingness and principle in organization of troop management. The speech by Col A. Kuz'michev was devoted to mastery of a Leninist work style. Lt. Col V. Polushkin gave a speech about more effective use of means of automation and mathematical computer methods in management. Maj Gen A. Overchuk, member of the military council and chief of the district political directorate, spoke on the role of party-political work in further improving troop management in light of decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress. He reminded the audience of Lenin's thesis about improving the work style and about exactingness and principle.

High quality and effectiveness of troop management presume the active participation of staff officers in political enlightenment work among unit personnel. In performing this work, they study the job and political qualities of people better and delve more deeply into the state of affairs and the situation locally. Party organizations display particular concern for seeing that staff and directorate officers are active propagandists of decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, materials of the May and October (1977) CPSU CC plenary sessions, materials of the Extraordinary 7th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the briefing and statements in it by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, the USSR Constitution, and materials of the ceremonial session in the Kremlin devoted to the 60th Anniversary of the Great October.

We also keep an eye on how party members who are among the troops take part in preparing and conducting party meetings, party bureau sessions, Marxist-Leninist training classes and political classes, and how often they give lectures and briefings to the soldiers, and on what topics. An analysis of all this permits the political department, on the one hand, to see weak points in the work of party members and party organizations, and on the other hand, to see shortcomings in its own work.

I will cite an example. It became known that party members in one of the staff party organizations showed poor participation in military indoctrination and were not displaying the proper concern for strengthening discipline among personnel in units. The political department did not let such an abnormal phenomenon pass by. It presented the most serious demands on members of the party bureau and obligated them to apply all efforts to eliminate the shortcomings which had been revealed. Meanwhile, supervision over the work of this party organization also was intensified. In particular, we heard a briefing by its secretary in the political department. The steps taken helped get rid of many omissions in the work of this party collective. We also see to it that lectures given by members of the agitation and propaganda collective under the political department and of agitation and propaganda groups under party bureaus are closely connected with problems of improving management. Here are the lectures given this year: "Supervision and Check of Execution as a Method of Scientific Management," "Ways to Improve Troop Management," and "Basic Directions for Automating Troop Control."

A discussion of articles in the periodical press on management issues is of much benefit to staff officers. Thus, we were enriched by many elements of a scientific nature in discussions held at the initiative of party organizations on the articles "Providing Troop Management Under Modern Conditions," "On Measures of a Quantitative Estimate of Strength of the Sides," "On Certain New Aspects of Problems of Automation and Troop Control," and "Scientific Principles of Management Activity of Military Cadres."

In modern warfare the officers of control organs will experience an exceptionally high physical, moral and psychological stress. Therefore, ideologicalpolitical work is aimed at ensuring the appropriate moral and psychological training of these cadres. We were spurred on to devote greater attention to this problem by the lessons drawn from one complex exercise in high mountainous terrain. Not all the participants in this exercise demonstrated high moral and volitional training. A certain amount of the blame here lay with the political department and party organizations. They did not always focus the attention of party member-directors on problems of moral preparation of personnel. We began by creating a pioneer group, the duties of which included development of recommendations aimed at improving the moralpsychological conditioning of staff officers. Some of the comrades in this group study the actions of officers in a difficult combat situation, while other workers study their psychological compatibility under various conditions of management activity. The recommendations and advice of this group are checked in practice and presented for discussion by the officers. Thus, practical science conferences held at the initiative of the political department in party organizations of directorates where Col V. Kharchenko and Lt Col M. Sharamko are secretaries were devoted to problems of the moral and psychological preparation of the staff officer. Such conferences were a strict check for many recommendations concerning the moral and psychological preparation of staff officers.

Management of troops in the present-day stage is a complex, creative process which requires high competency, a great deal of art, good professional training and a scientific approach to accomplishment of tasks at hand on the part of commanders and staff officers. This is why our party members persistently master modern methods and forms of management and foremost staff culture, and why they analyze and delve more deeply into the essence of the processes which occur and all aspects of management activity. This facilitates a further increase in combat readiness of units and subunits.

Scientific organization largely facilitates an improvement in troop management. This is a great and important matter. The staff and directorates of the district and party organizations are working on it. They are disseminating the experience of those who skillfully apply scientific data in management work. The party organization headed by Officer P. Shestakov, for example, introduced working methods of staff officers in preparing the instructions and orders of the commander (senior chief) and other documents—methods tested in practice.

Staff officers have a large area of work which requires remarkable capabilities of them during everyday training, let alone in exercises. The party organization takes this into consideration. It strives to develop in them such qualities as independence, initiative, persistence in attaining a goal, resolve, and the ability to act precisely, coolly and purposefully within the limits of rights and obligations granted them. The essence of organizational matters, as noted at the 25th CPSU Congress, "is for each person who has the necessary rights for this and who bears the full range of responsibility within the limits of those rights, to perform his own job. This elementary worldly rule is at the same time the primary basis of the science and practice of management."

Every officer member in the party organization where Col Yu. Radyuk is secretary firmly knows his functional obligations regarding management and constantly practices the optimum techniques for their fulfillment. Take Officer A. Zvarich, for example. He worked out a booklet on management activity as applied to a changing situation which was tested in a number of exercises. In addition to this, he made the appropriate blank forms, references and the most simple necessary means of mechanization for operations under field conditions. It must be admitted that we do not see this situation in every case by any means. An acquaintance with the work of party members of one of the departments showed that some of them perform their duties imprecisely, both in the apparatus itself and in the units and subunits. The political department helped the department party organization eliminate the shortcomings which were revealed. There was a talk on this subject with every party member, and each of them drew the necessary conclusions for himself.

Concern for the scientific organization of management work aroused not only the chief of staff, but also workers of the political department to regard the qualitative aspect of officers' command training in the most serious manner, i.e., their mastery of modern forms and methods for increasing operational and tactical training and the ability to deeply analyze changes in the situation and make more active use of means of automation. More topics relating to the sphere of management now are being included in training plans for staff officer command training. Thus, at the last course, staff officers were familiarized with the most varied issues of management activity. The political department is focusing the attention of all staff party members on these matters.

We have established specific days and hours for independent professional training. The political department and party organizations see to it that the time set aside for this is used rationally, and a fundamental assessment was made of instances of a formal attitude toward self-education on the part of some party members. And it must be said that a majority of our officers now are persistently improving their troop management skills. Among them we can note in particular colonels V. Ivanovskiy and V. Sereda, lieutenant colonels I. Vlakhovich, A. Zhernakov and V. Sinkevich and others.

The organization of troop management also depends on officers' military-technical training. The political department and party organizations often remind staff party members of the well-known truth: Under modern conditions it is impossible to arrange precise troop management without high military-technical knowledge. At the same time, they also are doing a great deal to ensure that officers systematically fill in their engineer-technical knowledge and their knowledge of mathematics, physics, radio electronics and cybernetics. The party organizations see to it that officers reach a deep understanding of the role of management work and of its social and physical processes. In one of the conferences of party organization secretaries, to which officer-specialists were invited, the talk was of how staff and directorate party organizations and all party members facilitate the introduction of cybernetics into the troop

management system. The recommendations which were elaborated were made known to a wide range of party activists and to every party member.

Scientific troop management at the present stage also depends on the amount and quality of information coming to the staff. The new stage in development of military affairs is typified by the receipt of quite a vast amount of information and by its rapid use.

Realizing this, the political department and the staff and directorate party organizations are constantly fixing the party members' attention on the organization, qualitative processing and use of the information coming to the staff when elaborating decisions. The requirement here is to rely widely on the achievements of military science and make use of new methods of work based on the latest achievements of mathematics and electronic technology.

We attach no less importance to the veracity of information coming to the staff. Staff and directorate party organizations require of party members an obligatory reliability and precision of incoming written communications, summaries and reports from units, and absolute fulfillment of the instructions which are issued. Analytical work has shown that in recent times our officers have begun to display more objectivity and principle in assessing combat training and that they are also seeing that their subordinate officers do this.

The focus of attention of the political department and primary staff party organizations also is the important sector of staff officers' use of electronic computer technology and modern means of mechanization in accomplishing their management functions. The political department systematically studies this matter in directorate and staff party organizations. We recently discussed the results of such work and the conclusions and suggestions stemming from them especially at a conference of primary party organization secretaries directly involved in this important matter. Lt Col Yu. Dvoyrin spoke at the conference. He told of the use factor of computer technology in departments and directorates. Frankly speaking, this factor is low in places. The opinion was expressed that officers who perform specific functions at the "staff-computer" level must be more skillful in algorithmizing and programming problems and in mastering the systems analysis method.

The staff now is seeking to ensure that all our officers, and above all the engineers, technicians and officer-specialists of services, can speak a "common language"—the language of military operations research. In this regard, great stress is being placed on propagandizing mathematical knowledge and on broad familiarity with the exact sciences.

Field exercises, as we know, are a serious check of the precision and thoroughness of troop management. The results of all previous work are reflected here as in a mirror. This is why, in preparing for exercises,

we attach particular importance to the organization and quality of management and to a careful preparation of documents needed for decision making by the district commander in chief, to making this decision known to the troops in a timely manner, and also to exercising supervision of its fulfillment.

Supervision over execution of the orders of commanders and chiefs is an obligatory element of the staff officer's management activity. In consideration of this, many party members in their speeches at a recent meeting of the party aktiv of our staff posed the issue of a more thoughtful organization of troop tests. It was suggested at the meeting that it was necessary to plan more integrated checks under the direction of the senior chiefs.

Why did this question arise? The fact is that until now we placed more stress on individual, specific checks. As practice showed, these checks did not make it possible to delve deeply into the stages of combat and political training and of military discipline.

It was not by chance that there also was talk about the need for a more thorough preparation for visits to troop units. We still see instances of an unconsidered dispatch of officers to perform assignments in units. Without having had time to be on one detached—duty trip and shake the road dust from themselves, as they say, some officers again go on detached duty. How can they delve into the essence of the matter?

Now, long before the detached duty, officers examine in detail under the senior chief's direction the methodological issues of work in outlying areas and ways for studying and generalizing foremost experience and analyzing what has been done and what has been achieved.

Workers of the political department also go out as part of the large groups of officers sent to the units. They help the officers find the proper political approach to facts, events and phenomena which they encounter in the troop units.

Party organizations create in the collectives of party members of staffs and directorates a spirit of creativity; a situation which generates innovation and motivates people to introduce scientific principles of troop management and make wider use of new means of automation and mechanization in this matter. There is often a great and objective conversation at party meetings and bureau sessions about the display of initiative and a sense of new things in management activity. Recently there was a meeting of the staff party aktiv with the agenda being "On the responsibility of party members of the district staff and directorates for effective troop management." An exacting party conversation facilitated an increase in the creative activity of many party members.

In planning their work, party organizations provide for measures aimed at a constant honing of the art of management and a study of the latest

achievements of modern science and technology and the working experience of the best officers.

The primary party organization headed by Col V. Kharchenko does a great deal in this direction. Party bureau members here use all forms of inner-party work to develop in party members a spirit of creative attitude toward their duties and to concentrate efforts on a constant search for new, progressive methods of troop management. Thus, the following lectures were given for the officers: "The 25th CPSU Congress on issues of a qualitative improvement in management," "Recommendations of the practical science conference of leading workers of political organs of the Soviet Army and Navy on issues of improving troop management," "The latest technical means being used in troop management," and others. Party members discussed the paper "On Certain Issues of Troop Management." The theoretical interview "Creative Development of Marxism-Leninism in Decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress on Issues of Management" left an imprint in the awareness of many people.

From time to time the party bureau hears reports of party members about how they are improving their rating, mastering foremost work methods and resolving management problems which arise. Party members N. Ignatenko and I. Pen'kov gave such reports here. The party organization requires its members to display an imaginative approach toward improving troop management. It permits no one to be complacent or to hold to outmoded schemes and cliches.

The secretaries and members of the party bureau are the true organizers of the struggle for qualitative solution of problems of management and control of troops. This is why questions of developing military-scientific work and strengthening its influence on the improvement of troop management are often presented at our seminars of the party aktiv. Party organization secretaries give reports at conference of the political department apparatus on the participation of party members in military-scientific work and in developing and improving the forms, methods and means of management.

The political department and party organizations have begun to react in a more fundamental manner to the shortcomings allowed by party members in management activity. For example, take the party organization where Maj Yu. Gusey is the secretary. Omissions relating to troop management were uncovered here in the work of a number of party members in one of the exercises. The party organization conducted a special party meeting at which a fundamental assessment of these facts was given.

The political department and the party organizations are striving to generalize and propagandize efficiently the positive work experience of staff officer-party members in improving troop management. Thus, they generalized the experience of the search by officers P. Shestokov, S. Safonov, Yu. Dvoyrin and others, who displayed imagination in elaborating and introducing new forms and methods of troop management.

In fulfilling the recommendations of the practical science conference of leading workers of political organs of the Soviet Army and Navy and instructions of the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, the political department and party organizations are continuing to improve the forms and methods of party-political work aimed at improving management activity of officer-party members in the new training year.

The demands for a Leninist style placed on the leader are precisely worded in the materials and decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress. Comrade Brezhnev said at the party congress: "The modern leader must organically combine within himself a party spirit with deep competency, and a state of discipline with initiative and with a creative approach to the job." Fulfillment of this requirement is the basis of the work of our party organizations to improve troop management. In preparing for a worthy celebration of the 60th Anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces, party members of the district staff and directorate are displaying persistence and creative exploration in successfully accomplishing the important missions facing them in the training year which has begun.

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MAR AVN YEFIMOV ON IMPORTANCE OF DISCIPLINE IN FLIGHT TRAINING

Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No 12, Dec 77 signed to press 31 Oct 77 pp 1-3

[Article by Mar Avn A. Yefimov, First Deputy Commander-in-Chief, VVS [Air Force], twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Honored Military Pilot of the USSR: "Discipline of the Winged Formation"]

[Text] Intense combat training is underway in VVS units [chast'] and subunits [podrazdeleniye]. These days added incandescence is evident in the training because aviators are studying the outstanding documents of our epoch—the decisions of the extraordinary seventh session of the ninth convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which passed the new Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the materials of the grand meeting dedicated to the 60th anniversary of Great October.

Studying the new USSR Constitution, military aviators are more deeply conscious of their responsibility for the security of our great motherland, for learning to skillfully and effectively use the growing combat capabilities of modern aviation equipment, for becoming true masters of flying.

"The duty of the USSR Armed Forces to the people," it states in the new USSR Constitution, "is to reliably defend the socialist fatherland, to be in constant combat readiness which guarantees an immediate rebuff to any aggressor."

One of the basic factors insuring high combat readiness in military collectives is the struggle for a further strengthening of order and organization on the ground and in the air, improving mature military discipline, responsibility for diligent fulfillment of the requirements contained in the documents which regulate accident-free flying operations.

The life and combat training of aviators, as for all armed defenders of Great October's conquests, are strictly regulated by the statutes in general military regulations and in special directives and instructions. This fully applies to flying. As before, it is necessary to improve the organization and discipline of aerial warriors and to insure careful reasoned planning of combat and political training, plus strict control over it.

Many years of knowhow in organization of flights and lessons on the ground demonstrate that the productivity of every training hour primarily depends on how firmly compliance with regulations and organization have been established in the collective, how demanding are the commanders and how much fighting spirit is there in the party-political work.

The importance of the combat training missions accomplished by aviators today raises the significance of flight discipline, the significance of strict and accurate adherence to flying laws and rules. The essence of discipline became more ponderable, capacious, profound under modern conditions. It is looked upon as one of the foundations of flying training and of combat mastery. Maximum concentration and the ability to instantaneously evaluate an unfolding situation and make coherent decisions that respond to this situation are required from the pilot (crew) in the air.

The concept of flight discipline presupposes not only a high degree of organization and execution on the part of aerial warriors, but also careful planning of flying operations that envisions the minutest detail. It provides the specificity of the assigned missions and considers the actual conditions in which they will be accomplished. The combat training plan for the week, month, and year and the schedule for each flying shift are the law of life for aviators, the regulations of their combat training.

He who has firmly assimilated the requirements of regulations and directives, as a rule, carries them out accurately in any situation. To fly combat aircraft in an excellent manner day and night in any weather, to skillfully carry on maneuvering air combat throughout the entire altitude and speed spectrum, to accurately make navigational flights, to conduct accurate destructive strikes against varied targets in the first attack—this is what makes up the service obligation, this is the primary responsibility of the motherland's winged defenders.

The aviation regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel G. Kolodiy is renowned for model order and strict compliance with regulations in the air and on the ground. The personnel in this unit were the victors in the socialist competition in honor of Great October's 60th anniversary and are now preparing for a worthy greeting for the glorious jubilee of the USSR Armed Forces. Flying training missions are accomplished in the regiment without spurts and storming based on a reasoned and methodologically correct combat and political training plan. Work is accomplished calmly, in a business-like way, in accordance with the requirements contained in regulations and all governing documents. Knowing the missions and the degree of preparedness of personnel, the command delineates specific and realistic aviator training goals by season, taking into consideration extant and forecast conditions, including weather. Every aerial warrior here is a model of concentration, practicality, and responsibility.

The troops' service in the regiment was checked at the end of the past training year. The aviators received high evaluations in all categories, and this is no accident. The commander sets the tone by always being tight, strict, polite, and demanding with his subordinates. Possessing impeccable flying mastery, Lieutenant Colonel G. Kolodiy at the same time passes his rich knowhow on to subordinates and serves as an example of unswerving adherence to flying regulations and laws for them.

Organization, discipline on the ground and in the air, high vigilance, and diligent flight organization are the characteristic traits of the work style of the aviators in the excellent regiment. Recent firings at the range again confirmed this. Personnel demonstrated excellent results, a high level of air training, and combat mastery.

The organization and the indoctrinational function are merged in the commander's actions taken to insure firm compliance with regulations in the subunit. The officer skilled in foreseeing the consequences of his decisions, orders, and commands and who considers their effect on peoples' consciousness always achieves the most. In this connection, officers who have recently been assigned higher responsibilities deserve serious party attention. They must patiently be taught the art of combining the measures of persuasion and of compulsion, to analyze the state of military discipline and the effectiveness of disciplinary practice, and to study the mood of subordinates. The job of senior chiefs, of communist leaders is to assist young officers in understanding the essence of a commander's demandingness, learning to organically combine it with sensitivity, benevolence, and the ability to make a good impression on subordinates, to win their authority and trust.

A reduction in the quality of indoctrinational work and of daily control by commanders, staffs, and party organizations leads, as a rule, to violations of military discipline and order. This is exactly what happened in one operational unit.

It cannot be said that Major I. Zakharov completely avoided the training and indoctrination of subordinates. But, there were instances when he didn't listen to advice from his assistants and from party and Komsomol activists. This in turn led to a noticeable reduction in the role of the subunit commanders. They loosened their control over the activities of the young officers, warrant officers [praporshchik], and sergeants. Here is the result. Violations of military discipline cropped up in the unit, this in turn then gave birth to potential accident causes.

Or take another example. One aviation commander levied a mandatory requirement on his personnel to stop at the maintenance inspection point prior to taxiing out to the runway. This was required so that the operating capacity of on-board systems could be given an additional check. The pilots faithfully followed the established rule. But, was it worth it for the commander, and then his deputy, to violate this very rule, since other pilots followed their example. It is fully understandable that similar methods of training and indoctrinating subordinates do not have a positive effect. And, even if such instances are isolated, they must not go unnoticed by communist leaders, by all personnel.

Socialist competition for a worthy greeting for the 60th anniversary of the USSR Armed Forces has widely unfolded now in the troop units. Good news about high-quality accomplishment of flying missions, about the struggle to reduce the periods for assimilation of aviation equipment, about the increase in the number of otlichniks and of class-rated specialists is coming in from garrisons near and far. Commanders, political workers, all communists stand out

as enthusiasts for the struggle to achieve strict compliance with regulations on the ground and in the air. They always remember that the higher the stress in combat training at airfields, in flying training and air combat zones, on long navigational routes, and when intercepting aerial targets, the stricter the requirements for adherence to flying laws must be.

Tactical flying exercises are the most complex and responsible type of aerial training the warriors of the winged formation undergo. Resolute, disciplined, and completely efficient troops achieve success at these exercises. Consequently, a further increase in the combat mastery of each individual and the success of the collective as a whole will depend upon how the exercises are organized and prepared and how the basic documents are studied.

The work of a pilot in the air is greatly stipulated by how accustomed he is to strict fulfillment of the requirements of military regulations and orders from the commander, to order and organization on the ground. And this in turn depends upon ideological maturity and political consciousness on the part of aerial warriors, their conception of their duty to the motherland. Commanders, political workers, officers of staffs and services, party, and Komsomol organizations systematically conduct the training and indoctrination of people, using the varied forms and methods of organizational and party-political work and the mobilizing force of socialist competition in order that aerial training continually increases and aviators' moral-political and psychological tempering is strengthened.

Grand rituals which create high enthusiasm on the part of aviators also have a lot to be said for them. This includes the cortege of the unit's combat banner and the personnel formation prior to initiation of flying, raising of a flag in honor of victors in socialist competition and masters of aerial combat and of accurate gunnery, and escorting veterans of the Great Patriotic War on the eve of complex flights or exercises.

Inspection parades play a special role in the maintenance of compliance with regulations and organization in VVS units. Holding them regularly sharpens up the aviators, favorably impacts upon the troops' service, on strengthening discipline, and on strict adherence to the daily agenda. They permit achievement of a further strengthening of military discipline when combined with agitational-mass and political-indoctrinational work. It should be set up in such a way that propaganda of regulations and directives facilitate aviators' developing an active viable position and an irreconcilability to any deviations from the norms of communist morality.

At atmosphere of demandingness in compliance with regulations and high party and service exactingness has been set up and is being maintained in the aviation unit commanded by Lieutenant Colonel V. Yuzin. The knowhow of those on the right flank of socialist competition is generalized and disseminated in a business-like manner. Everywhere—in the barracks and training classrooms, on the airfield—the daily agenda and the manner that orders and instructions are issued and carried out are carefully observed, viable propaganda of the regulations is carried on. Good training facilities have been set up here. The personnel are comfortably housed. The garrison is clean and homey. The servicemen strictly comply with regulations. The concern on the part of the

commander and the party organization about creating optimal conditions for the aviators' training and rest facilitates their achieving new successes in combat training. In a short period, they made a high-quality conversion to modern aviation equipment and are preparing for a fitting greeting for the glorious jubilee of the USSR Armed Forces.

Many years of experience of accident-free flying in many units and subunits convinces one that, given punctual adherence to all requirements contained in governing documents and the requisite control over the conduct of preventive measures completely rules out the possibility of critical situations in the air.

This knowhow is widely disseminated in the troop units. It is the duty of commanders and political workers, party organizations, and of Officers' Homes and clubs to rationally employ it in their work and to widely introduce the Leninist principles of socialist competition: publicity, comparison of the results, and the capability to emulate leading knowhow.

Communists and Komsomol members are called upon to be the commanders' faithful assistants in bringing about strict compliance with regulations and in the struggle for a high degree of organization. They are a powerful force. This force must be directed in the interests of the task, with its assistance tementing the military collective, aiding in bringing to light the spiritual potential of each person. The commander's systematic individual contacts with party and Komsomol activists give witness to the fact that their opinions are taken into account and their evaluations are valuable. And the party and Komsomol aktiv, relieved by the commander's trust, operates more confidently, counting on the fact that their senior comrade will support their initiative.

In conversations and lectures on the questions of vigilance, discipline, and strict compliance with regulations, propagandists and agitators and party and Komsomol activists must continually explain to aviators the necessity for the high combat readiness of subunits, units, and of the entire Air Force.

The new training year has begun. It will continue under the sign of a further improvement in the combat mastery of aviators, the development of brave, decisive actions when carrying out flying missions with maximum effective employment of aviation equipment and weapons. Striving to greet the 60th anniversary of the USSR Armed Forces in a worthy manner, our commanders, staff officers, political workers, communists, and Komsomol members are carrying on a tireless struggle for firm compliance with regulations and organization in the troop units. They understand that this is the foundation for a further rise in the combat might of the Air Force—the reliable guardian of the aerial boundaries of our great socialist motherland.

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VISUAL ORIENTATION: IMPORTANCE AND TRAINING METHODS

Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No 12, Dec 77 signed to press 31 Oct 77 p 10

[Article by Col V. Timofeyev, candidate of technical sciences, docent, and Maj V. Yelizarov, military navigator first class: "It Has Not Lost Its Significance"]

[Text] Practice shows that, in spite of the high degree of automation and improvement of the navigational equipment on board modern aircraft and helicopters, visual orientation has not lost its significance. However, accomplishing it, especially at low altitudes, has become very complicated. This has been brought about by the rise in flight speeds and a reduction in time available for observation outside of the cockpit, with the consequence that reference points do not remain in the crew's view for very long.

Visual orientation is a complex psychological and physiological process. An expert evaluation of the capabilities of visual orientation which included a broad survey of flying personnel operating third-generation combat aircraft was conducted to study the basic factors which determine its reliability and to develop recommendations for crews. Based upon the results of the investigation, these factors are (in order of importance): density of characteristic reference points, time deficit, contrast of the terrain overflown, quality of flying map, and physical condition of the crew members. Therefore, during preflight, special significance is attached to substantiated selection of a map which corresponds to flight conditions; careful selection of the reference points; and their study and notation on the map.

To increase the reliability of visual orientation, one must select reference points which possess the maximum number of distinguishing features which make it possible to rapidly detect and identify them. Characteristic reference points can be divided into three classes: simple, having no more than three distinguishing features (contour, dimensions, and contrast against the background of the surrounding terrain), average—four to five features, and complex, which have more than five distinguishing features.

Distinguishing features have a general and a particular character. General features make it possible to restrict the terrain sector within the boundaries

of which a specific reference point is sought. Mutual positioning of objects, degree of contrast, surrounding background, and terrain relief fall in this category. Particular features—visible contour, color, object size—characterize the individual type of reference point. These particular features make it possible to set a reference point apart from others, that is, to identify it.

It should be emphasized that not all distinguishing features preserve an identical significance under varied flight conditions. Some of them, like the contours of large populated points, tall buildings, and approach routes, are constant. One must also place special attention on them during preflight and while airborne. Another group of features is less stable and changes with a change in flight altitude, visibility, illumination, and time of year. For example, the degree of contrast, color, and contour form of water reservoirs and small populated points. Consequently, they must be examined in combination with the constant features when making an identification.

The expert evaluation of flying personnel made it possible to divide reference points based upon characteristics and assign them a degree of importance. This division is shown in the table, where the reference points in each subgroup are placed in descending order of importance.

During preflight and when flying the mission, it is necessary to first select reference points having the highest degree of importance in the subgroups, plus place special attention to their constant distinguishing features. In order that the map can be most easily used in flight, these features must be selected (flagged) ahead of time. Reference points selected reduce inertia when transferring the glance from a map of one scale to a map of another scale or from the map to the terrain.

To guarantee the high reliability of the orientation, one must in the assigned flying area select and "flag" on the map at least three simultaneously observed characteristic reference points (area, localized, or linear), guided by the average ranges of their identification shown in the table. This is especially important for turning points, initiation of the firing run, and target areas (landing area).

Maps with a scale of 1:500,000, 1:200,000, and 1:100,000 are the most useful for flights at low altitudes. A scale of 1:500,000 is the best for a navigational flight and 1:200,000 is the best when searching and for approach to the target. The 1:100,000 map is used, as a rule, in preflight and also during the approach to the landing area and point targets.

At night, the contrast of reference points and their surrounding background seems to be washed out due to the lack of illumination of the earth's surface. In combination with the diminution of the observer's visual sensitivity threshold, this leads to a reduction by several times of the range of reference point detection and identification. Thus, at night populated points can in a number of instances be seen at a range of only 2-3 kilometers, which makes visual orientation for all practical purposes impossible.

Reference Points	Average range for identification at low altitudes, kilometers
Large populated points, large lakes	10-15
Average populated points, urban-type settlements, average lakes	7–10
Small populated points, small lakes	4–6
Large rivers	8–12
Average rivers, highways, edges of large forests	6–9
Railroads (2- and 3-track), highways, improved roads	4–7
Small rivers, single-track railroads, dirt roads	3–5
Commanding heights	8–11
Reinforced concrete railroad and highway bridges, stations, and dams	6-8
Prominent bends in the shorelines of rivers and in highways	5–7
Intersections of roads, rides, and firebreaks	3–6
	Large populated points, large lakes Average populated points, urban-type settlements, average lakes Small populated points, small lakes Large rivers Average rivers, highways, edges of large forests Railroads (2- and 3-track), highways, improved roads Small rivers, single-track railroads, dirt roads Commanding heights Reinforced concrete railroad and highway bridges, stations, and dams Prominent bends in the shorelines of rivers and in highways Intersections of roads, rides, and

The time for identification of visual reference points is linked not only to the conditions of observation but also to the accuracy of determining the location of the aircraft, whether the detected reference point has characteristic distinguishing features, the ability of the pilot and navigator to prepare the map during preflight and compare it with the terrain in flight. Given an exactly known aircraft location, reference points are identified at a range close to detection range. Given the accidental deviation of the aircraft from the flight route, as long as the crew remains unaware of it, the identification of reference points overflown is possible only in the event their particular distinguishing features plotted on the map are established as being different. The average time for recognition of visual reference points under simple weather conditions fluctuates within 40 seconds.

The recommendations presented generalize the knowhow of many flying crews. We think that they will be useful both during the time operational units are

carrying out combat training missions and during the training of the cadets attending pilot and navigator military educational institutions.

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USE OF AUTOMATED TRAINING AIDS DESCRIBED

Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No 12, Dec 77 signed to press 31 Oct 77 p 11

[Article by Gds Maj Shulenin, military pilot first class: "Training Aids Give the Exams"]

[Text] The requirement in flying is well known. Not a single pilot, not a single crew member, regardless of knowhow, position, or rank, can be allowed to fly without comprehensive preflight training. Ground training is a specific and multifaceted process whose effectiveness depends upon the quality of the training facilities. They must include those devices, equipment, and simulators which will correspond to the equipment being operated and which will insure full capability to train crews for any flying mission.

In light of the fact that the demands for aerial training of aviators are rising, training facilities cannot but improve. In our unit [chast'], for instance, thanks to the efforts of the commander, members of the methods council, and party activists, fundamental improvements in the facilities have been made and should be of interest to aviation specialists in other units and subunits [podrazdeleniye].

The classroom for flight analysis and mission assignment is the largest and the one most saturated with information. Proficiency in the analysis of the flight data greatly depends upon its equipment. Our skilled craftsmen learned this immediately. The illuminated schedule on which the dynamics of the upcoming flights are clearly depicted, won the unanimous approval of the flying personnel. What value does it have? The commander no longer must waste time figuring out the schedule. It suffices to throw a switch and, on the plexiglass illuminated by neon lights, the numbers of the drills being accomplished, the taxiing sequence, take-off time, and data on completed flights plotted with a grease pencil are clearly visible. While the flying personnel are doing their physical training, a scribe under the supervision of the chief of the objective control group makes the entries on the schedule. A considered daily routine makes it possible to get the classroom ready for assignment of the missions in a timely manner and without excess effort.

Next to the schedule is the objective control board, which is filled in and used just as the schedule is. Both devices take up the entire front wall of

classroom. The classroom board is in front of them. It can be moved via runners attached at the top and bottom on rollers and driven by a small motor or fixed in a particular position. It is controlled by a switch mounted in a pointer. During flight analysis, the board is located to the left and covers the schedule. In this position, it shuts off the schedule illumination by means of end switches and turns on the illumination of the objective control board. The board is shifted all the way to the right after the analysis for the assignment of missions. The schedule is uncovered, it lights up, and the lights on the objective control board are turned off.

Normal stands and testing stands are positioned on the side and rear walls and in the spaces between the windows. The testing stands are a simplified variant of the OM-7-8 testing device widely used in the state automobile inspection system and well familiar to drivers. There are two-four answers opposite each question. The pilot, having selected what he thinks is the right answer, touches the tip of the electric pointer to a contact located opposite each answer. If the pilot is correct, the stand is illuminated from within. As practice showed, the testing stands have become a reliable assistant to flying personnel as they prepare to fly.

Our innovators developed the stands prior to the start of the training year. It is possible to use them to replace the previously prepared posters with new questions and to rapidly change the terminals in the electric circuit. It should be stated that every officer made his contribution to reequipping the training facilities. For example, Major-Engineer V. Yelesin elaborated a simulator stand where flying personnel work out skills in checking the air-craft's radio-electronic equipment. Success in this endeavor also depended greatly on the proper distribution of effort. Pilots and navigators actively participated in laying out the classroom and preparing diagrams and posters, especially Lieutenants D. Sitnikov, G. Sokolov, Yu. Yarin, I. Verevkin, and others. For them, the innovative work was a good avenue for perfecting their technical and special knowledge. The pilots raised their class ratings prior to our country's jubilee.

Communists and Komsomol members were always at the head of line in the great deal of work done to improve the training facilities. The unit's command and party committee carefully monitored the reequipment program. The training facilities set up assist flying and engineer-technical personnel in continually renewing and intensifying their theoretical knowledge, improving their skills in working with aircraft equipment and assemblies, and improving the quality and effectiveness of training aviators for flying. This, it goes without saying, is the foundation of accident-free flying.

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TRAINING OF ENGINEER-AVIATION SUPPORT UNIT COMMANDERS DISCUSSED

Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No 12, Dec 77 signed to press 31 Oct 77 pp 16-17

[Article by Col A. Kadesnikov, military pilot second class: "A Commander's Ascent"]

[Text] Officer B. Pashchenko was assigned to a squadron as deputy for IAS [Engineer Aviation Service]. He went about his job, which was new to him, enthusiastically but his initial steps to become acclimatized were difficult. Why did this occur?

"The main thing," he thought, "is for the aircraft to fly normally, the rest is not all that important." At the same time, violations of discipline among the aviation specialists began to come to light and some of them exhibited a sense of gentleness and self-contentment. Soon, a potential accident cause occured due to the fault of one of them. The squadron commander discussed this in detail with his deputy for IAS.

"Don't forget about the chiefs of the TECh [technical maintenance unit] detachments," the commander said. "Do not try to solve all the problems yourself, no one is capable of that. You must include both them and the party activists in the process of indoctrinating technical personnel."

Pashchenko listened to the advice of his senior, but did not make the proper conclusions. Instead of profound analysis of the state of affairs in the subordinate service, he arranged a dressing down that same day for those who were responsible for the accident. But, things got no better as a result, naturally. Relations between the chief and his subordinates became even more strained.

Major V. Pervushin, the secretary of the unit party committee, went out to the parking area, visited the lessons of the IAS specialists, interested himself in how the aviators prepared for servicing day. Talking with Pashchenko, he brought his attention to a number of deficiencies. He then specifically mentioned how communists and the Komsomol aktiv would be able to assist in eliminating them.

Pashchenko recognized that he had made many errors in his work. Moreover, he had often noticed that after giving instructions, and quite business-like and clear instructions at that, the people still work without any spark. And, the most alarming thing of all, the contact with the chiefs of the TECh detachments and the maintenance groups was strained.

They invited Pashchenko to the party committee meeting. The speeches made by the communists were sharp. Pashchenko attempted to make a reasoned evaluation of everything, to change his work style, to establish mutual relationships with subordinates. But this turned out to be a difficult matter. The regimental deputy commander for political affairs came to his assistance.

"You have the desire to work," the lieutenant colonel said, "and that is the main thing. The lack of success can be attributed to insufficient knowhow. First of all, you have to be equal in relationships with subordinates. Try to get closer to people, get to know them better, especially the technicians in the links and the group chiefs. . . "

Some time passed and a turning point occurred in Pashchenko's relationships with subordinates. He learned from the political worker the art of guiding the subunit aktiv, something he had previously neglected. Along with the party bureau secretary, he met the party group organizers and agitators, discussed with them the on-going mission of the squadron, and got advice on how best to avoid violations. Pashchenko found an approach to the chiefs of the TECh detachments and of the groups. Thus began his ascent to the heights of a commander's mastery.

The example of Pashchenko confirms the thought that a commander's success requires a combination of party spirit and competence, a creative approach to indoctrinational work, a demanding, precise, and attentive relationship with people, and respect for their worth. Only on such a foundation are regulatory mutual relationships between a commander and subordinates built and, thus, is built in the collective a salutory situation which facilitates increasing combat readiness and strengthening military discipline.

The command and the party organization in the unit, along with individual work, conduct collective measures directed towards formation among commanders and chiefs at all levels of a clear understanding of the party's requirements for supervisory cadres and teaches them to skillfully train and indoctrinate subordinates. For this purpose, theoretical seminars of aircraft commanders and group chiefs are active in the subunits. Experienced communists officers Yu. Velichko, M. Mokrinskiy, A. Demchenko, and V. Gerasimov supervise them. Questions concerning organization of party-political work during flights and for servicing days, military, legal, and moral indoctrination, and the practical activities of officers and young commanders to strengthen conscious discipline are raised at these seminars.

For instance, the theoretical seminar entitled "The Leninist Work Style of a Commander" was interesting and useful. Lieutenant Colonel M. Mokrinskiy gave a report at the seminar on the example set by crew commanders for strict adherence to the documents governing flying. Officers actively participated in the discussion. They emphasized the requirements levied on the contemporary leader and shared knowhow in organizing flights and strengthening one-man command on a party basis.

Theoretical and scientific-practical conferences are of great assistance to officer leaders. Thus, at one conference, commanders of detachments and crews and group chiefs examined the officer's role in the political and military indoctrination of subordinates, the importance of the unity of a leader's word and deed, of his authority.

Undoubtedly, such a form of training in the practice of the political and military indoctrination of personnel facilitates the moulding of officer leaders, the strengthening of military discipline, and the confirmation of compliance with regulations in the subunits. Methodological recommendations on conduct of wrap-ups of the political-indoctrinational work in the squadron, detachment, crew, and group, as well as on organization of socialist competition were elaborated at the conference. Officers A. Kurkin, V. Titarenko, and Yu. Solov'yev discussed their working knowhow. The collectives they command achieved the rank of excellent based on the results of the jubilee socialist competition and are preparing to consolidate their successes prior to the 60th anniversary of the USSR Armed Forces.

Officers' methodological training is also upgraded at instructor methods meetings, commanders' flights and lessons, at daily instruction and meetings, and during the exchange of leading know-how. Such lessons are led, as a rule, by squadron commanders, deputy unit commanders, or chiefs of services.

Officers need to assimilate the foundations of military pedagogy and psychology in order that their methodological mastery will grow. Our commanders and party organizations are placing a great deal of stress on propaganda of pedagogical knowledge. Speeches are organized on such themes as "An Officer's Pedagogical Mastery," "Psychology of a Military Collective," "Essence of Pedagogical Tact," and "Paths to Indoctrinating Aviators With Volitional Qualities." Such questions as "A Commander's Work to Solidify the Military Collective," "Forms and Methods of Organizing Socialist Competition," and "Propaganda of Leaders' Knowhow" are discussed at special seminars on the practice of training and indoctrination.

Work with young crew commanders is not neglected. The young officer's lecture series is continually active in the unit and enjoys great popularity. In it, experienced propagandists give lectures especially for aircraft commanders and discuss indoctrination with combat activeness, the authority of a commander, the individual approach to training and indoctrination, and on how to prepare crew members for flying. The lecturers usually attempt to explain the Marxist-Leninist concept of the essence of military training and indoctrination, reveal training and indoctrinational work methods, and underscore the importance of a commander's demandingness. Speeches by officer leaders, party activists, and masters of training and indoctrination elicit the young commanders' vibrant interest.

Leading commanders widely use the wrap-ups of combat and political training, methods meetings and conferences, viewings and discussions of military training films, and schools of leading knowhow as they and their political workers provide methods training for young officers. They study along with them the documents which govern accident-free flying, teach them to conduct lessons on drill and physical training and general military regulations. They study the forms and methods of organizing socialist competition in a crew, detachment,

as well as the special features of party-political work during flights and during the period of ground training, all this being done during special lessons. Many officers study in the Marxism-Leninism evening university, themselves lead Marxist-Leninist training groups and political lessons.

Analyzing the participation of young officers in indoctrinational work and the state of disciplinary practice, the commander came to the conclusion that not all of them correctly understand the party basis of one-man command and put party groups to little use. This was characteristic, for example, for officers O. Popel' and B. Vinokurov. Timely intervention and assistance from the commander and from party activists altered the situation and Senior Lieutenant Popel's crew achieved the rank of excellent based on results of the jubilee competition.

Our best officers—crew commanders and chiefs of maintenance groups, those communists who are setting the example of organization and discipline—are attracted to carry on party—political work. Like the group of speakers, they lecture and organize discussions. Through their participation in indoctrinational work, they facilitate the moulding of young commanders and chiefs, they assist in inculcating them with political qualities required of the modern leader. Many of these officers are party group organizers and the secretaries of subunit party bureaus. Among them are communists K. Belavin, V. Dudorov, and A. Isatskov.

The party bureaus they head often hear the reports by communist leaders at their meetings, conduct the struggle for firm compliance with regulations in the subunits, and provide a sharp principled evaluation of any violations of military discipline. Thus, spot-checks on compliance with regulations in the subunits were introduced at the initiative of party activists. Komsomol activists also participated in these spot-checks along with officer leaders and communists. The subunit senior sergeants' lecture bureaus and the young commanders school supervised by communists N. Mineyev, V. Pavlyukov, and Yu. Belyayev serve the goals of bringing about compliance with regulations in the subunits. This all undoubtedly facilitates the growth in the political consciousness of commanders and chiefs at all levels, improves their methodological mastery, and strengthens authority in collectives.

The new training year has begun. Our commanders, political workers, and party organizations are concerned with the effectiveness of every lesson, drill, and flight. The enormous political enthusiasm on the part of personnel engendered by celebration of Great October's 60th anniversary and passage of the new USSR Constitution aids in maintaining the constant incandesence of socialist competition. Soviet aviators are striving to greet that glorious date—the 60th anniversary of the Armed Forces—with a further increase in combat readiness and mastery and with a strengthening of military discipline.

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MAOIST THEORY AND EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES DISCUSSED

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[Article by G. Mos'ko, candidate of historical sciences: "The Army in the Theory and Practice of Maoism"]

[Text] The 25th CPSU Congress, evaluating the theory and practice of Maoism in the current phase, emphasized that this ideology and policy is hostile to Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Maoist principles on the basic issues of party and state building and economic policy are fundamentally at odds with the true needs of the country and the interests of the Chinese people. In them a special place is assigned to the army and to armed force.

In 1938 Mao Tse-tung wrote: "The gun decides everything. From the point of view of the Marxist doctrine of the state the army is the primary component of the apparatus of state power." The Maoists carried this truth over to socialist society, which does not have antagonistic classes. Denying in practice the leadership role of the working class in the state of the proletarian dictatorship, they grant it to the army, asserting that the "People's Liberation Army of China is the backbone of the proletarian dictatorship."² This is no accident because Maoism reduces the proletarian dictatorship to nothing but destruction and suppression, diminishing its most important function: the constructive function. 3 China has revised the Marxist-Leninist point of view concerning the missions of a socialist-type army which says that as society progresses along the path of building socialism the internal function of the army, the function of suppressing the forces of counterrevolution, gradually dies away. The external function becomes paramount: defending the gains of the socialist revolution against infringement by international imperialism and establishing foreign policy conditions for building socialism and communism. The Maoists argue that the army must perform internal political missions above all.

In the first years after the victory of the revolution and the formation of the PRC in 1949, when the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) was taking an active part in suppressing the Kuomintang, landowner,

and criminal bands and organizations which included about 2 million people, this was appropriate to the situation in the country. By 1952 internal counterrevolution had basically been wiped out. Nonetheless, the scale of army participation in political campaigns and its punitive function were not reduced at all; on the contrary, they were broadened. Mao Tse-tung and those around him saw the PLA as the ideal for organization of the entire society as a complex of paramilitary production units, engaging simultaneously in agriculture and industry, education, and military affairs. The Maoists tried, although they failed, to realize this idea during the black years (for the Chinese people) of the "great leap forward" (1958-1960). During those years the slogan "All the people are soldiers!" was intensively propagated. People's communes organized in a military way were formed. Working groups of PLA regulars were used extensively to propagandize this political line among the masses of peasants. These groups were also supposed to identify and "purge" all enemies of this risky, unprincipled line and others who simply did not agree with Maoism. The scope of PLA participation in imposing the people's commune on China is illustrated by the fact that more than 80 percent of all command and political personnel from some districts were included in the working groups. 5 The way of life of the peasants in the communes resembled barracks life: rising at a bugle call, going to work and returning in formation to a drum beat, common dining halls, and the like.

Mao Tse-tung had a number of reasons to choose the army as the model for reorganizing the country's socioeconomic life. In the first place, he hoped to maintain the labor activism of the people by noneconomic methods of compulsion, to force people to work by ordering, under threat of political punishment. In the second place, the Maoist leaders believed that rigid army discipline based on fear and blind obedience, limiting democracy, and control according to the principle of bureaucratic centralism created a favorable opportunity for suppressing opposition in society. In the third place, given a country with a large population and low level of development of productive forces the Chinese leaders were especially attracted by the army way of leveling out distribution with very minimal satisfaction of the vital needs of the people.

In actuality, it was during this very period that militarization of all aspects of social life began to be pursued actively in the PRC. The natural failure of the anti-Marxist policy of the "three red banners" which soon followed by no means meant that Mao Tse-tung and his group had renounced the discredited military-administrative methods of leadership and using the army to accomplish domestic political objectives. Broad political campaigns unfolded in the country to stimulate the productive activity of enterprises and communes. They were begun on the model of campaigns carried out in the PLA and involved direct participation by military men; these campaigns were one of the first signals that army forms and methods of ideological work were being copied and applied in other spheres of social life. In these years the army was the proving ground where ideological and political campaigns were tested before being imposed in all strata of Chinese society.

One should not think that Mao Tse-tung alone was counting on the army, but Liu Shao-ch'i occupied a completely opposite position. The differences in their views concerning the role of the army in carrying out socioeconomic transformations within the country were not differences of principle, they were tactical differences. While working out measures to save the economy during the "restoration period" (1961-1965) the Chinese leaders called on the army to clean up the conseout" the communes. quences of the "great leap" and to "straighten" Summarizing the activities of the PLA working groups in the countryside, in a decree dated 23 March 1961 the Military Council of the CCP Central Committee took note of the typical mistakes and shortcomings: refusal to coordinate activities with local leaders and inadequate knowledge of local conditions, refusal to travel to the countryside dissatisfaction with the policies of the Mao Tse-tung group in the countryside, and so on. 7

The population was very critical of the actions of the military in the countryside: after all, just two years earlier they had created the people's communes by forceful methods and now they were taking part in reorganizing them. In the directives of central party and military bodies, therefore, the working groups were ordered to structure their work with due regard for such attitudes. Army personnel workers, for example, were not permitted to criticize local leaders and their activities were to go forward "under the unified leadership of the local party committies."

All these measures expressed the endeavor of certain Peking leaders headed by Liu Shao-ch'i to bring army participation and domestic political activities under their control, for in the local party bodies it was the influence of precisely this part of the party and state figures of the PRC that was dominant. And the fact that directives of the Military Council of the CCP Central Committee contained such orders was evidence that Liu Shao-ch'i and his followers had had some success. Under the conditions of economic and political crisis in the country the Mao Tse-tung group was forced to accept the fact of sharing influence over the army with the opposition.

At this time army methods of work were implanted especially energetically in civilian party and state institutions through demobilized soldiers and officers. At one of the meetings on questions of indoctrination work in the army Lin Piao stated: "Our army has always been a school that prepares party cadres, a school from which local cadres have emerged." In his opinion, the workstyle of the PLA should have continued to "exert its influence on the methods and style of work of party and local governmental bodies." By the early 1960's there were already more than 7 million persons demobilized from the PLA employed in production and in the party and state apparatus. In the late 1950's 46-60 percent of the cadres in PRC agriculture and party and administrative bodies in the rural regions were former military people. Lach year the PLA demobilized roughly 700,000 people who

were required to take an active part in training the popular militia and in straightening out agricultural production. However, in view of the grave economic situation that had come about in agriculture they tried by every means to remain in the city and avoid returning to the countryside.

The failure of the voluntarist projects of the "great leap" called forth a wave of spontaneous anti-Mao actions by the common people of the country. Under these conditions the army was used extensively as a police force to suppress them. An especially critical situation arose in the regions inhabited by national minorities where socioeconomic transformations had been carried out during the "great leap" period without consideration of the concrete conditions. The protest of the local population against the Great Han-assimilation nationality policy of the Peking leadership was then added to this. During the armed uprising in Tibet in the spring of 1959 PLA units even used aviation and artillery in the course of heavy fighting against the "rebels." Between 2,000 and 5,000 insurgents were killed, many thousands were executed, and roughly 30,000 fled to India. 12

Many smaller cases of armed actions against the authorities were carefully concealed from the Chinese people and the world public. The Program of Defense Building for 1961 required that the army continue its struggle against the "rebels" even though "the scale of armed rebellions in Kansu, Szechwan, Tibet, Yunnan, and certain other places has diminished after a year of struggle but there is a danger of repeated and new uprisings." At the same time the Chinese leaders allowed the PLA command to keep its "right" to violate the boundaries of neighboring countries: "In the conduct of operations to pacify the rebels in regions bordering on neighboring states (the Chinese-Indian, Chinese-Nepalese, and Chinese-Sikkimese borders) we must follow orders strictly: no intrusion more than 20 kilometers deep into neighboring territory." 13

Peking used the repressive actions of the PLA against the people of the country to instigate an anti-Soviet campaign. For example, during the hungry years after the failure of the "great leap," the flight of the indigenous population from Sinkiang into the Soviet Union assumed massive proportions, the Chinese leaders decided to stop it by any means, not even hesitating before mass executions by firing squads (the Ili incident of 29 May 1962). 14 To justify the repression which had become known not only within the country but also abroad, Chinese figures resorted to direct falsification of the facts and slander of the Soviet Union, alleging that the USSR was the "instigator and leader of reactionary nationalist elements." Speaking of this at a session of the All-Chinese Assembly of People's Representatives in 1964, Chou Enlai did not directly name the USSR, but his statement on the provocative actions of "external forces in Sinkiang" could not be misunderstood.

The Maoist leadership, "substantiating" its repressive measures using armed force against all who were dissatisfied with its political line,

attached the label "counterrevolutionary elements." It is far from accidental that this was exactly when the idea of the exacerbation of class struggle within the country as a supposed rule of socialism began to be cultivated widely. Soon it was formulated as the so-called "theory of the continuation of the revolution in the proletarian dictatorship." Describing the Maoist repression against political enemies and people who simply did not agree with them as "class struggle" against counterrevolutionaries, this tenet was also a theoretical substantiation for army participation in the domestic political struggle, for using the PLA as a punitive body.

The army had never been unified in its attitude toward the policies of the ruling Maoist clique. Discontent among servicemen with the consequences of the "great leap" and "communization" became very widespread in the late 1950's and early 1960's. 16 These attitudes were revealed most strikingly in the Maoist-fabricated "case of Peng Tieh-hua," a man who came out openly against the adventurism of the "great helmsman" in politics. Struggling to restore their shaky position in society, therefore, Mao Tse-tung and his followers in the early 1960's decided to consolidate their strength in the army first of all in order to use it in their plans later. With this objective a massive ideological offensive against the PLA was begun and helped turn it into a tool of the Mao Tse-tung group. 17

The Maoists undertook a new attempt to impose army methods of work and life on all Chinese society in 1964. But this time they did not impose their socioeconomic ideas by direct administrative compulsion, which had failed in 1958-1960; they began preliminary ideological preparation. The lead article in JEN-MIN JIH-PAO onl February 1964, calling on the entire country to learn from the PLA, said that the first thing that should be taken should be the "priceless experience of political work in the PLA, ... whose basic objective was to arm all commanders and soldiers with the ideas of Mao Tse-tung, to act in conformity with the ideas of Mao Tse-tung in all our activities." Party and administrative executives in industry, agriculture, institutions and schools were required to adopt the concrete forms and methods of ideological work in the army.

It was later decided to supplement ideological pressure with organizational measures. In all elements of industry, transportation, foreign trade, the cooperative system, and finances new party executive bodies were to be set up: army-type political departments. This decision was fundamentally at odds with the CPC by-laws, which said nothing about political departments in the civilian sector of the economy. By violating the party by-laws the political departments from the very beginning placed themselves above the local party committee under whose leadership they were supposed to work. Not only did they take over the functions of the party committees in the sphere of ideological work, they "immediately began shifting cadres, replacing and normalizing the administrative apparatus of various institutions" in other words, they purged unsuitable persons.

A large number of servicemen were sent for party political work in the national economy and at institutions during the campaign to "learn from the PLA"; more than 30 percent of all political workers participated. In addition, the civilian institutions and enterprises sent their own cadres for training in appropriate courses in military units. During these years there was also another form of military infiltration of local party and administrative bodies: Between 1963 and 1965 commanders of large military districts became heads of four of the six bureaus of the CPC Central Committee. In many provinces they held the post of secretary of the party committee.

At this time the experience of the Tachai production brigade and the Tach'ing petroleum works was being praised highly. The organization of labor and domestic life in them "on the model of military subunits" in conformity with the slogan of "reliance on one's own powers" and the institution of universal leveling in distribution and other facets of barracks socialism was given out as an example for agriculture and industry. In reality, their activities amounted to implementation of the ideological slogans of the campaign of "learning from the PLA"; this was one of the reasons for which it was begun. This idea was confirmed by JEN-MIN JIH-PAO, which stated that "Tach'ing and Tachai set an example in the movement to 'learn from the PLA.'" The current Chinese leadership, building its policy primarily on the same Maoist principles, openly states that studying the experience and traditions of political work in the PLA and the "ideas of Mao Tse-tung" in the field of military building will make it possible to "create a mighty production army."20

When implanting the ideas of the "great helmsman" in society the Mao Tse-tung group chose young people as one of the first targets of the campaign. In March 1964 at a joint session of the Central Committee of the Chinese Komsomol representatives of city and provincial committees, and workers from the Main Political Directorate of the PLA, a program was developed for ideological indoctrination of young people under the slogan "Raise higher the red banner of the ideas of Mao Tsetung, let everyone learn from the army." Mao's "instructions" on "indoctrinating revolutionary heirs" posed a strategic objective: make young people, without adequate political and life experience, into a force to be used in the struggle against ideological and political enemies and see that young people, who constituted a large majority of servicemen, become propagandists for the "line of Chairman Mao" in the armed forces.

The campaign to "learn from the PLA" played a special role in this training. But during the campaign the Maoists were unable to achieve their main goal of eliminating opposition to their policies in the country and securing for Mao Tse-tung absolute control over the economy and party leadership in the center and the local areas. The campaign to "learn from the PLA" unquestionably promoted the growth of army influence in the domestic political life of the country. But both among young people and in the armed forces those who did not agree with the policies of the Mao Tse-tung group continued to have

influence. This is persuasively confirmed by the first events of the "cultural revolution" where Hsiao Hua, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the PLA, speaking at a meeting on questions of political work in January 1966, stated directly that the outcome of class struggle in the army would "decide the question of whether the gun would rule the party or the party rule the gun."²²

During the "cultural revolution" Mao Tse-tung and his followers used the army for open political struggle against their enemies in the party and state apparatus. Relying on the PLA they destroyed the people's democratic superstructure and established a military-bureaucratic dic-Something else should be noted too: the potatorship in the country. litical regime's reliance on the army helped turn the PLA into a relatively independent force in the country. The military leaders (especially in the military districts)did not always feel themselves bound to be guided by directives from the center. In the first half of the 1970's, therefore, the "left" radical forces especially close to Mao Tse-tung and the so-called "pragmatists" headed by Chou En-lai were united in their desire to limit this military "autonomy" and bolster their control over the army. On the other hand, it must be remembered that socialist tendencies, unhappiness with the armed forces' being taken away from their "professional" duties, and concealed resistance to the anti-people's policy of the Peking leaders in the areas of domestic and foreign policy were partially preserved in the army. These factors must be kept in mind specifically when evaluating the "Lin Piao case" of September 1971, the shuffling of commanders and political commissars of the military districts in December 1973, and a certain weakening of the military position in the central party-administrative apparatus and in the economy.

Although the military representation in the CPC Central Committee of the 10th convocation was somewhat reduced compared to the composition of the Central Committee formed after the 9th CPC Congress, this by no means signified a fundamental change in the army's place in the political system of Maoist China. Mao Tse-tung and his group continued to rely above all on the army. But in his desire to strengthen his regime of personal power Mao tried to curtail the "excess" independence of military figures. He needed the army only as an obedient tool. the 1975 constitution these tendencies were formulated in law. functions of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces were transferred to the chairman of the CPC Central Committee. The constitution characterizes the PLA as a "fighting detachment as well as a working (that is, propaganda - G. M.) and production detachment" and gives the Chinese leadership the right to use the army as a means of suppressing the slightest manifestation of discontent with the existing regime among the people. The army kept its prerogatives as initiator; and catalyst (which had often happened in the past too) of broad political campaigns in the country; such campaigns continue to be a means of monitoring the public and private life of citizens.

The mention of "production detachment" does not refer only or mainly to the army's involvement directly in production (which by itself, to a certain degree, does not arouse objection); rather it envisions army monitoring of the production activities of Chinese workers. This is seen especially graphically in the example of the almost annual compulsory participation of the PLA in spring and autumn field campaigns in the countryside. This is hardly called for by a critical shortage of work force if we consider that 80 percent of the Chinese population lives in rural areas. Even the production-construction corps (about 4 million strong)²³ which are part of the PLA are used not only for economic development of inaccessible border regions; they are also an instrument of Sinization of these regions. In reality they have become camps for labor "reeducation" of educated youth in the spirit of the "ideas of Mao Tse-tung" and an implement to monitor non-Han peoples.

While advancing the objective of "establishing universal order in the country" as a preliminary condition for getting out of their economic difficulties, the Maoist leaders (as can be seen from the materials of the 11th CPC Congress) do not offer the people a positive political program. Under these conditions the role of the apparatus of compulsion, which includes the army, is greater. Thus, in just the last month of 1976 more than 12,000 servicemen were sent from units of the Fuchow Military District to industrial enterprises, the countryside, and institutions and schools to monitor the campaign of criticism of the "gang of four" (Wang Hung-wen, Chan Ch'un-tsao, Chiang Ch'ing, and Yao Wen-yuan). All this leads the PLA to continue losing the features characteristic of a socialist-type army.

Following a great-power hegemonistic policy in relation to neighboring states Peking uses the army to create tension on its borders with India, Burma, Mongolia, and North Korea. In the summer and autumn of 1962 bloody conflicts occurred along the Chinese-Indian border and in 1974 China tried to use armed force to seize the Paracel islands. Separatist elements from India and Burma are carrying out military preparations in Chinese territory. Chinese military advisors trained and armed mercenary bands in Angola. In March 1969, for the first time since 1929, the Chinese mounted armed provocations on the border with the Soviet Union.

As a reflection of the basic line of PRC policy in the international arena even the 1975 constitution gave the external function of the PLA an openly antisocialist, anti-Soviet coloring. This function was defined as "defending our homeland against subversive activities and aggression on the part of imperialism, social imperialism, and their lackeys." Furthermore, the mention of "subversive activities" and "lackeys" without defining what and who are meant is intended to justify any armed provocation against neighboring countries under the pretext of guaranteeing the security of their own country.

Today Peking has gone even further. In the materials of the 11th CPC Congress the task of "struggling" against the USSR is paramount and

the United States is only mentioned later. Maoist policy is becoming especially dangerous today when the strategic objective, turning China into a mighty power and leader in the world arena, is directly linked to the need for rapid and all-encompassing modernization of the armed forces and building up military-economic potential. Hiltary expenditures of 1976 exceeded 40 percent of the state budget. And this is happening while the country continues its rationing system for distribution of food and industrial goods, lacks an integrated public health system, and so on.

In pursuing its campaign of war preparations Peking figures on the understanding and support of the most reactionary circles in the imperialist powers. The rightist forces in the imperialist camp, forgetting the lessons of history, refuse to see the enormous danger for their peoples which lies concealed in Chinese militarism today.

The CPSU and Soviet Government have always done and continue today to do everything possible to see that relations between the USSR and the PRC develop in a spirit of friendship and cooperation, for this is in the interests of the peoples of both countries and the cause of world peace. "We favor normalization of interstate relations with China," said L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in his answers to questions by the editor-in-chief of the Japanese newspaper ASAHI. "The restoration of true good neighbor relations between our countries would be very important not only for the USSR and the PRC, but also to improve the international situation as a whole." 26

FOOTNOTES

- 1. Mao Tse-tung, "Izbrannyye Proizvedniya" [Selected Works], Vol 2, Peking, 1969, p 282 (in Russian).
- 2. JEN-MIN JIH-PAO, 5 February 1977.
- 3. Mao Tse-tung, "The Question of the Correct Resolution of Contradictions Within the People," Peking, 1957, p 8.
- 4. "Istoriya Kitaya s Drevneyshikh Vremen do Nashikh Dney" [Historyof China from Ancient Times to Our Day], Moscow, Nauka, 1974, p 437.
- 5. JEN-MIN JIH-PAO, 30 July 1959.
- 6. The policy of the "three red banners" (1958-1960) pursued the goal of artificially stepping up the rate of economic development of the PRC by renouncing the objective rule of social development and mobilizing vast human resources. It included the "great leap" in industry, people's communes in agriculture, and a new (Maoist) general line.
- 7. Chen, Ch. (ed.), "The Politics of the Chinese Red Army," Stanford, 1966, pp 378-381.

- 8. CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO, 23 June 1961.
- 9. Chen, Ch., op. cit., p 557.
- 10. JEN-MIN JIH-PAO, 28 January 1960.
- 11. "The Political Work System of the Chinese Communist Military," Providence, Rhode Island, 1971, p 54.
- 12. Pringsheim, K. N., "The Conflict in Tibet," in "Contemporary China" edited by E. Stuart Kirby, Hong Kong, Vol 4, pp 81, 83.
- 13. Chen, Ch., op. cit., pp 190, 191.
- 14. Kaptisa, M. S., "KNR: Dva Desyatiletiya Dve Politiki" [The PRC: Two Decades — Two Policies], Moscow, Politizdat, 1969, pp 195-196.
- 15. JEN-MIN JIH-PAO, 31 December 1964.
- 16. See Yur'yev, M. F., "Attitudes in the Chinese People's Liberation Army in Connection with the Failure of the 'Great Leap,'" NARODY AZII I AFRIKI No 6, 1972.
- 17. See VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL No 7, 1976.
- 18. JEN-MIN JIH-PAO, 7 June 1964.
- 19. Ibid., 1 October 1964.
- 20. HUNG CH'I No 6, 1977, p 6.
- 21. Gudoshnikov, L. M., "Politicheskiy Mekhanizm Kitayskoy Narodnoy Respubliki" [The Political Mechanism of the PRC], Moscow, Nauka, 1974, p 113.
- 22. Gittings, J., "The Role of the Chinese Army," London, 1967, p 261.
- 23. "The Military Balance, 1975-1976," London, 1975, p 49.
- 24. HUNG CH'I No 6, 1977, pp 15-16.
- 25. KOMMUNIST No 12, 1977, p 114.
- PRAVDA 7 June 1977.

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CIVIL DEFENSE TRAINING ACTIVITIES

Instructions for Using Dosimeters

Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 77 signed to press 9 Nov 77 p 28

[Article by G. Odzhagov, chief of the Chemical and Radiometric Laboratory of the Azerbaydzhan CD Staff: "Operating Advice"]

[Text] If you want dosimetric instruments to be usable for a long time, the first piece of advice is to learn how to operate them correctly. Improper or negligent operation, the failure to observe the technical maintenance times, and violating the storing and transporting rules inevitably lead to the failure of the instruments or to the faultiness of their readings.

In order to prevent this, don't permit mechanical, electrical and other damage to the instruments. Protect them against blows, shocks and dropping. Carry the instruments only in their carrying boxes (bags or cases), and in transporting them whenever possible carry them in the front of the vehicle, and when taking measurements underway (in the vehicle) hold the instruments on your knees. Try to turn the switches gently, without excessive effort. Do not bend the connecting cable excessively, particularly during use under winter conditions. Otherwise it may break.

After using the radiometers, the cover of the pick-up (probe) should be put in the "G" position. In unplugging the plugs, connections, and caps, make certain they are correctly screwed on.

Strictly observe the procedure for readying the instruments for use. First of all make certain whether the power sources conform to the operating instructions of the given instrument, and whether they are suitable. With the presence of monitoring and check-out equipment (the AVO-5, Ts-55, and others), it is easy to do this, having measured their voltage under a load (with the instrument turned on). It is categorically prohibited to check them "by spark"! Having made certain that the instrument is off and the operating levers are in the extreme lefthand position, you can connect the

power sources, in watching the polarity. In connecting the instrument to the vehicle network, put the switch (plate) or the connector on the battery plate in the position corresponding to the given voltage. Remember that fuses of only those ratings and types are used which are given in the equipment diagram. In no instance should "slivers" and plugs be used in their place.

In the process of taking the measurements, periodically monitor the operating conditions of the instruments. Do not leave them turned on during breaks. As soon as work is over, turn off the instrument, put the operating levers in the extreme lefthand position, and disconnect and remove the power sources. Insulate bare ends of the lead wires.

For protecting the instruments against atmospheric precipitation, dust or other contaminants, it is essential to make certain that they are air tight. Wipe off the instruments regularly, and with increased humidity in addition wipe off the unpainted surfaces with an oily rag. Under conditions of significant dustiness, the articles on which the instruments are placed must also be wiped off.

If the instruments must be put on the ground and there is no specially equipped shelter nearby, place them under boards, dry branches, hay or other available materials.

In operating the instruments under winter conditions, universal or coldresistant cells (batteries) must be used as power sources. Instruments which are brought in from freezing weather into a warm room should be kept for 1.5-2 hours in their boxes (bags or cases), and then carefully wiped off with a dry rag.

Do not put the instruments and batteries near sources of heat or the exhaust pipes of motor vehicles. Pay particular attention to protecting them against long exposure to direct sunrays.

Remember that there should be no malfunctioning instruments at the site. Do everything so that they are constantly ready for use. Routine repairs are carried out directly in technical maintenance. If the instruments require a medium repair or major overhaul, the CD chief of the installation should send them to the repair shops.

Operating documents must be kept without fail for each instrument. These consist of the technical description, operating instructions and a technical service record. For a majority of instruments, the technical description and instructions are together, but for some, for example, the DP-63A, all the instructions have been combined in one document.

The technical description and operating instructions provide a notion of the design and operating principle of the instrument, the particular features of its use, preparation for use and execution of measurements, as well as on the technical maintenance and storage rules, and so forth. These instruments should always be in the instrument case. The persons to whom the instruments have been assigned must not make any changes in them.

The technical service record contains information on the technical state of the instrument and the data on its operation. It records to whom the instrument has been assigned, where it has been moved, when an inspection was carried out as well as a technical check and monitoring and testing work.

The person responsible for the instrument each day on a special sheet must account for its use. In repair and testing in a shop, this is done by the repair foreman. The total operating time during the quarter is recorded in the section of the service record "Accounting of Instrument Work in Operation."

The technical service record is filled out in the following manner. Immediately after receiving the instrument at the installation, in a special section (if this does not exist, in the section "For Service Comments") an entry is made of this with the giving of the date. The results of inspections and technical testings are entered in the corresponding sections.

Entries on monitoring, testing and repair work are made directly in the shops or laboratories for the repair and calibrating of dosimetric instruments.

In addition to the listed ones, the coworkers of the laboratory (shop) should fill out other documents as well, for example, the accounting logs for the radiation dose of the personnel; the receipt and delivery of dosimetric instruments for repair (testing); the calibrating of dosimetric instruments from reference points; accounting of the malfunction of dosimetric instruments; accounting and expenditure of radio parts.

The strict carrying out of precautionary measures and the observance of the operating rules will make it possible to extend the service life of the instruments and increase their dependability in use.

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Instructions for Repairing Dosimeters

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[Article by N. Nazarov, military instructor of Secondary School No 5 in Moscow: "...And Repairs"]

[Text] The list of defects which may arise in using dosimetric instruments is usually given in their technical description, in the section "Characteristic Malfunctions and the Methods of Eliminating Them." But what happens if the defect is not mentioned in these descriptions. Should the instrument be sent to the shop? Don't be in a hurry. But all of a sudden is

the damage not so serious and can it be eliminated by your own forces? Such "contact" helps us to better understand the design of the instrument and teach careful handling of it. Certainly the basic reason for the failure of an instrument is incorrect and unskillful operation of it.

What types of malfunctions in the dosimetric instruments are most frequently encountered, and how can they be eliminated?

If, for example, we take the DP-63A radioactivity indicator, it basically fails due to a missing of the contacts which are broken and closed with the "1.5 r/h" and "50 r/h" buttons. The reason is the excessive "energy" in pressing them. Open up the instrument. Using tweezers bend the misshaped plates with the contacts in the required direction. Carefully check the wires running to the switches, and make certain that the buttons are held properly to the front panel. Weakened nuts which hold the buttons should be tightened, and broken wires should be soldered to the appropriate contacts. Close the instrument and check its operation.

The DP-2 roentgenometer. You have turned the instrument on and see that the position of the arrow is not steady. Probably the contact has been broken in the "+" or "-" clamp in the power section. Having opened the instrument, inspect contacts No 32 and No 34. Tighten the nuts which hold the clamps, and resolder the wires which have been broken off these contacts.

In the DP-5A radiometer-roentgenometer, often the breaking of the contact plates in the power compartment is seen due to their comparatively frequent bending (for a better contact) or their corrosion by the electrolyte of the dry cells which have been "forgotten" for a long time in the power compartment.

What should be done? Remove the lid of the power compartment and pull out the panel from the casing. Disconnect the strand of three wires 1-2, 2-2 and 3-2 from contacts 1, 2 and 3 of the casing, and with a hand drill drill out the cap that holds the broken plate to the housing from the side of the power compartment (drill diameter 3.2-3.5 mm). Then using a M3 x 14-15 mm screw, a washer and a nut attach a new plate taken, for example, from a light socket (the central electrode). The screw, washer and nut should be anodized. Now remove the chips from the housing, connect wires 1-2, 2-2 and 3-2 of the strand to contacts 1, 2 and 3 of the housing, replace the panel in the housing and fasten it with screws. Carefully clean any dirt out of the power compartment and clean the contact plates of corrosion. Now it is merely a question of connecting the power sources, closing the power compartment and checking the proper working order of the instrument.

In operating the instrument, there can be excessive play in the handle of the subband switch from excessive force applied to it. In order to eliminate this, it is essential to remove the screw holding the handle to the switch shaft, and inspect the handle and the shaft to see if there are cracks or chips on the handle or whether there is a bevel under the handle

area on the switch shaft. From thin tin plate (a can of instant coffee, and so forth) cut out a piece 2 x 3-4 mm in size, place it in the handle seat and carefully slip the handle on the switch shaft and fasten it with a screw. Make certain the handle and the switch work properly. If the play has not been eliminated, adjust the necessary size of the inset piece.

It may also happen that the subband switch moves around its axis. This means that the nut has become loose. Remove the panel of the instrument from the casing and, in holding the switch on the outside, tighten the nut with a 14-mm wrench. Check the wires running to the switch. Solder broken ones to the appropriate contacts. Then reassemble the instrument and test it.

If a portion of the film of the probe has been damaged, it can be glued, for example, with rubber cement.

The DP-12 radiometer. The most widely found defect is damage to the variable resistors "Anode" and "Heat." Obviously someone has "laid" too heavily on the designated levers. It is easier to replace the broken button. But if there is no replacement, remove the panel from the instrument housing, remove the handle from its shaft, having first unscrewed the check screw. Remove the nut with a 14-mm wrench, take off the steel and rubber gaskets and lower the button inside the instrument. Unscrew the nut of the hollow shaft of the button, and remove the check washers from its shaft. Then remove the button from its housing, pull out the shaft of the button and inspect its contact system.

Usually the movable contact (current collector) is misshaped. Straighten the current collector and assemble the button in reverse order. Solder the wires to the corresponding contacts if they have been broken in disassembly.

Having replaced the button in its former position and having fastened it securely on the panel, slip the handle on the shaft and hold it with the check screw. If everything has been done correctly, the radiometer will work.

On the DP-24 instrument, at times the ZD-5 charger fails due to the fact that the scale light on the DKP-50A dosimeter which is being charged has burned out. For replacing this, remove the panel of the charger from the casing, insert a new bulb, replace the panel and fasten it with screws. If there are no other defects, the instrument will work.

As they say, it is impossible to provide formulas for all instances which may arise, but still the main conclusion can be drawn that if you know the instrument well and can handle it, be confident that it will serve you for a long time and will never fail at the essential moment.

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Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction

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[Article by Col (Res) A. Kostrov: "Weapons of Mass Destruction"]

[Text] The military instructor gives the subject "Characteristics of Weapons of Mass Destruction of the Armies of the Imperialist States" in four lessons (or two 2-hour exercises).

In preparing for the first lesson, he must realize that the physics of the atom and the atomic nucleus will be studied by the students only in tenth grade. For this reason there is no need to examine the structure of the atom, the processes of the nuclear reaction or the design of a nuclear warhead. It is merely essential to give a general understanding of the destructive factors of a nuclear explosion, and concentrate basic attention on relating the possibilities and effectiveness of protective equipment. It is essential to bear in mind that the initial knowledge relating to the destructive factors of nuclear and chemical weapons has already been acquired by the student in the fifth grade, while the skills of using protective equipment have been reinforced in the school CD practical exercises as well as participating in the Zarnitsa [Summer Lightning] and Orlenok [Eaglet] games.

An example of the successful holding of exercises on this subject would be the experience of the military instructor from one of the Moscow schools, V. Ivanikhin.

A week before the exercise he gives the students the assignment to become familiar with the material in the first chapter of the textbook for the secondary school "Grazhdanskaya Oborona" [Civil Defense] (1976 and 1977 editions, pages 10-18), and 2 days later he organizes for them the viewing of the film strip "Weapons of Mass Destruction." For this reason, in the very first lesson he was able to test the knowledge of the students by asking them the questions: What is a nuclear weapon, what are its destructive factors, and a brief description of them? Then he gave the students the task: in analyzing the destructive factors of a nuclear explosion, to show the attenuating action of the existing protective gear. In the course of the talk he uses fragments of the film strip, he summarizes the answers of the students, and draws particular attention to their correct understanding of the questions of protection.

Thus, in examining the action of the shockwave, he gives the following explanation.

The impact of the shockwave is determined by the amount of excess (that is, above the atmospheric) pressure and the speed of the air in its front. When the shockwave encounters an obstacle which protrudes above the surface of the earth, a so-called backpressure arises and this significantly exceeds

the pressure in the front of the shockwave. Buildings, particularly multistory ones, with an overpressure of 0.2 kg per cm² will be subjected to medium destruction, and the persons inside of them can sustain various injuries. At the same time a person who was in open space, with such a presure, as a rule, would not sustain debilitating injury, if he used the protective properties of the terrain or had been able to lie flat on the ground. For this reason, upon the "Air Alert" signal, it is recommended in any instance to immediately leave the building and take shelter in a protective structure or terrain depressions.

If it is considered that with an air explosion a distance equal to R is safe for an unprotected person, then persons who are in an open slot trench will not be injured even at a distance of two-thirds R from the explosion epicenter. A covered trench reduces the casualty radius by double, while a shelter protects prople even if they are near the epicenter.

The students with the help of the instructor draw the conclusion that the best means of defense, of course, is a shelter, but one must not avoid a simple shelter in the form of an open or covered slot trench, and so forth.

At the lesson they also discuss the ability of the shockwave to "roll through" interior spaces through windows, doors and various openings. To avoid this, the shelter entrances are covered with strong airtight safety doors, while the entrances to the slot trenches and radiation shelters are at a right angle, and the shelters themselves have offset angles.

Then during questioning the students described the next destructive factor of a nuclear explosion, light radiation. In persons who are outside of shelters it can cause burns and temporary blinding for 5-30 minutes. Vision gradually returns. The light does not penetrate through nontransparent materials, and for this reason any obstacle which creates a shadow to a certain degree provides protection against the direct impact of light radiation and burns. But in order to prevent mass fires, it is essential to promptly carry out protective fire prevention measures. The military instructor briefly lists precisely which ones they are.

In analyzing the third destructive factor of penetrating radiation, the students note that its impact is weakened in passing through any medium. They discussed the concept of the "half-value layer" which various substances possess. This is a layer the passing through of which attenuates the intensity of gamma rays by one-half.

The students were given the homework assignment of determining by how many times the dose of penetrating radiation would be reduced by a covered slot trench with a layer of dirt 30, 50 and 70 cm thick.

In examining the concept of the "radioactive contamination of the terrain," the instructor went through with the students a number of distinguishing features of this destructive factor: The broad area of contamination (the

length of the zone along the trail of the cloud of hundreds of kilometers, and a width of scores; the duration of action up to several weeks); the difficulty of detection (radioactive substances have no color, odor or taste, and contamination can be detected only by using dosimetric instruments).

Having pointed out that the radioactive substances have an injurious action by external irradiating or in falling on the skin or being taken into the organism (through the respiratory organs or gastrointestinal tract), in causing radiation sickness, the military instructor stressed that external irradiation is the most dangerous. For this reason, on terrain contaminated by radioactive substances it is essential to take shelter immediately and use the individual protective equipment for the respiratory organs and the skin, as well as the special medical preparations.

The military instructor must particularly take up the characteristics of the neutron weapons being developed in the United States and evoking indignation and an angry protest in all sanely thinking people of the earth. It is essential to give a political evaluation to this barbarous venture of the imperialists. In going beyond the subject of the lesson, let us describe this in somewhat greater detail.

As KRASNAYA ZVEZDA wrote on 7 September 1977, in the spring of 1963 the Americans tested underground the first version of a neutron charge, and in subsequent years the pentagon in deep secrecy improved the neutron-type nuclear charges. What is the particular feature of them?

Depending upon the design of the charge, its power and the conditions under which the explosion is carried out, the role of the shockwave, light radiation, penetrating radiation and radioactive contamination and hence the nature of the destruction can vary. The purpose of a neutron-type nuclear charge is to redistribute the relationship of the destructive factors in favor of penetrating radiation, and more accurately the neutron flux. How is this to be achieved?

A reaction of thermonuclear synthesis is the most powerful source of neutrons. In comparison, for example, with the reaction of the splitting of the uranium or plutonium nucleus used in atomic charges, with the fusion of the hydrogen atoms of deuterium and tritium, with the formation of a helium atom, there is the releasing of many times more neutrons which are electrically uncharged elementary particles. If a thermonuclear charge is designed the power of which would be equivalent to the detonating of just several score or hundreds of kilograms of conventional explosives, the penetrating radiation, basically neutron radiation, would become the main destructive factor.

The foreign press has asserted that American specialists have succeeded in building a similar charge for arming the warheads of the Lance tactical missiles (range up to 120 km). It has also been stated that the United States is testing neutron charges for artillery ammunition.

With the explosion of a neutron charge, there is a characteristic mushroom-shaped cloud. The shockwave and light radiation cause solid destruction over an area with a radius of 200-300 m. Outside of this zone, the buildings, other structures, combat vehicles and so forth remain undamaged. However, the invisible neutrons which possess an enormous kinetic energy are spread further, in easily penetrating through armor and steel helmets, through clothing and brick walls. In entering the human organism, they rupture the molecular bonds in the cells.

The dose of neutron radiation which arises, according to the data of the American press, at a range of 800 m from the point of explosion "of the neutron warhead for the Lance missile almost immediately deprives the human organism of viability." At a distance of 1,400 m from the epicenter of an explosion made at an altitude of 130 m, the radiation dose is reduced by 20-fold. However, here, as the foreign specialists have proposed, one-half of the casualties will perish within a month.

Due to the great penetrating capacity of the neutrons, protective structures, as foreign specialists have stressed, require a great deal of expenditures. For example, concrete walls a half meter thick absorb 90 percent of the neutrons. Multilayered combined materials from plastics are more effective. Thus, it has been announced that Austrian specialists have developed a material a layer of which just 2 cm thick passes not more than 1,000th of the neutrons hitting it.

The military instructor commences the second lesson with an analysis of the homework assignment. Then he gives a definition of a nuclear strike area. In describing the zones of destruction, he pays particular attention to the degree of destruction caused to above-ground buildings and protective structures. In drawing on the blackboard a diagram of the zones of complete and heavy destruction which are most dangerous for the unprotected population, using calculations he shows that these zones comprise only 24 percent of the total area of the strike zone, including around 12 percent of the zone of total destruction. And here if the people are sheltered in reliable shelter structures, they can sustain only insignificant injuries.

The military instructor also took up the role of rescue work in the strike area. He points out that the nonmilitarized formations and all the ablebodied population should be ready to carry out this work and provide medical aid to oneself and to others.

Then he acquaints the students with the characteristics of the zones of radioactive contamination of the terrain. He described the radiation zone, the radiation levels, and the units of measuring them, and here draws attention to the fact that the radiation levels drop by approximately 10-fold with every 7-fold increase in time. The military instructor demonstrates a calculation of the decline in the radiation level. The population, he explains, in order not to sustain injury should be in shelters in a zone of moderate contamination from several hours to a day, and in zones of

heavy and dangerous contamination, up to 5 and more days, observing the appropriate conduct and protective measures in leaving the shelter.

The radioactive substances fall out on the terrain not all at once, but rather as the cloud moves. The time of their fallout in each given point depends upon the wind speed. And again the problem is asked: to calculate when the fallout of radioactive substances will commence in a population point 400 km away from the place of the explosion, with an average wind velocity of 50 km per hour? How much time will the residents of the given point have for taking protective measures?

At the end of the lesson, the students received a homework assignment of repeating the material from the section "Characteristics of a Chemical Strike Area" using the textbook (pages 16-22).

In the third lesson (the second 2-hour exercise), in using posters and individual frames of the film strip, the instructor described the types of poisons used by the armies of the imperialist states, and the ways they penetrate the human organism, having given basic attention to the neuroparalytic and skin-blistering toxins. He again drew the students' attention to the fact that a gas mask provides reliable protection against all toxins, but a respirator and gauze-fabric mask do not. For protection against the neuroparalytic and skin-blistering toxins, in addition to a gas mask, it is essential to use devices which protect the skin. He stressed that one must not use food and water which have been in the zone of contamination. One must not remain without protective equipment in those shelters which are not equipped with filter ventilating units. And since it is impossible to establish the type of toxin at the moment of using chemical weapons, it is always essential to have ready protective gear for the respiratory organs and the skin as well as the medical preparations from the individual first aid kit.

In using a diagram which was drawn before the lesson on the classroom blackboard, the military instructor explained that the entire territory of the strike zone can be divided conditionally into two parts: the zone of the direct use of chemical weapons and the zone where the toxic vapors and aerosols spread. The first zone is formed at the moment of the detonation of the chemical ammunition or the dropping of toxins from the spraying aviation devices). The second is formed from the primary cloud of toxic vapors and aerosols, and this cloud moves with the wind and can afflict people at a distance of 15-20 km from the place of its formation. A portion of the toxins, having settled on the terrain in the form of drops in the area where the weapon was used, in evaporating, forms a secondary cloud. In moving with the wind, it contaminates the air to a depth of several kilometers, and maintains the ability to injure unprotected persons during the entire period of the evaporation of the toxin from the contaminated area. For this reason the people who are down wind even a significant distance from the region the toxin was used, should utilize protective equipment for the respiratory organs and the skin.

At the end of the lesson, the instructor briefly described how the methods of use and the types of toxin, the meteorological conditions and the terrain influence the character and the sizes of the chemical strike zone.

The concluding fourth lesson is started by the military instructor by giving definitions of "bacteriological (biological) weapon" and "area of bacteriological contamination." The injury occurs as a result of breathing in contaminated air, the falling of microbes or toxins on damaged skin or mucous membranes, by the consumption of contaminated food and water, by bites of contaminated insects, or by immediate contact with sick persons (animals).

Bacterial weapons possess a high injurious capacity. It is difficult to detect them immediately, and consequently, to rapidly establish the diagnosis. They cause mass illnesses in people and animals, and maintain their injurious properties for a long period of time.

But regardless of all the complications, there are means (methods) for protecting the population, including: Vaccine and serum preparations, antibiotics, sulfanilamides and other medicines used for special and emergency prevention of infectious diseases; collective and individual protective gear; chemicals used for decontamination, insect and rodent control.

In order to prevent the spread of infectious diseases, a group of antiepidemic measures is carried out, including: Emergency prophylaxis; observation and quarantine; personal cleansing of the population; disinfection
of various installations contaminated by bacterial agents, and when necessary, insect and rodent control. In the course of the narration, the instructor analyzed these concepts. He particularly focused attention on
the fact that if the entire complex of antiepidemic and hygienic measures
is carried out promptly with the active participation of the population,
it is possible to prevent an epidemic.

In summing up the material studied on the subject, the military instructor stresses that we possess everything necessary to protect the people. It is merely a question of they themselves being able to use all the available equipment.

Possibly the ninth graders should be asked questions on the most recent types of weapons and delivery systems, ethnic weapons, cruise missiles and the B-1 bombers. For this reason we recommend that the military instructor acquaint himself with the corresponding articles in the journal VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA for 1976 and 1977.

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Tadzhik CD Conference

Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 77 signed to press 9 Nov 77 p 22

/Text/ In Dushanbe a conference of our readers has been held. workers of the CD staffs, the military instructors of the schools and the DOSAAF activists participated in discussing the report on the work of the journal and the 1978 plans as described by the representative of the editors. The speakers included: Comrades Pan, a worker from the republic CD staff, Vol'fman, an instructor from the republic CD courses, Burlakov, the deputy CD chief of staff for Dushanbe, Smirnov, the CD chief of staff of Kuybyshevskiy Rayon, the military instructors of the GPTU [State Vocational-Technical School] No 31, Luk'yanchikov, Secondary School No 35, Shlykov, the medical school, Kifer, and Ivashchenko, chairman of the Zheleznodorozhnyy Rayon DOSAAF Committee in Dushanbe. They unanimously voiced the opinion that the journal VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA is a good assistant to our readers in their work. At the same time proposals were made aimed at expanding the subjects covered by the journal. In particular, the speakers proposed that more procedural materials be published to help the military instructors of the CD courses, on the heroism of the local air defenses and CD at present, to describe more thoroughly the methods for organizing the socialist competition, telling about the equipment and weapons of the NATO countries, on Soviet military equipment, and so forth. The readers proposed that the journal publish more on the Army and Navy veterans, on the CD and DOSAAF activists and the best military instructors. The editors will consider many of the proposals made in their work. results of the conference were summed up by the deputy CD chief of staff of Tadzhikistan, Maj Gen D. Artamonov.

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Kiev Kommunist Plant CD Days

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/Article by A. Bogemskiy/

Text Days have become traditional at the collective of the Kiev Kommunist Plant. As a rule, they are timed to the summing up of the results of the training year. In the present jubilee year, the CD Day was held in a particular holiday mood. Training was successfully concluded by the nonmilitarized formations under the command of V. Kupchenko, P. Banevich, V. Vulyar, V. Sadov and Yu. Lukashenko. All the employees passed the standards in the training groups for the 20-hour program. The medical team, the reconnaissance group, the radio team and the firefighting and decontamination crews participated in the rayon contests. All of this was described by the general director of the association G. Lar'kov and the CD chief of staff A. Vasil'yev in radio broadcasts and articles published in the factory newspaper on the CD Day.

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Plant CD Lectures

Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 77 signed to press 9 Nov 77 p 27

Article by A. Denim CD chief of staff at the mill, Tashkentskaya Oblast

/Text/ Movie lectures on CD subjects are constantly given at the Obuvshchik /Cobbler/ Club. These are organized upon a decision of the party bureau of the Chirchik Footwear Mill, and are an important form for propagandizing CD among the population

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Tula CD Seminar

Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 77 signed to press 9 Nov 77 p 29

Article by N. Seliverstov, instructor of the CD course at the Tula Polytechnical Institute, Tula 7

/Text/ A seminar for instructors of the CD courses of the RSFSR VUZ's in mining specialties was held at the Tula Polytechnical Institute. The participants arrived from all corners of Russia. They listened to lectures by skilled specialists, they exchanged experience on training procedures and participated in practical exercises. Diverse questions were discussed such as: Adapting underground works for the protection of the population; electric and water supply systems in mines; combating fires and consequences of natural calamities and production emergencies at installations of the mining industry, and so forth. Experience in educational procedures was exchanged by the chiefs of the CD courses of the Leningrad Mining Institute, the Tomsk, Tula and Perm' polytechnical institutes, and instructors from the Voronezh State University. The seminar participants visited the Pripuskaya mine, where they were acquainted with the documents of the mine CD plan. The mine rescue detachment demonstrated for them the procedures and equipment for extinguishing fires, for rescue work, and the methods of providing aid to casualties. The instructor V. Kanunnikov conducted a practical exercise with the seminar participants on the subject: "The Organization and Procedure of Group Exercises With Students for Rescuing People From Underground Works. The Interaction of the Composite CD Team of the Installation With the Mine Rescue Subunit." Participating in the work of the seminar were representatives from the RSFSR Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education. A decision was taken to publish the materials of the seminar conference as a separate collection.

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Comprehensive CD Exercise

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/Article by P. Morozov, Artem, Primorskiy Kray/

Text Comprehensive exercises were conducted with a group of installations in the system of the Artem Dining Room Trust under the leadership of the director V. Iaksenko. In the course of them, movable meal points were deployed with the preparation of hot food. According to the results of carrying out last year's training plan, dining rooms No 24 (director, outstanding CD man G. Mikheyeva), No 7 (director V. Kumykov), and No 21 (director S. Alyab'yev) showed their best. They all received Honorary Diplomas. At present the new training year has been commenced in an organized manner at all the facilities.

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DOSAAF TRAINING ACTIVITIES IN ARMENIAN SSR

Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian 5 Jan 78 p 4

[Article by Twice Hero of the Soviet Union Lt Gen A. Shilin, deputy chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee: "A School of Patriotism"]

[Text] Our Leninist Party and Soviet Government strive persistently to eliminate war from the lives of nations. The halting of the arms race and a transition to disarmament, and the struggle to make the process of detente universal and irreversible are now of paramount importance.

Our state's policy of peace is fully reflected in the new Constitution of the USSR. War propaganda is now forbidden by law in our nation.

Defense of the socialist homeland is insured by the state. The new Constitution of the USSR states: "Defense of the socialist homeland is among the most important functions of the state and is the concern of all the people. The Armed Forces of the USSR were created and compulsory military service established for purposes of defending the achievements of socialism, the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state."

DOSAAF is a reliable assistant and reserve for the Army and Navy. The defense Society, together with the trade unions and Komsomol, has acquired extensive experience in the military-patriotic and international indoctrination of the masses under the direction of party organizations. Tours by the youth of sites of revolutionary, combat and labor glory of the Soviet people took on broad new scope on the eve of the 60th anniversary of the Armed Forces. Tens of thousands of boys and girls took part in the "Zarnitsa" and "Orlenok" games in the Armenian SSR alone. Nearly 90 percent of the Republic's adult population are presently DOSAAF members.

"In accordance with the goals and tasks involved in the building of communism" Article 51 of the draft new Constitution states, "Citizens of the USSR have the right to join together to form public organizations contributing to the development of political activeness and individual activities and to the development of their manifold interests."

The work of the defense Society, USSR DOSAAF, is brilliant confirmation of the viability and correctness of this provision. In the half century it has been in existence the defense Society has become a genuinely mass defense patriotic organization. Its membership has increased to 80 million. USSR DOSAAF is making a manifest contribution to the accomplishment of many important public and state tasks.

Preparation of the youth for military service and provision of the military units [chasti] and fighting ships with ideologically tempered and technically competent replacements occupies an important place in the defense Society's work. Armenia's DOSAAF Central Committee devotes its main attention to these matters. An excellent material and technical base has been created in the Republic for training future fighters. The Yerevan Model Motor Vehicle School, the motor vehicle school in the city of Kamo, the Yerevan Technical School, and a number of other training organizations of the Republic's DOSAAF stand out especially for their modern technical equipment.

As they carry out their military-patriotic propaganda work, local DOSAAF organizations must always stress the fact that the school of life which our nation's youth attend during their years of military service has been and remains a school of indoctrination in the spirit of love for the Soviet homeland, patriotism and internationalism. The Republic defense Society occupies a leading place in the nation with respect to the level of mass defense work and the training of specialists for the Armed Forces and the national economy.

In their talks with draftees, workers on all levels in the defense Society and DOSAAF activists must always stress the fact that as he dons the military uniform for 2 or 3 years the young worker, kolkhoz worker, employee or student is not parting with a single one of the civil rights guaranteed him by the Constitution of the USSR. Service in the army or navy is an honored duty, and the individual who has the honor of guarding the peaceful, creative work of the people enjoys special respect and love in the Soviet society.

Personnel of the Soviet Army live the same full life as that enjoyed by all the other workers. Like all citizens of the USSR, the Soviet soldier, upon reaching the age of 18, takes part in elections of state organs and may himself be elected to local agencies of state authority and to the Supreme Soviets of Union and autonomous republics, and upon reaching the age of 23 — — to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

The Constitution of the USSR advances the task of creating the material and technical base for communism as one of the main tasks of the state. Its accomplishment depends first of all on the training of highly skilled cadres for the national economy. DOSAAF plays an important role in this responsible work. Thousands of technical specialists were trained in the DOSAAF system during the period between the 7th and 8th congresses of the defense Society: motor vehicle drivers, mechanics, electricians, radio operators and naval specialists, who annually join the labor collectives of enterprises and construction organizations, kolkhozes and sovkhozes. The Society's organizations have trained around 3 million machine operators for agriculture.

Organizations of Armenia's defense Society are making a certain contribution to this work of state importance. Thousands of primary DOSAAF organizations have been created at industrial enterprises, on sovkhozes and kolkhozes, in educational institutions and establishments. They trained around 23,500 specialists for the national economy in the anniversary year. Schools, technical—sports clubs, and training courses of the Armenian SSR DOSAAF have become actively involved in the system of universal technical education.

Our task is one of further perfecting this work and improving the work of groups and courses, laboratories and public design offices.

Our Soviet society - - a society of patriotic and internationalist workers with a high level of organization, principle and awareness - - requires that DOSAAF committees and primary organizations constantly improve the selection, placement and indoctrination of cadres, evaluate their work according to the real state of affairs, strive for absolute fulfillment of decisions adopted, and develop in both the Society's leaders and its rank-and-file membership the ability to think and act in a Leninist manner and with state interests in mind in all matters, even the smallest.

Article 25 of the Constitution of the USSR points out that a unified public education system exists and is being improved in our nation, which serves the cause of communist indoctrination and spiritual and physical development of the youth, and their preparation for work and public activities. It is gratifying to see that the defense Society is making an enormous contribution to the accomplishment of this task. Tens of millions of people presently participate in the sections and technical sports clubs of DOSAAF. We must further expand the ranks of defense Society sportsmen and work to secure the leading international position of Soviet athletes. Armenia's DOSAAF organizations have achieved a great deal in this respect.

Inspired by the provisions of the new Constitution and the concepts contained in the reports and speeches of Comrade Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, members of the Republic's defense Society, like those of the entire nation, will continue to develop and improve their work persistently and to struggle actively to implement the historic decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress.

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